Common property rights and indigenous fishing practices in the inland openwater fisheries of Bangladesh: the case of the Koibortta fishing community of Kishoregonj by Rashid, Saifur







Common Property Rights and Indigenous Fishing Knowledge in the 
Inland Openwater Fisheries of Bangladesh: The Case of the 













This thesis is presented as part of the requirements for the award of the Degree of 
















This thesis contains no material, which has been accepted for the award of any other 
degree or diploma in any university. 
 
 
To the best of my knowledge and belief this thesis contains no material previously 







     -------------------------------------------------------- 















Bangladesh contains one of the richest and largest inland fisheries in South Asia and 
the third highest inland capture fisheries in the world and has a long history, which 
continues to the present, of conflict and cooperation between fishers and other diverse 
fishing interests over access to a range of fishing environments managed under a 
variety of leasing and tenurial arrangements. Several fishing communities are of 
ancient origin and over a long period of time have developed and adapted their 
indigenous fishing knowledge, including technologies, fishing practices and 
knowledge of diverse fishing environments to manage fisheries in a variety of 
environmental and ecological conditions.  
This thesis provides a detailed ethnographic account of one such community, the 
Koibortta fishers of Krishnapur village in the northeast flood plain region of 
Bangladesh, focusing on their management practices and indigenous fishing 
knowledge in selected inland common property fisheries.  It examines, using 
documentary and oral historical sources, the ways in which they have adapted aspects 
of their indigenous fishing knowledge to changing economic and environmental 
circumstances over the past 50 years. It also examines, using case studies of three 
water bodies, how they were able to gain short-term and insecure access to selected 
water bodies, partly by drawing on traditional social networks at village and multi-
village levels to mobilise fishers in negotiations with leaseholders. The thesis argues 
that these social networks and fishers’ capacity to adapt aspects of their fishing 
knowledge to new circumstances were insufficient to gain long term, secure and 
direct access to productive water bodies as fishers lacked strong government 
commitment to their long term security. The thesis concludes with a discussion of the 
capacity of Krishnapur fishers to manage fish resources equitably and sustainably.  
 iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
In the completion of my thesis I have come across many people who have extended 
their cooperation, and shown their patience and generosity, without which the study 
would have been impossible. I would like to offer my thanks and gratitude for their 
sincere efforts. I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of a number of 
governmental and other institutions. This research was substantially assisted by a 
fellowship from the South Asia Program of the Social Science Research Council with 
funds provided by the Ford Foundation. In addition, the Curtin Postgraduate Alumni 
Association provided a scholarship with a small grant to support my study. Working 
as research assistant with one of the ARC large scheme research project conducted by 
Dr. Bob Pokrant, provided me substantial financial support in undertaking my own 
research work. As an affiliated research fellow of the South Asia Research Unit 
(SARU) of Curtin University, I have been given some logistic and financial support in 
attending conferences and using its collected South Asia materials. During my 
fieldwork, I have sought advice and assistance of many persons and have drawn on 
the resources of numerous institutions, which helped me to bring the study to fruition. 
I am greatly indebted to my supervisor, Associate Professor Dr. Bob Pokrant for his 
constant intellectual and moral support and his considerable patience in guiding me so 
skilfully. He has the rare quality of being able supervise without imposing his own 
thoughts. I owe him much for his encouragement in writing my thesis and continuous 
editing effort in finishing my thesis on time.   
I owe my greatest debt to the people of Krishnapur (pseudonym), who readily 
accepted me into their lives, opened their homes to me and were always willing to 
answer my puzzling questions about the obvious. I remember their friendship and 
miss their presence everyday. 
The study would have been impossible without the active and enthusiastic 
cooperation of the countless number of fishers of Krishnapur and its environs who 
answered my every question; to them I offer my deepest thanks. My warmest thanks 
go to the Koibortta people, who received me into their homes as if I was a member of 
their family. 
 v 
Thanks are also due to my local assistants, who helped me with the census and carried 
out interviews during the fieldwork. 
I am indebted to many other people for their advice and encouragement during the 
course of my research. Professor Peter Reeves (National University of Singapore) and 
Professor John McGuire (Director, South Asia Research Unit at Curtin) provided 
invaluable guidance and support in many ways while I was undertaking my research. 
Dr. Andrea Schatral of the School of Environmental Biology at Curtin and Douglas 
Hill, a colleague of mine from SARU provided penetrating suggestion on various 
theoretical and methodological issues, read parts of the draft manuscripts, and 
suggested ways of organizing my thesis. Others to whom I owe a debt of gratitude for 
giving me the benefit of their knowledge and experience include Advocate Islam Ali 
of National Fishermen’s Association of Bangladesh, Dwijen Mallick, a senior 
Research Fellow of the Bangladesh Centre for Advance Studies (BCAS), Dr. Zahurul 
Islam of the Department of Spatial Science at Curtin and my colleagues in the 
Department of Anthropology at the University of Dhaka. 
On a more personal note, I thank my wife and two children. My research and the 
dissertation could not have been done without their dedication and love. 
I have a lasting debt to my father and parents-in-laws, who have always supported my 
studies relentlessly, even though they knew that encouragement would inevitably 











GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS 
Glossary of Bengali terms 
Acre: 100 decimal (Eksho shotok) and 2.5 acres is equal to 1 hactre 
Asraf: Upper class (of Urdu origin derived from the Arabic ‘Sharif to denote 
nobleman or aristocrat) 
Atraf: Lower class (of Urdu origin) 
Arotdar: Fish wholesale commission agent/ Fish Trader 
Arot: Fish landing and wholesale trading place 
Baor: Oxbow lake 
Balumohol: Sand belt 
Bari: House 
Beel: Lake, a deeper area or pocket where water remains throughout the year or for a 
longer period. 
Bepari: Fish trader, who buys fish from the fishers and sells to paikar through arotdar 
Bhati Anchal: Wetland region/ Low- lying area, which goes under water during the 
monsoon 
Bideshi: Foreigner 
Borshi: fishing hook 
Boromaach: Big fish 
Chotomaach/ Guramaach: small fish 
Chukti: Contract 
Current Jal: Fine mesh fishing net made of monofilament synthetic fiber (illegal) 
Dak: Auction/ bid 
Dadondar: Moneylender 
Dar-ijaradar: Sub-leaseholder 
Deshi: Native/ local 
Devota: Deities 
Doshok: A social body of ten (dosh) people, generally means ward or village 
committee 
Gotra: Line of descent or lineage 
Ghor: Room 
Gwati: Kin relations who comprise of both members and non-members of a lineage  
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Mohajon: Moneylender. 
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Nouka: Boat 
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Pori-nouka: Security boat 
Puja: Worship 
Somity/ Samity: Association 
Sarkar: Accountant/ Cashier 
Sutki: Fermented fish/ Sun-dried fish 
Shidal: Fermented small fish such as Puntius species 
Sundarbans: Large mangrove forest area in southwest Bangladesh 
Taka: Bangladesh Currency (60tk. =1US$) 
Upazila: Sub-district 
Zamindar/Jomider: Landlord (who holds land). 
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This chapter discusses the main objectives of the thesis, explains the conceptual and 
policy issues that stimulated my research and gives a brief description of the study 
methods, sources of data, fieldwork experience and an outline of each chapter. The 
main objective of the study is to examine the role of common property rights regimes 
and indigenous fishing practices in the management of inland open water fisheries of 
Northeast Bangladesh (Mymensingh & Sylhet) with special reference to the 
Koibortta1 fishing community of the village of Krishnapur, Kishoregonj District, 
Mymensingh Division has the highest inland open water fisheries potential in terms 
of the total Bangladesh inland water fish catch. The inland open water capture 
fisheries of Kishoregonj include a large number of rivers and estuaries, the country’s 
second highest number of beels (hereafter referred to as lakes) and haors (hereafter 
referred to as land depressions) and the largest area of floodplains. According to a 
Department of Fisheries (DOF) 2001 report, Mymensingh contributed about 13.5% 
(100,666 mt) of the nation’s total inland water catch (671,900 mt), of which the 
floodplains contributed 73,479 mt, lakes and swamps contributed 18,878 mt and 
rivers and canals and estuaries contributed 8309 mt (Ali, Thompson, Alam & 
Ahmed, 2003).  
The Koibortta of Kishoregonj are the single most important professional Hindu 
fishing community in Bangladesh and to date have not been the subject of detailed 
ethnographic research. The present study fills this gap by providing new insights into 
one community of Koibortta inland fishers. In particular, it provides detailed 
ethnographic materials on the property rights, management of fisheries resources, 
organization of fishing and indigenous fishing practices.   
1.2.Geographical and historical background 
Bangladesh is geographically located between 24 00 N and 90 00 E and is situated in 
the region of South Asia bordering the Bay of Bengal between Burma and India (See 
 2 
Figure-1 & 2). The country is a huge low-lying riverine land traversed by the many 
branches and tributaries of the Ganges and Brahmaputra Rivers. Most of the country 
is situated on deltas of large rivers flowing from the Himalayas: the Ganges unites 
with the Jamuna (main channel of the Brahmaputra) and later joins the Meghna to 
eventually empty into the Bay of Bengal. Tropical monsoons and frequent floods and 
cyclones inflict heavy damage in the delta region. The total area of the country is 
144,000sq km, of which 133,910 sq km is land area, and the remaining 10,090 sq km 
is water area (CIA, 2004). 
The country contains one of the richest and largest inland fisheries in South Asia. 
About 34 percent of the country’s land area is under water almost six months each 
year. It has extensive river systems as well as productive coastal and marine fishing 
grounds (World Bank, 1998). Today, fish provides 63 percent of the total animal 
protein2 intake of Bangladesh population, and the fisheries sector gives full-time 
employment to 1.2 million people, of which 0.77 million are engaged in inland 
capture fisheries (FAP-6, 1993). As a sector, fisheries plays an important role in 
generating livelihoods and providing fish food for a large number of the Bangladesh 
population and according to the DOF (2002) about 70 percent of its  rural population 
undertake some sort of fishing activities around the year. The fishing industry 
contributes 5.9 percent to the country’s national GDP (BBS, 2001) and 
approximately 6 to 7% of the country’s’ export3 income (Farooque, 1997; 
Nasiruddin, 2001). The main sources of fish are inland open water capture and 
enhanced fisheries on rivers, lakes and land depressions (inland lakes), ponds, coastal 
aquaculture and marine fisheries. Inland fisheries- mainly the floodplains- contributes 
substantially (about 38.7 percent) to the total sector production (Huq, 1998). In the 
past, the major source of fish production was the inland capture fisheries. During the 
1960’s more than 90 percent of Bangladesh’s fish production still came from inland 
























However, during the last three to four decades the contribution of inland capture 
fisheries to total national production has declined. This decline has been partly due to 
increased production from marine fisheries but more importantly to increased 
production in freshwater aquaculture and to over-exploitation of the fisheries and 
other human impacts such as Farakka barrage4 and natural processes affecting 
floodplain resources and wetland environments (Ali et al., 2003).  
The high productivity and potential of Bangladesh’s inland fisheries reflect the 
country’s vast nutrient-rich water areas, its tropical climate and the natural fertility of 
its land (Nasiruddin, 2001; World Bank, 1998). Bangladesh was second only to 
China in regard to the amount of inland capture fisheries production in 1995, and 
third in 2000 after China and India. Of the top ten aquaculture-producing countries in 
the World, Bangladesh is in ninth position. 90% of Bangladeshi fish exports5 are 
shrimp. While fish exports have been rising steadily since 1999, they currently 
account for only 3.3% of total production (Bennet & Mallick, 2002; FAO, 2002). 
Until recently fish and rice formed the mainstay of the diet of Bengali people (except 
for a few tribal non-Bengali people, all Bangladeshis are Bengali), something 
captured in the saying: mache-bhate-Bangali (fish-rice-Bengali).  For centuries fish 
has been central to the diet of Bengalis and nineteenth and early twentieth century 
historical sources show that between 85% and 95% of the Bengali population ate fish 
(Day, 1871; De, 1910; Gupta, 1908). Both Hora and Thapar hold the view that 
historically fish was widely used as food. Hora draws evidence from the Arthasastra 
that fish was relished as an article of diet (Hora, 1948b, p.10) and Thapar talks of fish 
as ‘an important item of diet in Mauryan times’ (Thapar, 1961, p.72). From the 
earliest history of India, fish was not only an important food item with its various 
methods of preparation and uses but also had other significance in the social life and 
cultural practices of Bengalis. In a number of ceremonial and ritual contexts fish was 
used, prohibited or restricted, which Das (1931) referred to as a ‘fish trait-complex’. 
For example, during the period of mourning, abstention from fish, eggs, meat, some 
kinds of pulses and onion was strictly maintained in certain castes (Das, 1931, p. 
287) and there were taboos on eating Hilsa from the ‘…day following Bijaya Dasami 
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day (tenth day of the bright half of the month of Ashwin (Sept-Oct) till the next 
Sripanchami day (fifth day of the bright half of the month of Magh (Jan-Feb)’. Fish 
had significant cultural importance in marriage rituals, funerals (sraddha) and many 
other social and cultural practices in Bengali life. In marriage ceremonies, fish was 
always among the items sent for adhibasa, and included a pair of fishes with scales 
with one larger than the other. In western Bengal, fish, which were painted and coins 
placed inside them were sent for gaye-halud (body turmeric), a part of the marriage 
ceremony of smearing with turmeric paste (Das, 1931, p. 284).  
The rich and diverse nature of the environments in Bangladesh and its location at the 
delta of the three great river systems of the Ganges/ Padma, Jamuna/ Brahmaputtra 
and Meghna enabled a majority of the farming population to engage in fishing some 
time during the year for their subsistence (Allen, 1905; Beveridge, 1876; Buchanan-
Hamilton, 1877; O’Malley, 1908; Sachse, 1917; Pokrant, 1996). The vast floodplains 
have supported a range of natural resource based options to sustain the livelihoods of 
the rural population. 
In present-day Bangladesh, most fish is consumed domestically and forms a vital 
source of food and micronutrients for its population (Alam, 2003). But in recent 
years a growing demand for fish in local and global markets is causing an imbalance 
in resource exploitation and decline in local consumption, especially among the less-
well off. Many fish species such as the larger carp, catfish and hilsha and some 
smaller local species previously eaten by the poor, including many fishers, are now 
too expensive for their own consumption and are increasingly consumed by middle 
and upper class urban and rural populations. In addition, there is a growing overseas 
demand among expatriate Bangladeshis for certain species which has also 
contributed to a rise in their price. Traditional fishing is also experiencing an 
increasing influx of people from other sectors (including farming), despite the risky 
nature of the sector, which is creating greater poverty and vulnerability for 
traditional/ artisanal fishing communities such as the Koibortta. The increasing price 
of fish in local and international markets.combined with intensified fishing activity 
has meant that many fishers are either forced to consume less-valued species or not 
eat fish at all (see chapter five). This is compounded by a lack of alternative 
employment possibilities in the wider economy.  
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Fishing peoples usually live close to rivers, land depressions and oxbow lakes, have a 
low standard of living and fishing is regarded as a low status occupation in the wider 
community. In general, fishing activities are organized on a small-scale basis and 
fishers are linked to the wider economy through an extensive marketing system 
largely controlled by non-fisher middlemen. Fishing people are often the victims of 
floods, storms, cyclones and other natural calamities. In addition, they are politically 
and socially marginalized and economically vulnerable.  
Different forms of property rights and management practices during different 
historical periods have had different impacts on the sustainability, livelihood and 
food security of the fishing community. In pre-British times, the limited evidence 
available suggests that local people including the traditional fishers had customary 
rights to fishing grounds subject to regulation by local rulers and revenue collectors 
(zaminders/ land lords). Prior to the Permanent Settlement Act (PSA) of 1793, fishers 
had to pay very nominal tolls or rent to the Government or even no tolls in some 
areas. After the introduction of the PSA, the former revenue collectors and local 
officials under the Mughals were given private property rights in most water bodies 
on their former tax estates, which effectively removed or seriously reduced common 
property rights in local water bodies. As a result of this privatisation, fishers became 
subject to much greater legal control by the new landowners and were increasingly 
required to pay more regular tolls for the right to fish in areas to which they had 
previously had greater access (Pokrant, Reeves, McGuire, 1996).  
With the abolition of the zamindary system in 1950, the Pakistani Government 
became the owner of most water bodies and started private leasing, a practice that 
continues to the present day. The management of fisheries became the responsibility 
of several Governmental agencies and Ministries based on principles laid down under 
the British and subsequently by several Government Acts during the Pakistan period. 
These included the Fish Protection and Conservation Act of 1951 and the Estate 
Manual Act of 1958. In 1950 the Government decided to lease out access rights 
through auction, but this resulted in wealthy non-fishing people gaining access to the 
rights, and sub-leasing to the fishers continued.  
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After liberation in 1971 fishers’ cooperatives were given sole rights to bid for the 
lease, provided they bid the highest price. However, this was not a foolproof system: 
often unable to bid the highest price, they had to go into partnership with landlords 
who gained control of the lease. For a variety of reasons, in 1985-6 the Ershad 
Government introduced the New Fisheries Management Policy (NFMP) that aimed 
to remove short-term leases; give more control to the fishers and to improve 
management and re-stocking programmes. However, short-term leasing is still 
common in many fishing grounds which has led to the decimation of stocks as 
leaseholders aimed to maximise profits during the short time available (Bennet & 
Mallick, 2002).  
At present, a range of Government agencies are involved in fisheries management, 
which has resulted in unclear lines of authority and some conflicts over management 
objectives and appropriate practices (Rahman, 1989). Since the 1980s there have 
been attempts by fisher groups, sometimes under the leadership of the National 
Fishermen Association, to increase their control and management of selected fishing 
areas. However, these have not been very successful and fishers remain largely 
subordinate to the interests of private leaseholders, state officials, traders and a few 
wealthy fishers. 
1.3.Main research question  
There is a growing body of international research on the problems facing marine and 
inland small-scale fishers caused by, inter alia, large-scale commercial fishing, land 
and water degradation, increased population pressure, new forms of property rights 
and greater control of fishing resources by non-fisher interests. However, there has 
been little scholarly, particularly anthropological research on inland open capture 
fisheries in Bangladesh. This thesis examines the ways in which one group of inland 
fishers in Bangladesh, the Koibortta fishers of Krishnapur village, have adapted to 
changes in legal access to traditional fish resources and water bodies brought about 
by post-1950 state-directed policies which have shifted greater legal control of water 
bodies from fishers to non-fishers. It shows how Krishnapur fishers have used their 
local village and wider Koibortta and other fisher kin and non-kin-based networks 
and institutions to protect their fishing interests, have modified their fishing methods 
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and techniques to deal with changing legal, social and ecological circumstances and 
have sought to collectively manage their fishing activities within an essentially 
private leasing system controlled by local and outsider non-fishers such as traders, 
politicians, and business people. It also shows that while Krishnapur fishers have had 
some success in gaining limited access to fishing bodies which has helped them 
ensure a more equitable, if limited, distribution of fishing rights among their 
members, they have been less successful in gaining secure, direct and long-term legal 
control of such bodies, something which they regard as a necessary condition for 
them to manage an equitable, productive and sustainable fishery. 
The study draws on anthropological and other research on property rights and 
indigenous knowledge, together with detailed ethnographically-based materials, to 
show how Krishnapur fishers have taken initiatives, not always successfully, to 
improve their livelihoods. In particular, it shows how fishers have been able to 
negotiate with largely non-fisher leaseholders to obtain limited access to privately 
leased water bodies covering a variety of fishing environments, namely, land 
depressions, lakes and sections of rivers. The discussion is framed within the 
discourse of property rights, particularly common property, and indigenous 
knowledge (IK). Provided here are brief working definitions of these concepts which 
will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters.  
• A property rights regime is a socially organized set of rules, sanctions and 
practices through which a property right is defined, regulated and used, and 
• A common property rights regime is one where rights are shared by the 
members of a group with exclusive access to a resource.  
• Indigenous knowledge is broadly defined as the local knowledge held by 
indigenous peoples or local knowledge unique to a given culture or society. In 
this thesis, it is used to refer particularly to indigenous knowledge of fishing 
and covers fishing practices, beliefs and rituals surrounding those practices 
and the social networks fishers use in gaining access to water bodies.  
1.4.Study unit and location 
The primary unit of study was a traditional Koibortta fishing community located in 
Krishnapur village of Bajitpur Sub-District in Kishoreganj District. In addition, the 
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the village was examined as part of a wider regional network of other Koibartta and 
non-Koibartta fishing communities located mainly in Bajitpur and adjoining sub-
districts. These fishing communities fish in a variety of   fishing environments such 
as land depressions, rivers, ox-bow lakes and ponds.  It is important to note that there 
are no specific fishing places within Krishnapur village itself. All the fishing places 
(locally referred to as Jolmohals) are located around the village and beyond to which 
other local fishing communities also have access.     
1.5.Study methods and materials 
The study used a combination of ethnographic and survey techniques.  Primary data 
were collected through extended participant observation for 12 months in two phases 
from February 2002 to April 2002 and July 2002 to February 2003. During this time, 
the author participated in many village activities and observed the activities of daily 
life (Fetterman, 1998; Herbert, 2000; Hamersley & Atkinson, 1983). Prolonged 
fieldwork and community involvement was necessary for building relationships of 
trust (see figure: 1.3-16).  
.  
 






Figure 1.4: Interviewing fishers 
 
Figure 1.5: The researcher with a fish trader on the river 
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            Figure 1.6: One of the key informants of the study  
A range of qualitative and quantitative data collection methods were used, including 
formal and informal discussion and interviews, systematic observation of fishing and 
fish related activities, case studies of selected farmers and fisher groups, a benchmark 
survey (see appendix 1.1 & 1.2), detailed surveys of fishers and farmers and key 
nformants of different ages and socio-economic background 
Beside primary fieldwork data, the study also drew upon a range of published and 
unpublished scholarly sources, Government and official publications. The author 
used some official data related to national fish production, fish stock, fish catch, 
decline of fish production and fish export. Such sources need to be treated with 
caution as many researchers have questioned their accuracy. Informal discussion with 
former fisheries officials suggest that at times statistics on fish catches and the like 
are altered to serve political purposes. For example, catch statistics may be inflated to 
show that particular development directives have been met. The absence of a good 
system of governance is widely recognised as one of the main reasons for such poor 
statistics.  
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Secondary data were collected from different Bangladeshi Universities, Research 
Institutes, District Fisheries Departments, the Directorate of Fisheries, Bangladesh 
Agriculture University, Bangladesh Agriculture Research Council, National 
Archives, BAFRU Library of the Flood Action Plan (FAP-6 and FAP-20), different 
national and international development agencies/ organizations such as the World 
Bank, UNDP, DFID, ICLARM, IUCN, DANIDA, CARITAS, and various Fishers’ 
Associations.  In addition, the South Asia Research Unit (SARU) at Curtin 
University, Western Australia provided a useful source of data and information on 
fisheries. To gather information and data from secondary sources, a review of various 
fisheries reports, District Gazetteers, books, journals and other published and 
unpublished materials was done. 
1.6.Fieldwork experience 
At the initial stage of my fieldwork, the fishing people of Krishnapur treated the 
author as an outsider. It took several weeks to settle into village life during which 
time the author became familiar with the local Bangla dialect and other social and 
cultural practices. The author dressed in the local style, drank tea with fishers at the 
local tea stall, participated in weddings, Hindu festivals such as puja and Friday 
Jumma prayer for Muslims, ate with both Hindus and Muslim families and lived with 
a Koibartta fishing family. Frequently tea and biscuits, betel leaf and nuts (pan-
supari) were shared and on such occasions there was a great deal of conversation on 
a range of issues. Such free-flowing conversation provided more scope for 
informants to digress and raise issues that they considered important. Often a throw 
away comment by an interviewee would lead to important new information that 
would not have been obtained from more formal survey techniques. Such leads were 
often followed up with other informants to establish the validity of particular issues 
and views. Additional information was collected through informal discussions and 
observations when visiting fishing people while they were fishing in rivers and other 
water bodies, drying and repairing their nets, selling fish on the water or in the fish 
market or sometimes while they were playing cards and gossiping (see figure: 1.7-
1.10). Engaging in such activities were markers of the author’s transition from 
outsider to insider. 
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Being a Bangladeshi who became to some degree an insider (deshi gobeshok) had 
both advantages and disadvantages. In certain respects the author was better equipped 
than a foreign researcher to understand the social world of the village community. 
However, as an urban educated Bangladeshi (shohorer manush/ people from the 
town) the author faced similar problems to those of foreign researchers (Arens & 
Beurden, 1977; Blanchet, 1984; Gardner, 1995; Kotalova (1993), and White, 1992). 
Such researchers have produced excellent ethnographies and it cannot be assumed 
that ’native’ observer possess privileged insights about the lives of the people he/she 
studies (see Ahmed, 2002). Both ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ researchers’ backgrounds, 
education, class origin, gender and race may shape the ethnographic encounter in 
both positive and negative ways. Where the author faced some problems was with 
regard to the minority status of Hindus in Bangladeshi society and the sensitivities 
surrounding questions of land ownership and relationships with Muslim fishers. 
Thus, Koibortta fishers were reluctant to discuss their relations with the wider 
Muslim community and to show land and fishery leasing documents which affected 
their livelihoods and even their right to remain in their homes. 
 
Figure 1.7: The researcher’s home  
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Figure 1.8: The researcher having lunch with a fishing family 
 
 




Figure 1.10: Researcher plying a fishing boat  
1.7.Chapter outline 
Chapter one provides a general discussion of the main focus of the thesis and the 
conceptual and policy issues that stimulated it and gives a brief description of the 
study methods, sources of data, fieldwork experience and encounters. Chapter two 
examines how anthropologists have studied fishing peoples in general and in South 
Asia, particularly Bangladesh. It concentrates on those studies which have examined 
property rights regimes and indigenous knowledge among fishing peoples. It reviews 
and evaluates the international literature on property rights regimes and indigenous 
knowledge pointing out their strengths and their shortcomings and how this study can 
be situated within this literature. 
Chapter three focuses on the role of property rights in inland open water fisheries in 
Bangladesh and elsewhere. It takes up current theoretical and policy debates on 
property rights and fishing practices in the global and Bangladesh context.   
Chapter four describes the ecology and history of the region where the study area is 
located. It first discusses the importance of wetlands to the ecology of the region and 
the threats they are facing. Secondly, it gives a brief history of the development of 
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Koibortta communities who have adapted their way of life to the specific ecological 
and other conditions found in the wetlands region.  
Chapter five provides a description of the main field site selected for the study. It 
introduces the Koibortta fishing peoples of the village of Krishnapur and surrounding 
areas, describing their spatial locations, physical facilities, housing patterns and other 
socio-economic and demographic aspects. Also discussed is the economic structure 
of the village and how agriculture and fishing are organized, food security and 
livelihood strategies of the fishing people, and gendered and other divisions of labour 
in the fishing economy, food habits and fish food consumption patterns. Included is a 
brief discussion of how the growing demand for fresh water fish from overseas 
Bengalis and Bangladeshis is affecting local supplies of fish, people’s protein intake 
and the general food security and livelihoods of the Koibortta.  
Chapter six focuses on Krishnapur fishers’ indigenous knowledge and practices 
related to their fishing environment, fish ecology, stock enhancement, fish habitat, 
fish breeding, fish catching and other fishing activities. The chapter goes on to 
describe their beliefs and ritual practices and the role they play in sustaining fish 
stocks, supplying food for direct consumption, trade and reciprocal domestic 
obligations and contributing to local medical practices.  
Chapter seven includes a general description of Krishnapur and neighbouring fishing 
village fisheries resources, gives a brief history of Krishnapur fishers’ struggle in 
gaining access to the local water bodies, and examines how fishers are able to gain 
some access and organise fishing collectively, despite formal and often exploitative 
control by private leasing interests. It particularly looks at the social networks 
through which fishers organize their fishing activities and share the limited resources 
among themselves and how these networks function within local institutional 
structures of the village and village clusters in the study area. Of particular 
importance are the kinship and other bases of social and local political organization 
which range from kin and community-based institutions such as lineage (gwati-
gusthi), ward committee/village committee (doshok) to multi-village (hajarkee) 
networks. These networks and institutions have distinct local characteristics and play 
important roles in mobilising fishers to deal collectively with, among other things, 
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issues of leasing water bodies, organising fishing activities, and countering what are 
perceived as the unjust and heavy-handed actions of other powerful interests groups 
aimed  at controlling Krishnapur fishers’ access rights to local water bodies.  
Chapter eight summarizes the main findings and concludes with a brief discussion of 
the broad issue of small-scale fishers’ capacity to manage their own water bodies 
equitably and sustainably.
                                                 
Endnote 
 
1 In this thesis I use the word ‘Koibortta’ to refer to the fishing community studied. In most studies in 
which this word is used the spelling varies: kaibartta, kaibarta etc. A more accurate transcription from 
the Bengali is Koibortta. However, when referring to other studies, I will use the spelling found there. 
 
2 Fish is an excellent source of readily digested, high quality animal protein. It is high in lysine and 
essential amino acids. Lysine is more than 10 percent of the protein in fish and only 2.8 percent in rice.  
This makes it particularly suitable for complementing the high carbohydrate diets prevailing among the 
poorer sections of the population in both the developed and developing countries. Fish is the most 
important as a source of protein, although its contribution to energy is also important. However, the 
vital role of fish in nutrition is probably due to its richness in micronutrients that are generally not 
found in staple foods. It is a very important source of pre-formed Vitamin A and Vitamin D, if its oil is 
ingested. Fish also contains thiamine and riboflavin (Vitamin B1 and B2). It is a source of iron, 
prosperous and calcium and other important trace elements. Marine fish is a good source of iodine. 
Fish also contribute fatty acids that are necessary for the proper development of the brain and body. 
Fatty fish is high in polyunsaturated fatty acids, especially omega-3 which is now considered important 
in lowering harmful blood cholesterol levels. The contribution that fish can make to the nutritional 
status of young children and lactating women is particularly significant. Their protein requirements are 
much higher because protein is required for growth. For children, whose stomaachs cannot digest the 
bulk of starchy staples (maize and cassava in particular), incorporation of a small quantity of fish can 
substantially improve the biological value of the diet and contribute to significant improvements in 
nutritional security (FAO, 2004).   
  
3 In 1995-96, total quantity of fish exported increased 147% over the period of 1989-90, which reflects 
an increased availability of fish for export in the country. In terms of volume, value and participation, 
the domestic fish market is large and scattered throughout the country. In recent years, Bangladesh is 
earning a considerable amount of foreign exchange by exporting fish and fish products. Share of fish 
exports, both in terms of quantity and of value, has also increased. During the last decade, the share of 
export earnings from fish and fish products varied from 7% to 13% of total export earnings of 
Bangladesh. In terms of total quantity of export of 'aqua-products', the quantity exported has almost 
doubled since 1988-891 (Rahman, 1995). Due to high domestic and international demand, the prices 
of exportable species have increased significantly (Subasinghe, 2001). Fish species that do not attain 
large sizes are termed chotomaach (finfish/ other fish). The majority of finfish, (according to Rahman 
(1989); there are 260 species of finfish belonging to 55 families are found in the inland open waters of 
Bangladesh, besides 63 species of prawn, several species of crab, tortoise and turtles), belong to this 
category. They are important from the viewpoint of providing nutrition and subsistence and 
supplemental income to the vast majority of the village people including the poor, the landless and the 
destitute.  
 
4.  Bangladesh is a small part of the hydrodynamic system that includes the countries of Bhutan, 
China, India, and Nepal. Bangladesh lies at the receiving end of this hydrodynamic system. The 
Ganges-Brahmaputra delta, of which Bangladesh is a part, has been created by deposition of river-
borne sediments.  In 1974 the Indian Government began to divert the waters of the Ganges through a 
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barrage (dam) at Farakka on the border with Bangladesh.. The barrage, which was built to prevent 
Kolkata’s port from silting, has seriously affected Bangladesh's agriculture, navigation, fisheries, 
forestry, salinity and various other components of the ecosystem. The massive withdrawal of dry 
season Ganges flow by India had a serious impact on every sphere of life in the Ganges dependent area 
of Bangladesh. It imposed massive financial, infrastructural and environmental losses in Bangladesh’s 
agriculture, fisheries, forestry, industry, navigation, water supply, etc. Scarcity of water in the main 
Ganges river course and its distributaries disturbed the flow pattern, velocity turbidity, total dissolved 
solids (TDS) and salinity levels on which fisheries thrive. The Gangetic water system supports over 
200 species of freshwater fish and 18 species of prawns in the area. Fish catches dwindled and 
thousands of fishers were consequently left without jobs. During the post-Farakka years the Ganges 
flow reduction has affected the navigation sector as well. More than 320 km of major and medium 
navigable waterways were rendered inoperative during the dry season, affecting the livelihoods of  
hundreds of boatmen. (Ahmed, 2004). Over the last two decades, Bangladesh has tried unsuccessfully 
to come to some agreement with India and the other co-riparian nations over water sharing 
(Khalequezzaman, 1993, Banglapedia, 2005). 
  
5 . During the last 10 to 15 years, a number of fish processing plants (Sea Mark, Sar & Co, Anraj, 
Kuliarchar fisheries and others) have been exporting fresh water fish (beside shrimp) to the USA, UK, 
Middle East, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Australia, Canada and other places, 






Anthropological approaches to the study of fishing communities, common 
property rights and indigenous knowledge in South Asia 
2.1.Overview 
This chapter examines the anthropological literature on common property rights 
(CPR) and indigenous knowledge (IK) in fishing with particular reference to South 
Asia and Bangladesh. There is a large body of general anthropological and 
sociological literature, which covers a wide range of issues related to fish, fisheries 
and fishing communities but not many on CPR and IK which are based on a 
detailed ethnographic description of fishing communities and their practices. Thus 
the chapter discusses this literature, focusing mainly on the studies of property 
rights regimes and indigenous knowledge among fishing peoples and shows how 
the present study relates to these issues. There are two separate but overlapping 
literatures on CPR and IK, each of which deals with particular themes. These 
include common property resources and their management regimes, property rights 
regimes and access of different interest groups to fisheries resources, debates over 
the tragedy of the commons, exploitation and sustainability of fisheries resources, 
regulatory regimes and management practices in different fishing environments 
(state control, private or collective/community control), role of indigenous 
knowledge and practices in common property fisheries resources management and 
the relations and interactions between property rights regimes and indigenous 
fishing knowledge and practices.  
2.2.Introduction 
Fishing is a means of livelihood and subsistence for many rural and coastal 
communities across the world. It is an ancient occupation dating back to pre-historic 
times (Collins, 1976). As a subject of anthropological interest, Palsson (1991) 
argues that fishers and fishing have been part of the anthropological enterprise since 
the subject emerged with the expansion of Europe overseas from the 15th century 
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on. He points out that Anthropology itself developed through encounters with other 
peoples and cultures associated with lands across uncharted waters. Palsson goes on 
to argue that anthropology, as the study of humanity, is as much the child of 
seafaring as colonialism and references to fish, fishers and fishing are found 
throughout the anthropological literature. Lagoon and deep-sea fishing were central 
to Malinowski’s work on the Trobrianders of Papua New Guinea (1918) and 
Mauss’s (1979) work on the band-organized coastal Inuit of Canada provides an 
early statement of the relation between what Mauss referred to as organic and super 
organic culture. 19th century evolutionists such as Morgan (1928) saw fishing as a 
central element in the development of the human species, describing fishing as a 
form of hunting and gathering.  Others, such as Engels (1942) paid little attention to 
fishing, a circumstance that has given rise to difficulties in Marxist anthropological 
attempts to analyse fishing economies.   
One of the first detailed ethnographically based longitudinal studies of small-scale 
fishers was that of Firth (1941, 1966) who did research among Malay fishermen in 
the 1930s and 1960s.  These seminal works remain classics of economic 
anthropology as they provide closely observed descriptions of fishing practices and 
their transformation over a thirty-year period. Along with this study, there are other 
notable anthropological contributions to the understanding of the history and 
transformation of fishing as well as the comparative study of the differential social, 
cultural and economic impact of commercial and capitalist development on fish, 
capital and labour at various periods and in various places.  Though these accounts 
are not solely devoted to fishing economy and activities, many provide valuable 
information on the material culture of the people concerned. On the other hand, 
there are some studies, which provide descriptions of fishing as part of a broader 
examination of the society in question. The economy of many fishing communities 
shares many of the general characteristics of an agricultural economy but also has 
special features arising from its specific technical conditions. Thus populations 
dependent on fishing may also achieve sedentary life styles, ranging from the small 
settlements of the Andaman Islanders to the substantial villages of certain peoples 
of the American Northeast Coast. Others such as the Nuer of Southern Sudan are 
opportunistic fishers who spearfish during a brief season in years when the Nile 
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floods. They have little in common with the North American Nootka or with 
contemporary Norwegian trawler operators and crews. In some places, fishing 
forms part of a semi-subsistence peasant activity, while in other places it can be 
adequately understood only in relation to the rise of mercantile and industrial 
capitalism where fishers work under conditions similar to agricultural and industrial 
labourers or as commercial and capitalist entrepreneurs. 
Halapua (1982) describes the organization and technical base of production in 
Tonga’s small-scale commercial fisheries and explains that capital investment alone 
is inadequate in promoting fisheries development as it neglects the social 
relationships under which production and distribution are carried out. Acheson’s 
(1981) review of the anthropology of fishing literature shows how fishermen have 
developed a wide variety of norms and institutions to share risk, establish de facto 
property rights over fish, reduce competition, ensure markets, gain access to 
information about the locations of fish stock and so on. 
In the past, the study of fishing and fishing peoples attracted less anthropological 
interest than that devoted to the study of agrarian communities. More recently, 
interest in fisheries has grown (Acheson, 1989; Balland & Platteau, 1996; Berkes et 
al., 1989; Broomley, 1992; Dyer and McGoodwin, 1994; Khnudesen, 1995; McCay 
& Acheson, 1987; McCay & Carolyn, 1990; Pomeroy, 1994; Berkes, 1985; Leal, 
1996 & 1998) and the anthropology of fishing is now an established specialization 
with its own journal Maritime Anthropological Studies (MAST), which has been 
revived recently.  Most of these studies concentrate on the present day organization 
of marine fisheries, including inshore, offshore and estuarine fishing rather than 
inland fishers.  More generally, it remains the case that we know more about fish 
species than about the people who fish.  
2.3.Literature on the fisheries of South Asia 
With regard to South Asia, in 1982 Paul Alexander (1982) noted that the region did 
not have any comprehensive ethnography of a fishing community. This is not 
entirely correct, as a number of descriptive anthropological studies on fishers had 
been undertaken prior to 1982. Since then, the situation has improved somewhat, 
but compared to the work done on South Asian peasant cultivators and tribal 
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communities, anthropologists of South Asia have shown less interest in fishing and 
fisher communities. Among the most important anthropological studies of South 
Asian fishers are those of Dwivedi (1980), Gulati (1981, 1983a), Klausen (1964), 
and Selvaraj (1975) on Keralan fishers, Punekar on the Bombay Koli (1959), 
Bavinck (2001 &1984) on the fishers of Tamil Nadu of India and Sri Lanka, 
Krishna (1990) and Ram (1991) on the Mukkuvar and Pramanik (1993), Mukherjee 
(1968, 1970) and Roychoudhuri (1980) on West Bengali fishers, Hazra (1970) on 
the marine fishers of Gujrat, Suryanarayana (1977) and Razeq (1970) on the marine 
fishers of Andhra Pradesh, and Mukhopadyaya (1968) on the fishermen of the West 
Bengal Sundarban.  Apart from the work of Ram and Bavinck, the remainder 
provide largely descriptive and relatively untheorised accounts of fishing 
communities of India.    
Literary and historical sources provide much information on South Asian fishers, 
particularly in Bengal (Buchanan-Hamilton, 1877; Day, 1871; De, 1910; Gupta, 
1908; Hora, 1948; Saha, 1970). For example, the eminent ichthyologist, Hora 
(1948), has given a detailed account of Hindu views of fish and fisheries. In a series 
of articles published in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal between 
the 1930s and 1950s, Hora examined the question of fish and fisheries in ancient 
India from around 600 B.C. In particular, he analysed references to fish in the 
Ramayana and in Kautilya’s Arthasastra. His articles are full of very useful 
information as to the social, economic and cultural structures of ancient India in so 
far as it relates to fish and fisheries (Pokrant, 1999). In the case of Bengal (which 
until 1947 included what became Bangladesh in 1971), there are several official 
accounts of fishing from the British colonial and early post-colonial periods 
(Buchanan-Hamilton, 1877; Day, 1871; De, 1910). However, none were written by 
trained anthropologists and were carried out to serve the interests of colonial state 
policy. Anthropologists and historians have largely ignored Bengali and 
Bangladeshi fishers, concentrating on peasant communities (Bandyopadhyay, 1990, 
1993; Bandyopadhyay, et al., 1994; Bose, 1986; Guha, 1983; Hartmann and Boyce, 
1983; Pokrant, Reeves and McGuire, 1999; Ray, 1979; Rozario, 1992; van 
Schendel, 1982).  
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2.4.Literature on the fisheries of Bangladesh 
Turning to Bangladesh, despite the fact that it has one of the richest and largest 
inland fisheries in South Asia (World Bank, 1998), which provides the population 
with 63% of its total animal protein intake, gives full-time employment to 1.4 
million people and part-time employment to some 12 million people, contributes 
6.15% to the country’s GDP and some 6-7% of export income (Farooque, 1997; 
Nasiruddin, 2001), there is no long-established tradition of research on the history 
and anthropology of the country’s diverse fishing environments and fishing peoples 
(Feldman, 1982; Jansen, 1987; Jansen, Devnath, & Das, 1985; Skagerstam and 
Brattsrom, 1991; Pramanik, 1993; Raychoudhuri, 1980) and no historical 
ethnographic studies have been done on Bangladesh fishers.  
Much of the fisheries literature in Bangladesh is technical and concentrates on fish 
and fish resources, artificial rearing, fish biology, and fisheries management. Many 
of these studies provide valuable ethnographic descriptions of fishing activities and 
communities but these are usually brief, limited in scope, ahistorical, often based on 
short field trips, difficult to access and subordinate to the broader non-
anthropological objectives of the research (FAP-6, 1993). Broadly the literature 
available on Bengal or Bangladesh fisheries can be divided into two categories: 
historical/administrative and literary. 
Historical and administrative studies are written by some historians and British 
colonial officials (Buchanan-Hamilton (1877), Das (1931, 1932), De (1910), Gupta 
(1908), Hora (1948), Hunter (1877), Jack (1916), O’Malley (1908, 1923), and 
Raychoudhuri (1908). There is also a contemporary literature written between 1947 
and 2003. Included here are Indian studies by Barman (1963), Pramanik (1993), 
Ray (1979), Sanyal (1965), Saha (1970) and Bangladesh studies by Aguero (1989), 
Alam (1998), Alam (2001), Blowfield and Haque (1995), Habib (1992), and 
Pokrant & Rashid (1997). Most of these literatures focus on socio-economic or 
cultural aspects of fishing communities, which are relevant to the present research.  
Another body of literature consists of literary sources, particularly novels written on 
different fishing contexts and places. These novels provide unique descriptions of 
the broader structures of fishing communities at different periods of time (Pokrant 
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and Reeves, 1998). They include Padma River Boatman by Manik Bandopadhayaya 
(1990), A River Called Titas by Advaita Malla Barman (1963), Ganga by 
Shamaresh Basu (1963) and Poka Makorer Ghar Basati by Selina Hossain (1986). 
Recent work by Pokrant, Reeves and McGuire (1996a, 1996b) focuses mainly on 
the ethno historic and ethnographic aspects of fishing peoples of Bangladesh/ 
Bengal. These studies show the highly differentiated nature of Bengal fishing 
peoples (jele/Jaila/ jailla/ jalo) in terms of occupational specialization, religion, 
ethnicity, class, status and region.  In colonial Bengal, fishers and fisher-related 
castes and groups were socially, politically and economically separate from the 
wider Hindu and Muslim communities and consisted mainly of low-caste and 
outcaste Hindus.(See appendix:2.1)  
Pokrant et al. (1996, 1997) also mention that over the centuries Bengal fishers were 
subject to Buddhist, Hindu and Muslim influences and many were absorbed into the 
emerging Bengali community by the time of British rule in the late 18th century. In 
addition to specialized fishing castes and groups, most rural Bengalis engaged in 
fishing as part of the seasonal agricultural cycle and some were boatmen (Majhi/ 
Naiya) and did fishing-related work such as fish trading, net and boat making and 
the curing and preservation of fish.  
Risley (1981) in his study The Tribes and Caste of Bengal, mentioned that 
originally non-Hindu fisher-hunter-gatherers, converted to Hinduism and many 
became settled as agriculturists even attaining non-cultivating landlord status in 
such areas as Medinipur (West Bengal), but a large minority remained fishers.. 
According to the 1901 census, there were some 550,000 fishers in Bengal of which 
over 95 per cent was Hindu (Koibortta, Kewat, Malo/Jhalo/Jaliya, Tiwar/tiyar 
(Rajbangshi), Namasudra (Jiani/charal), Das Shikari (Rajbangshi) and Berua). 
Considered unclean by Brahmins and other high castes, they lived in separate 
communities, practiced endogamy (in-group marriage) and mixed only with their 
caste equals. Socially despised, some tried to leave their fishing profession through 
accumulating wealth and adopting the ritual and social practices of higher caste 
communities. Among the Hindus, the largest fishing caste or jati in old Bengal was 
the Kaibarta/ Koibortta and they are thought to have been one of the region’s 
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earliest inhabitants (Risley, 1981). In another study Russell & Hira Lal (1916) 
mentioned that the Kaibartta/ Koibortta consider fishing to have been their original 
occupation and tell a story to the effect that their ancestors saved the deity in their 
boat on the occasion of the deluge. In return, they were given the power of catching 
three or four times as many fish as others.  
Khan (1989) states that originally low caste (Sudra) Hindus dominated inland 
capture fisheries. Since 1947 Muslims have entered the profession in greater 
numbers, despite the low status of the profession and its historical association with 
Hindus. Their entry was facilitated by the migration of Hindus to India after 
partition in 1947. In addition, land fragmentation caused by inheritance laws, 
growing population pressure and natural erosion of riverbanks has forced many 
Muslims into fishing. 
In the light of the limited ethnographic and historical work on Bangladesh inland 
fishers, this study, the first of its kind in Bangladesh, examines the inland open 
capture fishers of the village of Krishnapur in Kishoreganj District who are 
members of the Koibortta fishing caste, one of the most important inland fishing 
castes in Bangladesh. Its main focus is the role of common property rights, 
indigenous fishers’ knowledge and local social networks in fishers’ livelihood 
strategies.  
2.5.Literature on CPR and management of fisheries: global context  
All societies regulate access to scarce and valued resources through some form of 
property rights regime. Several types of property resources regimes have been 
identified: open access property; communal property; state property and private 
property (Berkes & Farvar, 1989). A property rights regime is a socially organized 
set of rules, sanctions and practices through which a property right is defined, 
regulated and used. It is also a claim made to a benefit from something scarce and 
valued by a category of users (see Bromley, 1992). 
According to Gibbs & Bromley (1989): 
 
Common property rights are a special class of property rights, which assure 
individuals’ access to resources over which they have collective claims. 
Villagers’ interest in forests, grazing lands; irrigation water, fisheries and 
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wildlife all provide examples of resources, which may be managed as a 
common property. 
 
It is argued by some that resources owned in common such as oceans, rivers, 
common grazing grounds, parks, and public lands are doomed to overexploitation. 
The argument goes that as such resources are owned by no one, they are protected 
by no one. In the absence of ownership rights the users of such resources have no 
incentive to protect them. However, Acheson, among others, rejected the 
inevitability of a tragedy of common property resources, and in his study of Maine 
lobster fishermen has described their property rights and how they maintain and 
limit access to a lobster fishing territory, although the fishery is in the open sea, a 
public domain. 
Historically, state and private property rights regimes have expanded often at the 
expense of communal or common property regimes. In recent years there has been 
renewed scholarly interest in the value of common property rights in the 
management of natural resources, including fisheries. This has been partly in 
response to Hardin’s negative assessment of the role of common property in 
management of resources but also to the worsening situation of many peoples 
hitherto dependent on common property rights for survival. All around the world, 
fish stocks, forests, grasslands, air, soils, wildlife, and water quality have been 
seriously degraded by human activity. A key question, then, is under what 
conditions will people conserve the resources on which their livelihood depends? 
Hardin’s classic ‘tragedy of commons’ article (1968) examined the problem of 
overexploitation of common property resources (including fisheries resources) 
under what he called common property practices, concluding that such practices led 
inevitably to environmental degradation. However, critics have pointed out that he 
conflated open access with common property and failed to examine the historical 
and ethnographic record on actual management practices among fishers, foresters 
and others who lived under common property rights regimes (Anderson and 
Simmons, 1993; Dyer & McGoodwin, 1994; McCay & Acheson, 1987; Ostrom, 
1990).  According to Hardin’s idea of tragedy of commons, when the conservation 
of common property resources is no one’s responsibility then it obviously results in 
overexploitation, resources stock depletion and environmental degradation. While 
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there is some truth to this view, there are many studies which show that where 
rights of access to common property is determined on the basis of long-standing 
local traditions and customs which include use-rules, use-restrictions and users 
rights protection, over-exploitation of common property resources can be 
minimised and even eliminated (Acheson, 1989; Baines, 1989; Berkes, 1995; 
Davis, 1984; Lesslie, 2000; Ruddle, 1989; Moorehead, 1989; McGoodwin, 1990; 
Ostrom, 1990; Pomeroy, 1999).  
The common property rights (CPR) issue has led to vigorous debate over key 
concepts and their applicability to different environmental and other settings 
(Hardin, 1968, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1998; Berkes, 1993 & 1996; Fenny et al., 1990 & 
1998, Ostrom, 1998, 1990, 1985 & 1977, Roe, 1994 & 1992). It is important at the 
outset to distinguish common property from un-owned non-property or open- access 
(res nullius: ‘no one’s property’). The latter is defined as a resource to which access 
is unrestricted and can be used by any one. Examples would be the air we breathe 
and areas of the oceans not owned by particular states (Ciriacy-Wantrup and 
Bishop, 1975; Knudsen, 1995). A completely open access regime is a free for all. In 
an open-access fishery there would be no limits on who can fish, the gear they can 
use or how many fish can be caught (Alessi, 1998). Ludicello, Weber and Wieland 
(1999) in their study Fish, Markets and Fishermen mention that when a fishery is 
open to anyone, there is no assurance that a fish not caught today will be around 
tomorrow. In fact, someone else will probably catch it. So why not catch it 
yourself? Why invest in the long-term sustainability of the fishery if what happens 
tomorrow or next week or next year is highly uncertain? The authors mention that 
leaving fisheries open to anyone is often done with the best of intentions. It is an 
attempt to be fair to all and to share the opportunity of fishing. However, the 
outcome of open access fishing is neither fair nor profitable. An open access fishery 
will attract too many boats, too may people, and too much fishing power. The result 
is an over fished fishery. In Bangladesh, an open access fishery was created by 
government fiat in 1995 which had largely negative consequences for small-scale 
fishers such as the Koirbortta (see chapter three & seven for more detail). 
Turning to common property rights, Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (1980) point out 
that these rights may assume many different forms, but define it as rights shared by 
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the members of a group with exclusive access to a resource. Several writers have 
commented on the advantages of common property rights particularly in the 
management of what are known as common pool resources. For example, Ostrom 
(1990) argues that common property could be optimal under a number of 
conditions, ranging from nearly open access to a system of strict controls and rules. 
Acheson (1981) mentions that in the case of fisheries, access to resources and 
property rights regimes vary from place to place.  There are many societies where 
fishery resources are considered as open to all and fishers can fish where they like. 
But there are also societies where fishers have established fishing rights, which may 
also involve control over the ‘fishing space’ and not only the resource. In some 
places, forms of access to common property resources are more informal without 
any explicitly formulated rules, while in other places, there are clearly stated rules 
and rituals imposed self consciously. For example, in the United States and 
Australia, natural resources such as fisheries are, respectively, the publics’ and the 
Crown's resources, and property rights in fisheries are defined in terms of an 
individual's right to try to harvest or otherwise use fisheries resources. In other 
countries, such as in Japan and Taiwan, there are instances where the property 
rights for fisheries resources belong to local communities. 
McGoodwin (1990) discusses two forms of fishing access: one he refers to as ‘a 
passive means of indigenous regulation’ and the other where fishing societies 
control their fisheries resources through ritualised and customary patterns of 
behaviour. He argues these both play a positive role in conserving fish resources.   
Until recently, anthropologists have paid comparatively little attention to the role of 
common property rights regimes in the management of fisheries. For example, 
anthropological classics such as Firth’s Malay Fishermen (1941, 1966) and Fraser’s 
Rusembilan: A Malay Fishing Village in Southern Thailand (1960) did not discuss 
property rights and fisheries resources management issues. Edward Norbeck (1954) 
devoted less than one page of his Takashima: A Japanese Fishing Community to the 
question of fishing rights and licenses. However, in the last two decades, a 
significant number of studies have been conducted on property rights and 
management issues in fisheries, concentrating largely on marine or coastal fisheries. 
Few are on the world’s largest inland open water fisheries of India, China and 
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Bangladesh. Among the most important marine fisheries studies are Acheson 
(1989) on the Maine lobster industry, Alexander’s (1982) study of Sri Lankan 
fishermen, Amarasinghe’s (1989) work on South Sri Lankan fishers, Anderson and 
Wadel’s (1972) study of North Atlantic fishermen, Cordell (1974) on property 
rights and management in the small-boat fishing of South-West Nova Scotia, 
Frazer’s (1966) study of the fishermen of South Thailand (1966), Gulati (1981) on 
the role of women in a fishing village of Kerala, Jentoft and Krestofersen’s (1989) 
on fishermen’s co-management in the Loften fishery, Kalland’s (1981, 1995) work 
on the fishing community of ‘Tokugawa’ and ‘Singu’ of Japan, Mesinus (1992) on 
fisheries management in Peru, McGoodwin’s (1987)  study of Mexico’s fishery, 
Merlijn’s (1989)  study of the role of middle-men in small-scale fisheries of 
Sarawak, Malaysia, Platteau’s (1982)  study of Kerala fishers, Maarten Bavinck 
study on fisheries conflicts, governance, management issues, myth and realities in 
the fishing regulations of Coromandel Coast fishing in Tamil Nadu (2003, 2001, 
1998 & 1997) and the changing economy of the petty / artisanal fishermen of 
Northern Sri Lanka (1987 & 1984), and Ruddle’s (1989) study of Japanese coastal 
fisheries. Sugnum’s (1997) work on fisheries management of small-water bodies in 
seven countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America focused on common property 
rights issues, management, and fishers’ access to different fisheries resources in a 
global context.   
To a greater or lesser degree, these studies take up common property rights issues. 
A few examples will be discussed to illustrate the kinds of issues addressed and 
their relevance for the present study. 
Acheson’s review of fishing research (1981) pointed out that two important kinds of 
regularities appear to exist across fishing communities. First, in a number of areas 
there are informal rules concerning the conditions under which gear of different 
kinds can and should be used which assist in minimizing conflicts. Second, the 
effects of unconstrained competition and conflict are so costly that fishers in many 
locations have organized to have laws passed to limit access to fisheries and fishers. 
In these cases, fishers were able to exert enough political pressure to achieve their 
ends. These comments have relevance in the Bangladesh context where many 
fishers, including the Koibortta of Krishnapur, have developed their own informal 
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rules to regulate access to fishing grounds and the ways in which fishing is 
conducted. However, Koibortta fishers have been less successful in ensuring that 
the legal system is able to protect their fishing rights.  
Acheson (1989) has taken up the question of whether resources owned in common 
such as oceans, rivers, common grazing grounds, parks, and public lands are 
doomed to overexploitation, as Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons thesis’ would 
have it. In his work on the Maine lobster fishery (an offshore trap fishery), he found 
that fishermen have common property rights over areas of the ocean, which are 
legally enforced, and they are able to maintain a lobster fishing territory and limit 
access to it. The fishermen here have long been concerned about their resource, and 
have increasingly entered the political arena to lobby for protective legislation, 
which underlines the fact, that common ownership- not just private ownership- can 
result in conservation and an economically sustainable fishery (Acheson, 1989). 
Krishnapur fishers have also been concerned for decades over their rights to fishing 
bodies and the conservation of fisheries and have pressured for a more equitable 
fishing rights system. While these fishers do not have the full legal protection 
accorded Acheson’s oyster farmers, where they are able to have some control of 
small fishing bodies, they have been able to share access in what they consider to be 
a more equitable manner. However, they have been less successful in ensuring 
sustainability of the resources partly because they have been subject to constant 
interference from more powerful non-fisher interest groups and the weakness of 
government policies which are more revenue-oriented than concerned with ensuring 
equitable and sustainable use of the resources. Whether small-scale fishers in 
Krishnapur, if provided with more secure access and control over fishing bodies, 
are more likely to ensure sustainability of fish resources is not known at this point. 
McGoodwin (1990) has shown that in many cases, small-scale fishers are unable to 
mobilize effectively and often come off the losers. The reasons for this include 
remoteness of indigenous fishing populations from the national centres where 
decisions are made; that fishers often belong to ethnic and other minorities and are 
ignored by the authorities; and sometimes lack knowledge of the appropriate ways 
to articulate their views and gain access to lawmakers who, in turn, have very little 
information on traditional fishing regulations. Krishnapur fishers also operate under 
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similar circumstances. They are largely illiterate, live far from the centres of power, 
and feel insecure because they are from a minority religious community. 
Kalland (1995) has argued that under such circumstances it is important for social 
anthropologists in particular to study such institutions so that indigenous concepts 
of fishing rights can be incorporated, if necessary in modified form, in the newly 
emerging management systems. Criticizing Hardin’s theory of the commons, 
Kalland mentioned that the protection of fisheries resources is not only a question 
of fishing regulations but depends on population dynamics, on whether or not there 
are economically or socially more rewarding opportunities for employment locally 
or elsewhere, and on prevailing values and conventions. In order to exploit a 
resource in a sustainable way, fishers need an appropriate technology as well as the 
knowledge and social organization for its operations. Kalland further mentioned 
that besides paying attention to the technological efficiency of catching fish, 
attention must be paid to the maintenance and replacement of this technology, how 
necessary knowledge of fishing activities is preserved, expended and transmitted 
from one generation to the next, the extent to which knowledge and information is 
shared or kept secret, who controls the means of production, and the possibilities 
for and constraints upon capital accumulation (Kalland, 1995, pp. 6-7). Krishnapur 
fishers are themselves adopting new technologies but, as is shown in chapter six, 
such technologies allow a more efficient exploitation of fish resources as measured 
by catch per unit of effort rather than being oriented to maintaining fish stocks.  
Another example, which challenges the ‘tragedy of the commons’ thesis, is that of 
the small lobster fishing community of Putna Allen of Mexico (Leslie, 2000, p. 52). 
The campo system of Putna Allen fishing community effectively restricted access to 
lobster resources among cooperative members without state involvement. By 
creating a social institution to protect their private investments in lobster shelters, 
fishers themselves developed a localized system of conservationist fishing practices 
through private property rights sanctioned by a set of formal locally devised written 
rules. Fishers acknowledged that they had more at stake than simply earning short-
term income because they wished to safeguard their Campos to protect their 
substantial investments. The locally developed and operated campo system 
prevented over exploitative fishing practices and the “tragedy of the commons” 
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without state involvement. Over time, the ‘campo system’ became the framework 
that distributed access to lobster resources, fishing work organization, and 
allocation of returns from the lobster fishing. Today the ‘campo system’ is a well-
defined set of property rights in a form of corporate private ownership governed by 
formal rules created and enforced by local fishers (Leslie, 2000, pp. 46-52). 
Krishnapur fishers share many of the views of their ‘campo’ counterparts regarding 
the need to sustain fish resources and to operate with some degree of autonomy 
from the state. But they have been unable to obtain clear, secure and long-term legal 
title to fishing bodies.  
Many researchers argue that while environmental degradation is a major problem, 
in many cases fishers who are dependent on fisheries resources, and their 
governments, have acted to generate effective rules to manage those resources at 
sustainable levels (Ahmed et al., 1997; Berkes, 1989; McCay & Acheson, 1987; 
Ostrom, 1990; Pinkerton, 1989; Ruddle & Akimichi, 1984). One such successfully 
managed resource is the Maine lobster fishery mentioned earlier, where catches are 
currently at record high levels despite decades of intense exploitation, with catches 
having remained relatively stable between 1947 and 1988 (Maine Department of 
Marine Resources, 1995). Several factors produced these consistently high catches, 
but there is general agreement that the regulatory apparatus has played an important 
role. In Bangladesh, such a fisher-focused regulatory apparatus has not yet been 
developed and implemented to the degree necessary to assist Krishnapur fishers to 
manage their own resources. Rather, fishers are caught in a struggle between 
government and powerful local interests, some of whom have close ties with 
government officials (police and sub-district and district administrators) and 
politicians.  
Ferguson and Derman’s (1995) study of African fishing communities shows that in 
a growing number of cases throughout Africa, communities are exploited by 
outsiders and the continuation of local cultures and livelihoods is seriously 
threatened. In these cases, the communities often find themselves powerless to 
prevent the expropriation of the resources over which they previously had legal or 
customary rights/controls. They further point out that such action by outsiders led to 
human rights violations within an authoritarian political context. Krishnapur fishers 
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have been subject to such pressures as members of a minority religious group and as 
residents of an area rich in fish resources which have attracted non-fisher groups 
locally and from other parts of the region. Others studies argue that private property 
regimes might have some success in reducing the pressure upon resources but 
cannot eliminate other adverse effects on the resources (Edward, 1994; Johnson & 
Libecap, 1982; Keen, 1983; McGoodwin, 1990; Scott, 1988a; Seijo, 1993). 
Because of such failures in privatised fisheries, many fisheries researchers put 
emphasis on the importance of common property rights in ensuring equitable 
returns and sustainable catches. Ostrom (1990, pp. 90-101) has identified several 
factors that have enabled groups to manage commons over long periods without 
bringing about overexploitation. She found, for example, that boundaries must be 
well defined, rules must be linked to local conditions, and sanctions must be 
imposed when rules are violated. Usually, a strong community tradition is essential 
for such management, as well as the absence of interference by governments. The 
folk management and co-management fisheries regimes that have arisen around the 
world show some promise in addressing many issues of sustainability and equity 
that plague fisheries management today. However, the development of such regimes 
is by no means automatic or simple, nor is their survival assured, as this study 
demonstrates (Pinkerton, 1994a, p. 334). Ostrom (1994) further mentions that 
fishers can obtain good earnings from the fisheries where they control them with 
their own management practices and can produce fish by their own efforts and 
where they are able to protect their rights from non-fishers who have tended to reap 
the benefits of community efforts by both legal and illegal access.  
Davis‘s (1984) study of the fishers of the East Coast of Canada highlights the 
voices of the traditional fishers who have been exercising their customary rights on 
the fisheries for decades. He quotes one fisherman who says: 
I have fished here all my life. So did my father and his father. Men in 
my family have been fish’n here for a long time. If anyone’s got a 
right to fish here it’s me and I’m no different than most of the fellas 
fish’n here.  
Here, the local fishers see themselves as having exclusive rights to their territory, 
which extends eleven miles along the coast and more than thirteen miles seaward. 
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They actively defend it against outsiders and to avoid conflicts between local fishers 
using different gears, fishers divide their territory into different sectors, each 
allowing a specific kind of gear. Bowles and Bowles show (1989, pp. 236-239) that 
in the fisheries of Matinicus Island the fishers claim a very well defined area of 77 
square miles around the island and they strictly control who will be accepted into 
their fishery. A fisher must live on the island and have island kinship ties or 
purchase property from local fishers, who then become informal sponsors, 
something like an apprenticeship system. Krishnapur fishers express similar views 
but are unable to protect what they consider to be their traditional fishing grounds 
as effectively as the Canadian fishers. Part of this relates to the confined nature of 
inland fishing bodies in Bangladesh which are located in often densely populated 
regions and surrounded by farmers, traders, industry and other groups, each of 
which makes claims on fishing bodies (see chapter 7).  
A range of fisheries literature shows that in different countries, fisheries are under 
different forms of collective management practices. For example, in many of the 
reservoirs of Zimbabwe, North-eastern Brazil, North-eastern Thailand and the 
ejidos of Mexico, age-old community management is still operational along with 
the licensing system used in the other reservoirs. The majority of Indian and Sri 
Lankan reservoirs are public properties where a fixed number of licensed fishers 
make their living. In Cuba, the scope of the common property norm has been further 
widened to include depositing the catches from reservoirs into a common national 
pool (Sugunun, 1997).  
Davis’s work (1984) on East Coast Canadian fishers of Port Lameron Harbour in 
Nova Scotia shows how the local fishers claim exclusive rights to their territory, 
which extends eleven miles along the coast and more than thirteen miles seaward. 
They protect their fishing ground from outsiders and to avoid conflicts among 
themselves, they share their fishing territory in sections, and allow each a different 
kind of gear. In this regard, Donald R. Leal (2001, p. 12) comments: 
Informally organized fisheries are playing a valuable role in fisheries 
management today. At the very least, government should legalize them. 
Fishing communities with a history of fishing nearby waters should be 
allowed to establish property rights to those waters. The communities 
should have sole authority to either prevent or restrict entry. Where 
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boundaries are clear and where communities are allowed to keep out 
outsiders, the potential for controlling fishing is a good one.   
It is important to note that any ‘overexploitation’ of fishing stocks may not simply 
be the result of fishers’ common access to the fisheries but due to pressure of 
overpopulation on a fixed fisheries resource. McGoodwin (1990, p. 49) makes the 
point that there was a time when fishing peoples did not regulate their fisheries. 
Their populations were so small, and therefore their corresponding impact on their 
resources so small that there was no need to constrain fishing effort. But today, the 
increasing pressure on fisheries stocks requires measures to regulate these 
pressures. 
Communal property regimes in coastal marine fisheries in Fiji and the Solomon 
Islands (Baines1989), in coastal Japan (Ruddle, 1989), in Java and West Africa 
(Lasserre & Ruddle, 1983), in Mali (Moorehead, 1989) and in Hawaii (Costa-
Pierce, 1987; Berkes, 1995) show that fisheries resources can be better managed 
when fishers and other stakeholders are directly involved in management of the 
resources and use rights are allocated either individually or collectively. In these 
cases, the devolution of management authority and responsibility is bringing about a 
shift in local power elites and structures. These new approaches require changes in 
the administrative levels of management and new laws and policies (Pomeroy, 
1999).  
In a number of studies, it has been shown that in some circumstances certain forms 
of state regulation and involvement were useful in successful management of 
resources, while in other cases excessive government regulation and involvement 
has had negative impacts on local fishers. Governments in many countries 
(including Bangladesh) justify interventions into fisheries on the grounds that it is 
in the best interests of those being regulated. However, such regulation has often 
resulted in more inefficient and less equitable fishing arrangements subsidised by 
the state. As Ostrom (1997) puts it: 
When resources that were previously controlled by local participants 
have been nationalized, state control has usually proved to be less 
effective and efficient than control by those directly affected, if not 
disastrous in its consequences. 
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Under some circumstances, such as is found in Bangladesh, without the security of 
property rights, there are dangers of increased conflict between fisher groups and 
between fishers and former lessees as the latter attempt to retain their control 
(Pokrant, 1996, pp. 10-14). 
Leal (1996) discusses several situations where government intervention in a local 
estuary fishing community near the Valensa of Brazil resulted in adverse impacts. 
The fishery was under the control of local fishing communities but at one stage the 
Brazilian government decided it should take steps to increase the production 
through modern technology such as new nylon nets, which were made available to 
anyone who qualified for a bank loan arranged by the government. But local fishers 
did not qualify for the loans and did not have enough capital to purchase the nets on 
their own. A few wealthy individuals around Valensa did qualify and purchased 
nylon nets and hired men who had never fished the estuary before. The local 
fishers’ management system crumbled as old and new fishers fought over fishing 
spots. Eventually the fishery was over harvested and ultimately abandoned (Leal, 
1996). In Bangladesh, small-scale fishers are also unable to obtain bank loans as 
they are considered bad risks and have no collateral. Loans are usually obtained 
from fish traders which create a system of indebtedness and reduce fishers’ capacity 
to act in other ways. It also contributes to a resource-mining mentality even among 
fishers who are concerned to ensure they have sufficient income to tide them over 
the lean season in fishing. 
According to Acheson (1995), while there is evidence that “…common property 
rights are associated with low labour productivity resulting 
from…overexploitation,” this does not have to be the case and depends upon local 
cultural, social and economic conditions (Acheson, 1990, p. 95). The author points 
out those different types of fisheries require different regulatory regimes. The target 
species, the technology used to catch them, and the characteristics of the fishers 
who pursue them all create the need for different approaches (Acheson, 1990, 
p.152). Thus, the process of fisheries management involves solving two 
fundamental problems. The first is conservation or deciding what amount of fish 
can be harvested on a sustainable basis. The second is allocation or deciding who 
benefits, in what ways, and to what extent (Smith, 1988).   
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A progressive fisheries management policy involves a concern for equity, 
productivity and sustainability. By equity is meant that fishers have security in their 
profession and are able to obtain a decent standard of living from fishing. 
Productivity refers to producing more fish at less cost. Finally, strategies of 
sustainability are necessary to ensure a fish stock is maintained in the long term. 
Berkes (1994), Pomeroy et al., (1996), Pomeroy and Williams (1994), and Sen and 
Raajjaer-Neilsen (1996) have emphasized that government support through 
legislation, funding and enforcement are necessary for sustaining intervention. 
However, it is argued here that such intervention is required to support a range of 
fishing regimes, including those organised along community lines, rather than 
replace them. Only the government can legally establish and defend users’ rights 
and security of tenure. One means of establishing these conditions without 
undermining local control is through decentralization. Without these state-
sanctioned property rights, resource users will find it difficult to enforce their 
claims over the resource against outsiders. As chapter six shows, this is also the 
case among Koirbortta fishers.  
Gibbs and Bromley (1989), mention that in many of the developing societies, where 
communal property resources have been nationalized and turned into state property 
this has complicated the ownership status of the resource and often led to resource 
depletion. There are several studies which offer numerous examples where larger 
governmental interventions into resource management have badly damaged 
perfectly workable community systems (Ostrom, 1990; Pinkerton, 1987). 
On the other hand, controlled community based management systems with some 
government or other non-government organization involvement, at least for a 
certain period of time, in the coastal marine fisheries resources in Fiji and Solomon 
Island (Baines, 1989), in coastal Japan (Ruddle, 1989), in Java/ Indonesia and West 
Africa (Lasserre & Ruddle, 1983), in Mali (Moorehead, 1989) and in Hawaii 
(Costa-Pierce, 1987, Berkes, 1995) have been shown to be successful. The Maine 
lobster fishery is an example of both communal and state property, where fishermen 
use it as a communal resource but the state maintains some management 
jurisdiction (Acheson, 1989).  
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Bavink‘s study (2001) looks in detail at common property rights and management 
issues in the fisheries resources of the Coromandel Coast in Tamil Nadu, India and 
how different  groups of people (artisanal and trawler fishers) regulate access to and 
use marine fish resources. The study examines sea tenure in relation to discourses 
on legal pluralism and fishers’ struggles. The study shows that access problems 
worldwide are often difficult to resolve as they involve many issues and many 
claimants or stakeholders.  The study further shows that in many cases, 
governments are incapable of providing an effective and legitimate management 
framework and that the livelihoods of artisanal fishers who depend on the resources 
in question are in jeopardy. According to Bavinck, the government of Tamil Nadu 
has tried to resolve the conflict by regulating fishing rights, the end result of which 
has been the creation of three 'legal' systems in inshore fisheries. The author 
examines each system in detail and concludes that fisheries regulation is not the 
exclusive responsibility of the state. Instead, he notes the existence of well-defined 
regulatory practices among both the artisanal and trawler fishermen. As on the 
Coromandel Coast, Krishnapur, fishers play some role in managing their own 
resources, sometimes using caste groupings across villages as a means of 
mobilising fishers through different tiers and spatially dispersed social networks. 
There are also similar conflicts which in Krishnapur are between the local 
Krishnapur fishers (equivalent to Bavinck’s artisanal fishers) and traders and 
leaseholders, the latter, like Bavinck’s trawler fishers, clearly favoured by the state 
in the allocation of fishing rights. Leaseholders and traders exert their economic 
control through commercial and rentier capital rather than investment in their own 
fishing fleets. However, they also invest in nets and employ some local artisanal 
fishers seasonally and excluding others from their lease sites.  
2.6.Literature on common property rights and management of fisheries: Bangladesh 
context 
There is a growing body of knowledge on traditional aquatic resource management 
in Bangladesh which has important theoretical and practical implications for the 
study of riparian commons in Bangladesh and elsewhere. It is argued that such 
knowledge can serve as a model for efforts to establish viable and equitable 
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fisheries management regimes; be a source of motivation and empowerment; enable 
participatory approaches; and contribute to cross-cultural comparisons of traditional 
and new riparian commons (Soeftestad, 2000). 
Despite a growing interest in aquatic management in Bangladesh, the detailed 
anthropological and social scientific study of fisheries management is of recent 
origin. There are a few donor-funded development studies on management issues, 
which provide limited descriptions of fisher’s access to the fisheries, common 
property rights in inland fisheries, and fisher’s indigenous practices in the 
management of fisheries. However, most research has focused on technical and 
scientific matters such as fish resources and stocking, artificial rearing, fish biology, 
fisheries management. More social scientific studies provide some general 
descriptions on diversified issues related to fisheries resources, fishing economy, 
organization of production, fishing gears, fish species, methods of fish catching and 
so on (Ahmed et al., 1997; Alam, 1998; Alam, 2001; Ali, 1992, 1997; Blowfield & 
Haque, 1995; FAP-6, 1993; Habib, 1992; Islam, 1979; Kremer, 1994; Minkin et al., 
1997; Naqi, 1989; Pokrant, 1996a, 1996b; Pokrant et al., 1998; Raychoudhuri, 
1980; Reeves, 1992; Skagerstam & Brattsrom, 1991; Thompson, 1999; Toufique, 
1994,1995,1996; Tsai & Ali, 1996; Ullah, 1985; van Schendel, 1991;). Among all 
these studies, only a few actually deal with common property rights and 
management issues focusing on the strength of indigenous fishing knowledge and 
practices. Mahbub Alam’s (2001) ethnographic study of the Hindu fishers of 
Charan Lake in Tangail district of Bangladesh, Toufique (1996) on property rights 
and issues of power in inland fisheries of Bangladesh, Khurshed Alam’s (1998) 
comparative study of the organization and development of two fishing communities 
of Bangladesh, Pokrant et al.’s (1997) study of the organization and historical 
development of inland fisheries of Bangladesh,  Ahmed’s (1991) study of the 
management of river fisheries in Bangladesh, and more recent work by Thompson 
et al. (1999) and Middendorp et al.(1999) on fisheries community management 
programmes in various parts of Bangladesh are the major works which deal with 
common property rights, access to fisheries resources, organization of production 
and management regimes, conflicts between the state and the stakeholders, between 
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the fishers and newly entrants non-fishers, and the role of NGO’s and other bodies 
in the management of the resources. 
Pokrant, Reeves and McGuire (1997; 2001) have provided historical evidence on 
the origins and development of private leasing arrangements in Bengal fisheries. 
They show that the position of Bengali fishers under the British was shaped by legal 
changes in the 18th century related to the Permanent Settlement of 1793. The main 
objective of these changes was to support local estate holders and rulers, the 
jomidars/ zamindars, and to give them the authority to collect a Jal Kar (water tax). 
The authors also mention that these rights were established on non-navigable rivers, 
the lakes, ponds, depressions and tanks. This system eventually replaced pre-British 
practices, where fishers gave gifts of fish and paid occasional tolls to the agents of 
landlords to access fishing waters. 
Mahbub Alam’s (2001) study shows the complex access rights of the traditional 
Hindu fishers to the water resources of Charan and discusses the leasing system of 
common fishing grounds in relation to common property rights. The study shows 
that over a period of time the access to common property such as lake, became 
competitive and other non-fishers groups’ interests became prominent. These new 
interest groups threatened the traditional Hindu fishers, who had customary fishing 
rights in fishing grounds during earlier periods. According to Alam (2001), 
government regulations, which allowed non-fishers to gain access to fishing waters, 
helped to bring about over fishing. 
Ahmed (1997) points out that fishery, as well as several other food and non-food 
resources, were traditionally regarded as common property in Bangladesh. Only 
traditional low caste Hindu fishers fished full-time and developed and adopted 
technologies to catch fish and protect their resources. Access to fisheries was more 
or less open to all members of the communities living in around flooded areas. 
Also, a lower population placed less pressure on such fisheries. In more recent 
times other non-fisher interest groups have been able to exploit the poor fishers in 
various ways, since access is not limited.  
Toufique (1996, 1997 & 1998) has examined why common property rights over 
Bangladesh’s inland fisheries have failed to become firmly established in recent 
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years. He argues that the introduction of leasing or contractual systems for water 
resources, subsequently transferred property rights from traditional fishers to 
socially powerful agents, the ijaradar (lessees), who were not fishers.    
Khaled (1985) examined leasing methods of river fisheries and found that 
overexploitation of the fisheries is encouraged by the government through its 
existing leasing system. Under this system leaseholders receive short-term leases 
with no guarantee that a lessee will be able to renew the lease of the same fishery in 
successive years. Bar and Dixon’s (2001) study of methods for the management of 
common property resources in Bangladesh reveals that a revenue oriented fisheries 
management system with short lease terms where lease values increase yearly with 
no consideration for the productivity of water bodies encourages over fishing and 
destructive fishing by lessees who dewater water bodies to maximise profit at the 
expense of the sustainability of the fisheries resources.  
Blanchet (1993) in her study of Shanir Haor in the wetland region of Bangladesh 
shows how property rights, fishers access to fisheries and local fishing practices 
differ from the text of the law. The powerful leaseholders of water estates claim 
ownership over all fish at all times of the year. Since the mid eighties they have 
required local fishers to buy fishing rights during the monsoon and have forbidden 
the use of fishing nets. The so-called tickets they issue only allow for the use of 
fishing hooks (Blanchet, 1993). Similarly, Ullah’s study (1985) of the Jamuna 
fishermen identifies property rights on the Jamuna River and discusses how genuine 
fishers are excluded from mainstream fishing efforts within the existing leasing 
method. He mentions that in the river sector, the Ministry of Land grants the 
exclusive right of fishing by auction to the highest bidder for leases of one to three 
year’s duration. The private lessee, who is usually a fish merchant or moneylender, 
negotiates with fishermen the right to fish on payment of cash rent or a share of the 
catch (sub-lease). Sometimes, the fishermen’s cooperatives receive such leases at a 
negotiated rent based on average rental over the preceding three years. Ullah (1985) 
identified two other types of property rights over the different segments of River 
Jamuna: ‘Debotter’ properties and privately controlled water bodies. The ‘debotter’ 
properties are properties reserved to support worship of Hindu deities and are rent-
free tenures. Privately owned water segments are ‘maurasi jalkars’ held in 
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perpetuity at a fixed rent and the ownership is passed on to the heirs of the original 
holders. 
In the context of developing new management regimes for inland fisheries, Pokrant 
(1996) argues that  
…a common property rights regime has some potential advantages 
for open capture fisheries in Bangladesh. These advantages include 
reduction of uncertainty of supply, greater efficiency through low 
administrative costs, a stronger sense of ownership and 
responsibility for the longer-term sustainability of the resource, a 
more flexible and adaptable system to meet local needs and a greater 
degree of legitimacy for the system as a whole. Without the security 
of property rights, there are dangers of escalating conflicts between 
fisher groups and between fishers and former lessees as the latter 
attempt to retain their control (Pokrant, 1996, p. 10-14). 
Thompson’s study (1999) on community based fisheries management (CBFM) also 
emphasized the benefits of CBFM. Such benefits include fishers cooperating in 
order to increase and conserve fish stocks; sharing the costs and benefits of 
improved management; managing effectively conflicts among themselves; 
enhanced position of organized fishers in dealing with stakeholders; sharing of data 
and understanding of the conditions of the fishery by the government and the fishers 
and the emergence of more effective and enforceable rules with a high level of 
acceptance by the different stakeholders. Thompson argues that the success of 
community management needs to recognise that fishers require time to develop 
fishery organizations or institutions, that 3 years, which is often the standard for 
fisheries leases in Bangladesh, is not enough for this, and that community 
management develops faster where there is a well-defined community and 
waterbody and few conflicts or factions within the community. He also suggests 
that any government or non-government intervention requires a focus on ‘a visible 
conservation measure’ such as a sanctuary or an improved production technology, 
as this allows fishers to work towards a specific and well-defined goal. Other 
suggestions include recognition of other ‘stakeholder’ interests in water bodies, 
revenue support from government, better liaison between levels of government and 
NGOs, dedicated local staff with some autonomy to make decisions, NGO 
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involvement in training and credit provision as a way of reducing dependence on 
money lenders. 
Ahmed et al (2002) have dealt with the complexities of managing inland fisheries in 
Bangladesh, which they say makes it necessary to develop a more cooperative 
model between NGO’s, fishing communities, government and research agencies to 
ensure success in managing the resources. In another study, Ahmed et al (1997) 
discussed four different models of such cooperation, which have evolved in 
Bangladesh. The first model is an NGO-led strategy to establish fishery rights for 
target groups in publicly owned water bodies. The second model reflects a 
government –led strategy to establish a direct relationship between the state and the 
users (fisher communities). The third strategy involves collaboration between 
government, NGOs and researchers working together with fishing communities. A 
fourth model involves fisher communities assuming true co-management 
responsibility and achieving partnership status with government, NGOs and 
research agencies.  
While the studies mentioned above contribute to our understanding of the status of 
fisheries and their management issues, they are based on limited ethnographic 
materials and focus almost entirely on common property rights without locating 
them within the broader cultural and social context of the community under study. 
There is no single detailed ethnographic study on any of the inland open water 
fishing communities of Bangladesh, which addresses the relationship between 
common property rights and indigenous knowledge. Such a study is required as 
common property rights are in reality based on some formal and informal 
knowledge and practices. Property rights are reflected in their users’ cultures, values 
and technology. For example, common property management draws on local skills 
of fishing, management and ecological knowledge. The next section reviews the 
literature on indigenous fishing knowledge and practices and how they relate to the 
management of inland open water common property fisheries. 
2.7.Literature on Indigenous Knowledge in fishing 
An area of inquiry separate from but closely linked to that of property rights 
regimes is the study of systems of indigenous knowledge. The term ‘indigenous 
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knowledge’ is broadly defined as the local knowledge held by indigenous peoples 
or local knowledge unique to a given culture or society, and is used here 
interchangeably with traditional knowledge, local ecological knowledge, indigenous 
technical knowledge (ITK), ethno-ecology, folk-knowledge, traditional 
environmental (or ecological) knowledge, or p̀eople’s science’. From an 
anthropological perspective, the social and cultural context in which knowledge is 
generated and put to practical use is central to the discipline with its focus on the 
embeddedness of such knowledge in the personal, the specific and the contextual. 
 Also, the idea of fishers’ indigenous knowledge implies that their knowledge is not 
only reflected in their actions but shapes their perceptions, beliefs and ideas through 
which they organise their fishing and fishing related activities and control their 
individual and collective behaviour in maintaining social solidarity.  
This idea needs to be broadened to include the organisation of fishing, mode and 
techniques of production, formally and informally acquired fishing knowledge and 
wider notions of fishers’ relations with the natural and supernatural worlds. It 
emphasises the hybrid, changing and adaptive nature of fishers’ knowledge which is 
a product of the mixing of ideas and practices acquired formally and informally and 
technologies received from government agencies, non-governmental organizations 
and other bodies with locally derived fishing knowledge, cultural heritage and 
technologies (Ostrom, 1990, 1992; Sillitoe, 2002).  
In general, indigenous fishing knowledge includes both material and non-material 
/spiritual aspects and the beliefs and rituals associated with them. Robben (1989, 
p.7), following Bourdieu (1977) and others, emphasises the practical activities 
through which people cope in the world and the ways they interpret and define them 
socially and culturally. The most crucial and defining quality of people is to be 
found not in what they think but in what they do and how they do what they do, 
namely, attending to everyday activities, tasks and demands of their social worlds.  
Robben also comments that fishers’ knowledge is taken-for-granted, tacit and based 
on their: 
 ‘…actions in supernatural, moral, ideological, or ecological context. 
It is not static and absolute, but dynamic and historical. What seems 
the most insightful assessment at one point may prove to be less than 
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perfect and complete in another context or at another time’ (Robben, 
1989). 
Earlier models of development tended to ignore indigenous knowledge as backward 
and an obstacle to progress. However, Anthropology has always had a strong 
interest in what is now called indigenous knowledge as for a long period the study 
of so-called traditional societies was its main subject matter. For example, 
Anthropologists were often among the first to critically evaluate the claims of 
modernisation theorists that so-called ‘tradition’ was a primary obstacle to effective 
development (Gardner & Lewis, 1996).  
In recent years, however, the state sector and NGOs in many countries, including 
Bangladesh, have moved from this modernization or anti-tradition paradigm 
towards a more positive acceptance of the utility of indigenous knowledge in the 
study of medicine and sustainable development (Ellen & Harris, 2001, 2003). In 
contrast with the global literature, interest in IK in Bangladesh fisheries has been 
limited and the few studies available are largely descriptive and do not take IK as a 
central topic for inquiry.  
As part of the renewed interest in IK, there has been a growth in research on 
indigenous fishing knowledge. What such research shows is that indigenous fishing 
practices have often been developed over a long period of time, after much trial and 
error, and in many cases, fishers have a more comprehensive view of their fisheries 
and of how they should be managed than those fisheries managers whose 
perspectives, with a few exceptions, are drawn from limited local experiences and 
based more on de-contextualised biological and ichthyological scientific texts.  
Many small-scale or artisanal fishing communities have developed a variety of 
fishing technologies and knowledge systems over the generations which have 
allowed them to exploit their locally available fisheries resources in a sustainable 
way. In addition, historically such communities were able to sustain their fishing 
resources as they used relatively simple technologies, did not engage in extensive 
trade and lived in communities and areas where population pressure on land and sea 
was low. Their fishing knowledge resulted from decades, even centuries, of close 
familiarity with specific aquatic environments where fishers through direct and 
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repeated activity and experience were able to ensure a regular and predictable 
supply of fish to meet their and other’s needs. Such knowledge was rarely, if ever, 
written down or systematised into a set of fishing principles. The technologies 
required were of low cost, usually invented or developed locally, although there is 
evidence of the movement of fishing ideas and practices across communities and 
regions (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Berkes et al., 1994; Gadgil et al., 1993; 
Palsson, 1991; Ruddle, 1994).  
As a set of practices aimed at wresting a living from aquatic environments, fishing 
is highly ritualised. In contrast to the land, which has been at least partially 
domesticated through agriculture, the river / sea has not been tamed or socialised to 
the same degree. Technology and skills cannot guarantee human safety in the 
waters, let alone some degree of predictability and periodicity in the relationships 
between labour and productivity in fishing. Under such conditions, rituals, defined 
as repetitive patterns of behaviour, which express and mediate a society’s tensions 
and contradictions, are often prescribed as necessary to appease and invoke the 
spirit world to gain favour and protection from misfortune. Such rituals reflect the 
experiences of many generations of fishers at sea or on turbulent rivers where 
uncertain and unpredictable events happen. Fishing communities also have many 
beliefs and ritual practices which relate to other aspects of their fishing lives such as 
fish yields and fishing environments. All these rituals connect the material and the 
non-material. 
Like many other communities, fishing peoples use and observe different types of 
rites and rituals on different occasions to assure themselves that they can bring 
about their desired objectives. According to Durkheim (1961), such rites and rituals 
are the symbolic expression of the identity and cohesion of the people of the society 
and help to preserve and perpetuate the values through which society continually 
expresses itself. In other words, such rituals reaffirm group membership and 
reinforce group solidarity. They also enable every member of the group to carry out 
their tasks with confidence in the face of uncertainty, risk and anxiety (Durkheim, 
1961; Malinowski, 1960).  
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Sillitoe emphasises the spatially and contextually defined nature of IK, arguing that 
IK is embedded within its distinct geographical, ecological or socio-cultural 
contexts (Sillitoe, 1998b; IIRR1, 9996) which give it meaning and direction. For 
example, to get a good catch, fishers depend on their ‘indigenous technical 
knowledge’ (Sillitoe, 1998c) and experience and on supernatural forces for which 
they perform rituals and worship specific deities (see also Robben, 1989, pp. 3-4). 
A change of context or space or de-contextualization might result in a change in the 
status and meaning of knowledge and practices because each community situates its 
fishing strategies in a unique context of personal interest and cultural significance 
which represents what is important for it and gives directions to the community’s 
choices in life (Robben, 1989).  
Robben’s (1989) study of Brazilian fishermen illustrates the cultural specificity and 
locally based practical wisdom of canoe fishermen. He mentions that the canoe 
fisherman who makes a sacrifice to ‘Iemamja’ (i.e. sea goddess) after the fishing 
trip  and recites a spell to impair a colleague from catching fish, does not need to 
interpret its meaning consciously in order to complete the task. He has a practical 
wisdom, which demonstrates a situational understanding of his activities.  
Robben also mentions that the regulation of fishing practices is greatly influenced 
by a sense of personal judgement developed through hands-on-experience which, 
for instance, allows a fisherman to maintain the right tension in a fishing line to 
secure a fish. Such practical wisdom is not effective if simply expressed in rules or 
principles but has to be acquired in practice through the everyday decisions fishers 
take, the acts they carry out or refuse to carry out, the emotions that move them, and 
the way in which they lead their lives or are forced to lead their lives.  
A pioneer in the study of IK is Berkes whose 1999 study of the James Bay Cree 
Indian fishers provides a detailed understanding of local fishing practices which 
give important insights into the Cree fisheries management system. The first is 
about concentrating fishing effort on aggregations of fish. The second concerns 
rotational or pulse fishing. The third involves the use of a mix of gill net mesh 
sizes. The primary mechanism that drives all three management practices is the 
fishers’ reading of the catch per unit of effort. It is the key environmental signal 
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monitored by the Cree: shaping decisions regarding what nets to use, how long to 
keep fishing, and when to relocate. But the Cree fishers monitor other 
environmental signals as well. They note the different species of fish in their nets, 
the size, the condition or fatness (considered very important as a signal of health), 
and the sex and reproductive condition of the fish. They also observe the fish and 
noted any unusual patterns in behaviour and distribution (Pp.117-121).  
In many fishing communities, local knowledge and practices are distributed 
differently between men, women and children. In some communities, women have 
roles not only in fishing but also in trading fish, producing dry fish and making nets, 
while in other places they are included in the trawler fishing crew. Hornell (1950) 
gives several examples from around the world in which women are involved in 
many kinds of fishing operations. 
Jackson (1983) gives a description of the indigenous knowledge of the Tokanoan 
fishing community of Northwest Amazonia. According to him, the Tokanoan 
fishers understand the habits of various fish species and can determine the seasonal 
and micro-ecological variations and especially the fishing prospects at different 
locations. They can also identify why yield differs substantially even on two sides 
of the same river. Jackson found that each man has his favourite fishing spot and 
this becomes familiar to his sons as they grow up. 
P.H.Nikijuluw (1994) shows how in the Maluku Islands of Indonesia similar 
fisheries management measures have been employed for over a hundred years. 
Consisting of about 900 islands with more than 1000 coastal villages, the Maluku 
Islands make up one of Indonesia’s 27 provinces. The two most common practices, 
sasi and petuanang, are based on indigenous environmental knowledge and 
awareness. For example, the people of the islands have a special type of fishing 
gear, which they use in the bay. By observing changes in wind, waves and 
temperature they can predict that on the following day there will be no fish in the 
bay. They can then switch to equipment, which is suitable for fishing outside the 
bay. Both ‘sasi’ and ‘petuanang’ are linked to religious customs; for example, the 
pastor and other religious leaders take an active part in ‘sasi’ ceremonies. The 
islanders pass on their knowledge of these management measures from one 
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generation to next. These indigenous approaches have proved successful in 
maintaining the exploitation of resources at a sustainable level, promoting village 
growth, and guaranteeing equitable catch distribution among villagers. As a result, 
there is always enough fish to meet the needs of everyone in the village. 
Malinowski (1918, p.90) was one of the first anthropologists to provide an account 
of the role of ritual activities in fishing, focusing on ritual as a means of alleviating 
anxiety in the face of uncertainty. He showed how Trobriand fishers engaged in 
ritual acts as attempts to cope with dangers and uncertainties at sea and thus come 
to terms with nature. He argued that rituals and rites are not observed in professions 
in which profit is calculable and certain. In fishing, where the yield is abundant and 
there is no uncertainty and risk, there is little or no observance of rites.  
Kalland (1994) argues that the devastating earthquakes, volcanoes, typhoons, 
landslides and floods have taught the Japanese people the power of natural forces. 
Nature has come to appear threatening to most Japanese. Like Malinowski, 
Kalland’s study (1995) of Tokugawa Japan (1600-1868) revealed that fishing 
festivals were designed to relieve the fishermen from anxiety and to help them 
manipulate natural powers. Worship of Shinto deities had to be conducted in a state 
of purity to ward off misfortune. The Japanese preoccupation with purity and 
pollution affected the fishermen in other ways as well. The idea of female purity 
gave rise to a widespread taboo against women participating on fishing boats in 
Japan (Oto, 1963; Segawa 1963; Yoshida, 1981). 
Fishing communities of Philippines have various ritual practices to deal with any 
unexplained sickness or misfortune in their expeditions, which they attribute to the 
‘Tawa sa dagat’ (the people of the sea) whom they may have displeased or hurt. To 
remedy this, the fishers must offer rituals to the people of sea for their swift 
recovery during expeditions. These beliefs and practices provide a sense of security 
for fisher folk (Ushijima & Zayas, 1994). 
Rituals and taboos practiced in fishing have different meanings in different fishing 
communities of different fishing environments. For example, in the coastal 
communities of Bantayan and Daang Bantayan in the Philippines, the ‘harang’ and 
the ‘halad sa diwata’ rituals are performed to thank the ‘tawa sa dagat’ for an 
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abundant catch, for the blessing of a new fishing vessel, for the anniversary of an 
older fishing vessel or for commemorating some past misfortune. Launching a new 
fishing vessel (‘lusad sa dagat’) is considered a major community event. On this 
occasion, the owner serves plenty of food and drinks. Such a ceremony, however, is 
confined to big commercial fishing vessels like the ‘kobkob’, ‘basnig’, or the 
‘hulbut-hulbot’ and ‘siper’. The smaller non-motorized fishing vessels are blessed 
or launched with the ‘tuob’ rituals. The ‘harang’ is usually held during a full moon. 
The blessing begins with the smashing of the ‘vino’ or locally produced wine (e.g. 
‘Tenduay Rhum’, etc.) against the boat, after which a pig is butchered inside the 
boat, its blood smeared on the sides of the hull. The meat is cooked without salt. 
The ‘mereko’ (fisher’s leader) then sails seaward with the family members and 
other guests. The ‘mereko’ begins to chant, invoking the grace and powers of the 
sea spirits while throwing small portion of food into the sea. Traditional fishers 
believe that this type of annual blessing of the fishing vessels will yield larger 
quantities of fish (Ushijima & Zayas, 1994).  
Tvedten and Hersong (1992, p.150) mention that in Africa magic and rituals 
influence fishermen’s behaviour and strategies both in their everyday work 
activities and in their relation to non-fishermen. Examples of the former are when 
specific fishing grounds are to be avoided, particular rituals are to be observed 
when going to and coming from the sea, when specific types of fish are to be 
avoided and when amulets or other objects are to be attached to boats in order to 
improve catches and avoid disasters. Relations with non-fishers involve conversion 
barriers related to exchange of fish, when people from specific social groups are be 
banned from the occupation and avoidance rules in relation to women.  
Several fishing peoples in India also have developed a network of ritualistic 
performances to satisfy the unknown powers, which are believed to control the 
various factors relating to success in fishing (Bavink, 2001; Pramanik, 1993; Ram, 
1991). According to Ram (1991), Mukkuvar fishermen hold the belief that fish 
cannot be caught until they allow themselves to be trapped in fishing nets. This 
particular belief is the result of the development of a kind of fish worship. A 
number of specific rituals are connected with the boats, as these are the only means 
to fight the turbulent rivers during cyclones. During the fishermen’s long absence 
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from home on fishing expeditions the womenfolk at home perform river worship or 
Ganga Ma. Beside this, they also observe various practices, including worship and 
fasting, in the hope of keeping their male partners free from danger and assuring 
their safe return from the river or sea. The popular novel by Kerala writer Thakazhi 
Sivesankara Pillai (1962), Chemmeen, draws on this theme emphasising that among 
Kerala fishers it is women, by their prayers and chastity, who bring the man home 
safe from the sea. 
Ram (1991, p. 51) shows how Mukkuvar fishers depend on a ritualisation of their 
fishing technology in controlling certain environments of fishing. To the 
Mukkuvars, all the tools of trade, their fishing craft and gear, particularly prior to 
their first use at sea, must receive religious consecration. Parish priests pray over 
the craft, and offer the insurance of divine blessings for the future luck and safety of 
the craft. Individuals in fishing villages who claim some knowledge of Hindu 
‘mantra vaadam’, described by a practitioner as the juggling of sounds or 
‘aksharam’ said to have begun with the origin of the world itself, are able to 
exchange their knowledge for a share in the fishing catch. By utilising their 
‘mantram’ to attract fish into nets (and also deflect fish out of the nets of the rivals) 
these men collect five per cent of the total catch from the crew they have helped. 
Significantly, the type of fishing where magic is used most frequently is the 
‘KaramaDi’ or beach-seine, precisely where human skills and expertise are least 
related to predictable levels of productivity (Ram, 1991, pp. 50-51). Ram found that 
many of the fishing rituals are related to fisher women and girls. Mukkuvars believe 
that wrongful conduct on the part of women may be responsible for the failure of 
economic ventures at sea, and may be regarded as putting at risk the safety and 
welfare of the men themselves (Ram, 1991: 51).  
These example shows that fishing knowledge and practices are embedded within 
local cultural contexts, which give meaning to, and practical guidelines for, 
successful fishing outcomes. Such contexts often do not draw any categorical 
distinction between the worlds of humans and non-humans and may indeed 
attribute human qualities to aspects of the natural world. For example, Ushijima and 
Zayas (1994) in their Philippino fisher’s study show that religious observance of 
rituals and practices are ways of dealing with supernatural beings and of coping 
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with the unexpected. Some Filipino fisher communities attribute unexplained 
sicknesses or misfortune when fishing to the ‘Tawa sa dagat’ (the people of the sea) 
whom they may have displeased or hurt and offer rituals for their swift recovery 
during expeditions. Pramanik’s (1993) study on the coastal fishing community of 
West Bengal in India identified that in the past, but also in the recent times, people 
observed magico-religious rites on different solemn occasions (Pramanik, 1993). 
All these practices contain technical and religious components which fishers regard 
as mutually constitutive rather than as two ontologically separate spheres of reality. 
As noted earlier, IK is neither timeless nor static. For example, Bavinck’s (2001) 
study of the Coromandel Coast fishing community of Tamil Nadu describes how 
traditional artisanal fishing communities of Tamil Nadu are incorporating new 
technologies in modification of their traditional fishing crafts (fishing nets and 
boats) and discusses the issue of conflicts and cohesions which exists in their 
technical innovations and motorisation of artisanal fishing crafts. His study also 
deals with the myths and realities in regulating the common pool marine fisheries 
resources in Tamil Nadu. As chapter …shows, Krishnapur fishers have their own 
kinds of ‘ecological’ knowledge on fish movements, diseases, seasonal changes, 
water flows and fish habitats as well as particular beliefs and ritual practices which 
underpin and giving meaning to their fishing activities. However, as discussed in 
section 2.7 below, there are no detailed ethnographic studies of fishers’ IK in 
Bangladesh.  
2.8.Bangladesh studies of IK in fishing  
The discussion and examples above indicate the rich materials available on IK in 
general and within fishing communities globally. Such material has considerable 
relevance to the present study as academic and policy interest in IK among students 
of Bangladesh is quite recent. As noted earlier, there are no detailed ethnographic 
studies which take IK as a central theme. What we have are several works which 
mention types of fishing gear, religious practices, the cultural significance of fish in 
Bengali life and the like. These works give little explicit theoretical attention to 
indigenous knowledge and fishing practices and their relations with sustainable 
fisheries development. However, there are some development-oriented, technical 
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and economic studies which provide detailed empirical descriptions of fishing 
practices, methods and fish production methods.  Among the most important of 
these studies are Alam (1998) on two fishing communities of Bangladesh, Jansen’s 
study (1987) of Noakhali fishers, Hora’s (1948) study of ancient Hindu views on 
fish and fisheries, Das’s work (1931) on the cultural significance of fish in Bengal, 
Feldman’s (1982) study of marine fishing families, Islam, Reihlen and Thompson’s 
(2000) pilot study of IK among fishers, and the work of Mazumder et al. (2000) on 
fresh water fisheries and sustainability. 
One of the few ethnographic studies of inland fishers that examined the impact of 
natural and human-made changes on local fishing practices is that of Khurshed 
Alam (1998) who studied two different fishing communities in Chittagang and 
Patuakhali. The study looked at issues such as how fishers were affected by changes 
in and outside the village, how the fishing populations reacted to the changes and 
how they coped with new situations. He also described the differences in fishing 
practices between the two fishing villages, drawing on several social, economic and 
political perspectives to frame the analysis. 
Mahbub Alam’s (2001) study of traditional Hindu fishers of Charan Lake, while not 
specifically concerned with IK, describes how fishers cope with the wider society 
and what barriers they face in getting access to local fishing rights. He shows that 
changing rules imposed by the state in different periods has affected local people‘s 
access to fishing grounds and the ways in which these fishers have attempted to 
devise new ways of dealing with such change through fisher’s cooperatives or other 
social bodies. Alam’s study illustrates how blurred the boundaries can be between 
IK and property rights.  
Mazumder et al. (2000) discuss the use of a variety of fishing gears in Bengal and 
the technology and knowledge the fishing people developed over generations. They 
argue that detrimental changes have occurred through outside intervention, which 
ignored the indigenous knowledge and experience of fishers.  Ahmed et al. (2004) 
provide detailed descriptions of fishing gear (gill nets, seine nets, lift nets, set bag 
nets, cast net, spears, long line and hooks) used by the fishers of the Titas floodplain 
area of Brahmanbaria and discuss in which season fishers use what type of gears to 
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catch certain specific species of fish matching with the lunar cycle/ lunar periodicity 
(full moon & new moon).  
Sillitoe (2002) and Huq and Rahman (1994) mention that fishing people who 
generally have little or no formal education, possess a considerable body of 
knowledge embedded in local cultural traditions. Such knowledge has emerged over 
time and been shaped by natural environmental changes such as the annual 
monsoon floods, development policies and interventions such as building flood 
refuge embankments, local political power struggles, and other wider social changes 
which blend into cultural change. Fishers have not been passive recipients of 
change but have wanted to improve their technologies and practices.  
2.9.Conclusion 
To conclude, the general and Bangladesh literature on property rights and IK shows 
that there is considerable social and cultural diversity in the ways in which fishers 
manage their resources and the kinds of knowledge and practices they have 
developed sometimes over centuries.  The review also reveals that in the face of 
major technological, organizational and environmental changes, traditional fisheries 
have become more diversified; traditional fishing methods have been consolidated 
and transformed as fishers, in their continuing struggle for survival, have made 
room for innovations. In particular, many fishing communities have drawn on their 
local knowledge and practices, often in a changed or modified form, to deal with 
new and sometimes threatening circumstances. Such knowledge and practices have 
incorporated changed notions of the most effective forms of property rights. 
However, despite the close connection between IK and property rights regimes, 
there has been less interest in explicitly linking the two.  
The remainder of the thesis focuses on property rights and IK in the Bangladesh 
context, paying particular attention to the Koibortta of Kishoreganj District.  The 
next chapter examines fisheries management in Bangladesh since 1793 when the 
British introduced the zamindary system which changed the legal status of many 





Common property rights, common property fisheries resources and 
management regimes in Bangladesh 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Bengla Lake surrounded for fishing by leaseholders 
3.1.Overview 
This chapter discusses the changing role nature of property rights in fishing over a 
200 year period followed by a general description of inland fisheries management in 
present-day Bangladesh. The general issues raised in the chapter are of particular 
relevance to Bangladesh as there has been a growing academic and policy interest in 
the role of common property rights in the management of Bangladesh’s common 
pool resources such as forests and fisheries. Bangladesh, which has one of the 
world’s most diverse inland fishing environments, has a long history of conflict 
among different groups regarding access to common pool resources. 
3.2.CPR and management regimes in inland open water fisheries of Bangladesh: 




From British period to present day Bangladesh, a number of fisheries policies, 
regulations and acts were introduced for the management of waterbodies and other 
fisheries resources (see table-3.1 and appendix 3.1). Prior to 1757, fishers and 
farmers of Bengal had customary rights1 over open water fisheries including rivers, 
land depressions, lakes and oxbow lakes and the floodplains. At that time, fisheries 
were managed by the local fishing community as common property under various 
systems of tenure. During the early stages of British administration, fishers had the 
same customary rights over all water bodies. However, the Permanent Settlement 
gave the landlords (zamindars) rights not only to cultivated land but also: 
...all the remaining varieties of land, i.e., pasture, forest, wasteland, 
marketplace, fishery, ferry, road, etc. were also declared to be private 
property of one social class, the zamindars, in disregard of the other 
classes' customary rights in them (Nakazato, 1994: 224). 
In other words, the land settlement provided a means whereby any usufructuary rights 
farmers and fishers may have had in the commons could be undermined. It is still 
unclear how extensive such rights were in pre-British times although, in the case of 
fisheries, there is evidence that they had some. For example, in some districts the 
agricultural population, including fishers, could fish freely with rod and line in 
certain lakes and could use hand nets in navigable rivers and lakes on particular days 
(Nakazato, 1994:226-227). Also, during the monsoon season, paddy fields were 
inundated with water and peasants took the opportunity to fish a dispersed fishing 
stock which was unprofitable to zamindars, lessess (ijaradars) and professional 
fishers. This was a central source of protein to the peasant population, although it 
was insufficient to cover entirely their needs. Nakazato (1994: 229) argues that the 
persistence of the peasantry's customary right to fish is partly explained by the 
seasonal division of labour between a dry season during which time most 
professional fishing took place and wet season when the peasant population had time 
on their hands and used part of it for fishing 
Several other commentators have noted that during British times a normal tax (kor) 
was collected from fishers in exchange for use rights (Ahmed, Capistrado & Hossain, 




1996). Pokrant et al. (1996) mention that during this period, zamindars leased out 
their water bodies to lessees who were usually drawn from local non-fishing rural 
elites. These lessees either sub-leased their fisheries to the fishers or entered into a 
share contract with them or employed fishers for a wage.  
It is important to note that inland fisheries, especially the floodplains, were 
historically connected to different water bodies. During pre-British and British times, 
the main rivers, where the Hindu caste fishermen dominated in the past, were subject 
to some control by the fishing communities themselves under various informal 
arrangements, particularly during the dry season when monsoon water levels 
dropped, allowing a clearer demarcation of fishing territories. However, on sections 
of rivers and lakes, local landlords (zamindars and jotedars) reserved their rights of 
access to the deepest and most productive parts of the water bodies and fishers were 
required to pay a fairly nominal fee for access. Often this fee was given in the form of 
a present (salami) of a portion of the finest fish of the catch to the landlords. In some 
places competition for particularly rich fishing grounds was fierce both between 
fishing communities and landlords. In some instances, landowners often had 
minimum control over water bodies and fishers (especially the wealthier ones) 
operated under the patronage of particular landlords. The number of people 
competing for the resource was therefore limited. Seasonal and subsistence fishers 
existed but in small numbers and fish resources were abundant enough to cater for all 
(FAP-17, 1994). 
The state itself was directly involved in regulating water-tax rights through the 
ownership of particular types of water bodies, namely, navigable rivers, estuaries, 
certain forest zones, such as the Sundarbans, and other water bodies. As noted earlier, 
many other water bodies were owned by landlords and other members of local elites 
and fishers increasingly had to pay for lease rights. In the case of navigable rivers, the 
public was allowed to fish in and to navigate rivers, but this right was subject to the 
state’s higher right to lease out fisheries. Such leasing was the subject of a number of 




Hence during the 19th and 20th centuries, the colonial state created a legal and 
regulatory framework which favoured landlords and leaseholders who were drawn 
largely from non-fishing classes and groups and who increasingly saw their water tax 
rights as valuable commercial and financial assets that needed to be protected from 
unauthorized fishers. The fishers had to come to some arrangements with them in 
order to survive (see Chu-fa-Tsai & Ali, 1997, p. 40).  
 
Table 3.1: Summary of major policies and legal issues related to aquatic environment 




Leasing policy details 
1950-1965 Open auction leasing of water bodies where highest bidder is granted lease. The method 
of fixing minimum revenue prior to auction was to average the last three terms lease 
value than to increase it by 10 %. In fixing the lease value the productivity of the fishery 
was not considered. 
1965-1973 Preference was given to registered fishers cooperatives in leasing out the water bodies 
provided the cooperatives agreed to pay the highest bid money. 
1973-1984 Restriction placed on leasing out water bodies to registered fisher cooperative societies 
through negotiation for 1-year lease for river and canal and 3-year lease for closed/semi 
closed type of fisheries such as lake, baor and ponds (pukur). If such a fisher association 
was not available or the terms and conditions of lease were not acceptable to the 
government then the water bodies would be put up for open auction where anybody 
including non-fishers could bid.  
1984-1986 Leasing to the fishers cooperative societies through negotiation was replaced by open 
auction system but limited to fishers cooperative societies. Open auction system of 
leasing water bodies was subsequently changed to bidding by sealed tender system, all 
other conditions and norms remaining unchanged. All closed Jolmohols of up to 20 acres 
(8 ha) were transferred to Upazila Parishad (local Government) for management and were 
transferred again in 1997 to the Ministry of Youth and Sports. 
1986-1995/6 To ensure biological management of fisheries resources and to establish the right of 
fishers to water bodies a licensing system introduced under the New Fisheries 
Management Policy (NFMP) in 1986 in selected locations, but this had limited success 
and ended in 1996 since when project-based approaches involving communities have 
been adopted. 
1995/6- Leasing system for flowing rivers was abolished and fishing was declared open to all free 
of cost except to those who catch fish by using mechanized boats. The policy was 
established for the benefit of the poor fishers but as there was no control, fishing pressure 
increased greatly and threatened fish stocks. Additionally influential people and mastans 
(musclemen) were reported as controlling the rights to river water bodies in some areas 
and to have harassed and exploited fishers.  
Source: Adapted from Ali et al. 2003 
 
After the partition of India in 1947, the new state of Pakistan abolished the zamindari 




Tenancy Act of 1950”. The Ministry of Lands managed the water bodies by leasing 
fishing rights for one to three years to the highest bidder, a private or corporate entity, 
who thereby acquired exclusive rights to determine fishing access to the water body. 
It led to a shift in control from Hindu landlords to newly emerged Muslim political 
elites and economically influential people as the leaseholders of these water bodies. 
The leaseholders allowed as many fishermen as possible to collect as much rent as 
possible during the tenure of their leases. Through this system, traditional Hindu 
fishermen lost significant user rights as Bengali Muslim fishermen had better access 
to local power brokers (Pomeroy 2001).  
The central aim of the leasing policy was to raise state revenue. The shift from the 
zamindari system to state ownership in the post-colonial period did little to weaken 
non-fisher control. From 1950 to 1965, anybody could participate in the auction to 
bid for the lease of a waterbody, which involved many rich and influential 
leaseholders. But in the mid 1960s, with pressure from fishers’ organizations, the 
Board of Revenue restricted leasing to the highest bidder among fisher cooperatives 
in order to assist poorer fishers. 
After the independence of Bangladesh, the Government of Bangladesh decided to 
restrict waterbody auctions only to registered fisher’s cooperatives but this intensified 
non-fisher control of co-operatives by wealthy traders, leaseholders and others. Due 
to a lack of capital and to control of local political authorities by non-fisher interest 
groups, fishers were outbid or their cooperatives were controlled by outside 
financiers (see Pokrant 1996, Toufique 1996, 1997 & 1998). Sometimes, local non-
fisher elites who did not get support from the fishermen cooperatives formed a fake 
fishers’ cooperative. They also tried to divide the fisher communities by making 
informal agreements with a small section of opportunist fishers to establish their 
control over fisheries resources. 
In 1979, during the tenure of President Ziaur Rahman, all the waterbodies were 
transferred from the Ministry of Land to the Ministry of Fisheries. But from 1979 to 
1983, the Fisheries Ministry did not lease out waterbodies to the actual fishermen or 




of the Fisheries Ministry to manage waterbodies successfully, President Ershad 
returned all these waterbodies to the Ministry of Land and in 1986/87 a New 
Fisheries Management Policy (NFMP) was introduced.  In March 1987, under 
pressure from the Jatiya Matsyajeebee Samity (National Fishers’ Association), the 
Government granted 10 waterbodies to local fishers associations for community 
based management. In a gazette notification on 7/1/1988 (Bengali years 1396 and 
1397), the government handed over 140 and 150 waterbodies respectively to the 
fishers’ associations. In order to protect the interests of the poor fishing community 
from the exploitative influences of leaseholders and moneylenders under the open 
auction system and to ensure the biological management of the fishery, the NFMP’s 
(New Fisheries Management Policy) aim was to reserve some water bodies for what 
were referred to as ‘genuine’ fishermen defined as those who depended on full-time 
fishing for their livelihood. Under this new system, the leasing system was abolished 
and fishing rights were directly licensed to fishers. Licensees were expected to obey 
and enforce rules and regulations. Annual gear-specific licenses were introduced to 
ease the pressure on fisheries by regulating harvests. Limited user rights to genuine 
fishermen were meant to ensure that they received a greater share of the fishing 
income (Ahmed et al. 1997).  
NFMP operated in a selected number of fisheries and enjoyed some successes. 
However, several problems became apparent. Fishers sometimes failed to pay license 
fees on time and there was a poor revenue return to the government compared with 
the leasing system.  Non-fishers continued to control water bodies, assisted by 
wealthier fishers. There was a failure to link license fees to the productivity and 
biological potential of the water bodies, which meant that for many fishers license 
fees were too high and increased yearly which over time put them out of the reach of 
many.  
Critics of the NFMP argued that it failed to achieve its goals due to a lack of fishers’ 
technical support from the fisheries department, a lack of financial support from the 
government and non-governmental financial institutions, (fishers were denied loans 
from banks and most had to rely on moneylenders), lack of security to protect their 




continuous threats from other interest groups. Despite these problems, to date the 
NFMP has been the only significant government effort to organise the interests of 
traditional fishers. 
In 1991, the new BNP government abolished the NFMP and some water bodies were 
returned to open access while others were given over to open auction leasing as an 
initiative to raise revenue through increasing the rental payments. According to the 
new rule, tendering was restricted to the fisher’s co-operatives and the lease of the 
waterbodies had to be settled within the fisher’s co-operatives.  However, in 1995, 
the BNP government again declared all the open water bodies as open for everybody 
and abolished the leasing system. In 2001, the present government made a small 
change to its management policy and gave 33 waterbodies (20 closed and 13 open-
water fisheries) to the National Fishers Association for community management on a 
trial basis. 
In summary, from the late 18th century to the present, Bangladesh’s inland fisheries 
management has been dominated by private leasing and controlled by non-fishers 
business and political elites. Most of the policies and rules instituted during this 
period led to a transfer of property rights from traditional fishers to the socially 
powerful agents, the leasees, and other commercial non-fishers interests (Pokrant, 
1996; Toufique, 1997, 1998). 
3.3.Fisheries management bodies and leasing practices in inland open water fisheries 
in present-day Bangladesh 
To facilitate the leasing process, rivers and its tributaries are divided by the Ministry 
of Land (M0L) into several small arbitrary segments. These segments or waterbodies 
are then leased out through auction for the collection of revenue.  Similarly land 
depressions and ponds owned by the government fall under this category. There are 
over 10,000 waterbodies (inland water bodies generating government revenue) in 
Bangladesh (Viswanathan et al., 2002 & table: 3.2) and they are leased to the highest 
bidder with a preference for fisher cooperatives but very often, either directly or by 
bidding through a cooperative, control ends in the hands of the rich and influential 




has become increasingly difficult and competition over the fisheries resources is 
becoming more intense and complex every year. Today, there are several groups 
involved in fishing or fishing related activities in inland open waters of Bangladesh 
and they include the traditional caste fishers (mostly Hindus), non-traditional fishers 
(who entered fishing later), the leaseholders of waterbodies (who are mostly non-
fishers), and the general fishers (members of the public) who catch fish occasionally 
for their own family consumption (Blanchet, 1993). 
In Bangladesh, there is no statutory provision regarding inland open water fishery 
management. Rather, the government makes rules, policy, guidelines and circulars 
and so on and in this way regulates the open water fisheries. The Ministry of Land in 
one of its memoranda (number-Bhum/7/5/91/424(12) of 12th Sept.1991) states that 
management of all open water fisheries remains vested in the Ministry of Land. 
 
Table 3.2: Distribution of fisheries/ waterbodies by category in Bangladesh 
Category of fishery Number of waterbodies 
Rivers 2,013 
Canals 1,924 
Lakes (depressions) 3,528 
Ox-Bow Lakes 162 
Ponds 1,632 
Others (unclassified) 860 
Total 10,119 
Source: Annual report of DOF activities 1985. 
However, the revenue from such fisheries is treated as the income of sub-district, and 
distributed to different sub-district on the basis of area and population (Farooque, 
1997). Many of the sections of the rivers are now under open access while a majority 
of the waterbodies connected to the open water fisheries of the rivers are still subject 
to formal leasing arrangements. In practice, many of these open water fisheries are 
considered as closed water bodies and are leased out with only a very small part of 
open fisheries kept open for commons’ fishing, mostly controlled by the leaseholders 
of the nearby water bodies or other local political and non-political elites. Poor 
fishers have little direct access to these open fisheries.  The large size of the areas 




activities directly but sub-lease areas to second parties. Most of the major leases on 
main rivers are at least nominally assigned to fishermen cooperatives.  Access to 
these river fisheries is usually in the form of a fixed fee to be paid for the use of 
particular fishing equipment during a set time period (FAP-17, 1994, p. 67).  
Generally two sets of people are able to lay some claim to fisheries resources in the 
inland water bodies including the rivers and the floodplains. Leaseholders who have 
rights to some part of the floodplains or a lakes located in the floodplains, may 
restrict fishing not only in the waterbodies area, but also in the floodplains around it 
as they regard any fish in their lakes as “theirs”. Landowners may claim similar rights 
over floodplain areas surrounding their landholdings, particularly if they have kua or 
submersible ponds where fish concentrate at the end of the flood season (FAP-17, 
1994, pp. 70-71). Most areas other than lakes have generally been regarded as open-
access for fishing as long as they are under water. Some canals or other particularly 
deep sections of floodplains or even areas specifically excavated by landowners in 
the floodplain to concentrate fish may have various forms of restriction placed on 
them. But usually restrictions are only applied when boundaries can be distinguished 
above the floodwaters. Generally it is accepted that flooded land is open to all for 
fishing as long as no boundaries or other means of ownership can be distinguished 
(FAP-17, 1994).  
In Bangladesh today, three systems of management of open capture fisheries are 
practised on state-owned water bodies: private leasing to cooperatives and private 
individuals under the Ministry of Land (MOL); licensing of individual fishers 
through the JMS (Jatiya Matsyajibi Samity) under the Department of Fisheries 
(DOF); and open access under the supervision of District Commissioners. In 
addition, there is private ownership of coastal shrimp farms (ghers) and many inland 
ponds (some of which are used for fresh water aquaculture) and in some parts of the 
inland flood plains. 
The two main state organizations involved in fisheries sector management and 
development are the Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock (MOFL) and the Ministry of 




fisheries bodies with responsibility for fisheries related administration, research and 
development activities. They are the Directorate of Fisheries (DOF), Bangladesh 
Fisheries Development Corporation BFDC), Bangladesh Fisheries Research Institute 
(BFRI) and Marine Fisheries Academy (MFA). Among these four, DOF is the largest 
and is responsible for management and conservation of fisheries resources, 
enforcement of fisheries rules and regulations, extension of aquaculture and fisheries 
management technology through training, demonstration and motivation, execution 
of development projects, quality control of fish and fish products for home 
consumption and export. On the other hand, Deputy Commissioner of Land and the 
District Administration, together with the Upazila administration, work under the 
MOL as it controls all public water bodies such as rivers, lakes, ox-bow lakes, 
Government owned ponds etc. Other than these two, there are a number of state 
central and local organizations and institutions involved in the fisheries sector, 
including the Ministry of Youth and Sports (MOYS), Ministry of Water Resources 
(MWR), Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives, 
Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Shipping, Ministry of 
Finance, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Forest and Environment, Planning 
Commission, Banks, Fishers Cooperative Societies/ Fishers Organization, and other 
Community Based Organizations (Ali et al., 2003) (Table: 3.3 & Appendix 3.2). 
A tender committee, consisting of the Deputy Commissioner of the district 
(chairman), Additional Commissioner Revenue (member), District Fisheries Officer 
(member), District Cooperative Officer (member), and the Revenue Deputy Collector 
(member secretary), works in every district for the purpose of settling leases of these 
fisheries or waterbodies and implementing leasing arrangements through a number of 
circulars (see appendix: 3.3). 
The Additional District Commissioner is generally responsible for leasing water 
bodies of 20 acres or more, provided the ministry has not placed an injunction on 
them. In practice, smaller water bodies are also leased at district level. This is done 
by lumping together several small lakes and creating a group fishery totalling 20 
acres or more. In the name of better management, the district authority takes over a 




accessible to the villagers. Water bodies, which are not leased at district level, can be 
leased by the Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO) provided the price is not below 5,000 
taka and the size is not below 3 acres. Here small lakes are also regrouped to make 
larger waterbodies.The two criteria of lease price and the size of waterbodies make it 
possible to auction small water bodies which were not leased in the past, thus 
removing from villagers a resource to which they previously had free access.   
Table 3.3: Major responsible bodies for the management of fisheries  
Levels  Actors Responsibilities 
Macro National MOFL Formulate policy and planning for fisheries management, 
resource conservation and development 
  DOF Assist MOFL in policy formulation and planning in 
technical aspects, plan for execution of the activities, 
guide, supervise monitor and evaluate  
  MOL Policy and planning, lease management of water bodies 
above 20 acres. 
  MOYS Policy and planning for management of closed type of 
water bodies below 20 acres. 
  MOFE Policy and planning for forest resources management and 
conservation, and protection and conservation of 
environment management 
MESO Division Divisional 
Deputy Director 
Supervision, monitoring, advising, enforcement of law 
 District District Fisheries 
officer 
Supervision, monitoring, advising, enforcement of law 
  Deputy 
Commissioner 
Leasing Joalmohol and collection of revenue 
  Divisional Forest 
Officer 
Supervision, monitoring, management of fisheries 
resources in the Sundarbans Forest 







Enforce Fish Act and Laws and extension activities 
  Chairman/UNO, 
Upazila Parishad 
Coordinating lease of small Jolmohals placed under the 
Ministry of Youth and Joalmohol manage under NFMP 
  Forest Ranger Issue permits for fishing in Sunderland forest area and 
collect revenue 




Motivate and organize the fisher for capacity building to 
establish fisher rights, and bargain for the interest of 
fishers community 
  Chairman, Union 
Parishad 
Management of khas water body up to 3 acres as common 
property resources 





The Ministry of Land leases out defined water areas through auctions for varying 
periods and against the payment of a lease fee to private entrepreneurs  (one to three 
years lease period), local co-operatives (up to five years), and government agencies 
(for longer periods, up to 30 years). Leasing of fishing grounds for a restricted term 
(one or three years) depends on local circumstances. The respective Ministries 
through their local bodies make a prior fixation of the bid value before putting the 
water bodies up for public bidding through open auctions. Lease periods are for 3 
years for closed water bodies. The minimum lease value for a fishery is fixed by 
adding 25% to the average of the last 3 lease term values and than an additional 10% 
increase every year. 
In 1984, the management of all closed waterbodiesof up to 20 acres (8 ha) was 
transferred to the Upazila Parishad (local Government) and was transferred again in 
1997 to the Ministry of Youth and Sports. Although the intention of the leasing 
policy is to favour fishing communities, in most cases fishers have limited access 
because their poverty, poor organization and the influence of powerful groups 
prevents them from bidding effectively for leases. Generally it is laid down in the 
circular that initially tenders are restricted to the Fishermen Cooperative Societies but 
if the offered lease is not at least 25% higher than in the previous year, new tenders 
are invited, and this time anybody- an individual or an organization- is entitled to 
make an offer. 
In almost every case, the bids are undervalued and usually obtained by politically or 
economically influential people who maintain a close link with government agencies 
or personnel in the area. Base leases are kept low in order to restrict access to the 
auction to genuine fishers but powerful people sometimes form fake cooperative 
societies to secure the lease of a waterbodies or pay the lease money on behalf of the 
society and control the fishery, with the fishers working either on a contract/share 
basis or as labourers (Ali et al., 2003). Leases are usually for one to three years 
(recently extended in some cases to six years), which encourage a resource mining 




system is subject to much political manipulation and a considerable proportion of 
revenue is lost through local level corruption (see Pokrant, 1997). 
Many of the leaseholders in the study area claim that no lease is obtained without 
bribe or ‘salami’ whether the applicant is an NGO, a fishermen’s co-operative, or a 
member of the public. A waterbody officially leased for tk.500 may cost the 
leaseholder tk.1, 000 in bribe. The lower the lease price, the higher may be the bribe; 
such is often the understanding between the parties concerned. The leasing system, as 
it operates now, serves the interests of both civil servants and leaseholders at the 
expense of fishermen and state revenue. Moreover, a number of studies demonstrate 
that the leasing system encourages over fishing and a mentality to treat a public 
resources as personal property to be exploited to the maximum for quick profits 
(Blanchet, 1993, pp. 5-6). The actual fishermen either individually or in a group are 
rarely lucky enough to secure any of the bids. However, the task of actually 
harvesting fish resources is left to poor fishermen. 
3.4.CPR, leasing practices and fisher’s livelihoods  
Over the years, the state has recognized that state owned resources must be used to 
address the prevailing inequalities in rural areas. Thus, in 1971, the fishing 
communities were organized into co-operative societies and were given the exclusive 
opportunity to make the first bid at auctions of waterbodies. However, certain 
features built into this have made it practically impossible for the state to achieve its 
distributive goal. In particular, the automatic rise in base lease fees by 25% from one 
lease period to another have led to the displacement of the fishing communities from 
the market. Only by borrowing increasingly larger sums of money from local 
mohajon and, therefore, surrendering effective control to the lender, have fishing 
communities been able to maintain a nominal title to access rights. In reality, the 
leaseholders usually approach the fishing community and acquire the right to use 
their names in order to obtain leases. Due to the lack of effective and reliable sources 
of institutional credit, few fishers have been able to obtain fishing rights. Since most 
of the cooperatives are disorganized with no proper leadership and a lack of 




bidders in public auction are often non-fisher middlemen who then establish an 
extensive network of sub lessees. Fishermen in need of fishing grounds are required 
to pay these sub-leasing agents to obtain access. As fishermen neither have a stable 
nor strong flow of financial resources, they must secure fishing rights through other 
arrangements with the lessee/sub-lessee, such as catch sharing, paying toll/rent (in 
terms of types and size of gear), or as working labourers.  
Fishers’ access to fisheries varies according to seasons. For example, in Krishnapur 
during the monsoon the land depression totally flooded and looks like a vast sea with 
small outcrops of villages above the water. When land depression and river 
boundaries are submerged, fish is a god-given resource and can be legally caught by 
any one who has a boat and net. The leaseholders are said to have rights over the 
water bodies they rent close to the land depression and up to 200 meters beyond. At 
the most, this represents not more then 10 per cent of the land depression’s surface. 
However, Blanchet (1993), in her study of Shaneer Tangua, Matian and other deep 
land depressions, reports that actual practice differs from the text of the law. The 
powerful leaseholders of waterbodies claim ownership over all fish at all times of the 
year. Since the mid eighties they have forced the fishermen to buy fishing rights from 
them during the monsoon and they have forbidden the use of fishing nets. The so-
called “tickets” they issue only allow the use of fishing hooks. She further mentions 
that in 1992, during the months of June and July, some 150 boats and in the months 
of September-November some 500 boats bought monthly ‘tickets’ for 1000 taka 
each. Leaseholders’ private police repeatedly harassed the fishers who did not buy 
‘tickets’ (the majority) and even those who bought tickets but used forbidden gears. 
Blanchet further mentions that the entrepreneurs who lease the largest waterbodies 
are not fishermen. They are based in district or Upazila towns where they have access 
to capital.  
In spite of such constraints, the monsoon is a relatively less restricted period than the 
dry season for all part-time and full-time, professional and non-professional 
fishermen. Local fishers and the general public have a very restricted access to the 
fish resources during the dry season and their catch and profits are lower than during 




identity do not dare to challenge the powerful leaseholders. Confrontations with the 
leaseholders’ police, which led to confiscation of boats and fishing gears, beating, 
and arrest, are more frequent during the dry season and these police are the object of 
public resentment and anger, especially amongst poor non-traditional fishermen 
(Blanchet, 1993, p.  4).  
3.5.Property rights, management issue and social conflicts in Bangladesh fisheries  
The underlying causes of nearly all fisheries conflicts are related to access to and 
allocation of resources. Unfair competition for control and access to fisheries 
resources, and unjust allocation of the fisheries resources to politically and 
economically well-connected interest groups have led to conflicts in many of the 
fisheries of Bangladesh. With a range of state organizations and bodies responsible 
for leasing and managing different types of inland open water fisheries and with the 
involvement of several interest groups with different political and economic goals, 
objectives and interests, a complex and conflict-prone situation exists in fisheries. 
Political rivalry, fake and false court cases against fishers, physical assault and other 
forms of attacks are central to these conflicts. To give two examples, political 
rivalries take place between members of political parties with support at the local 
level. Fisheries are often one of the ‘prizes’ of such rivalries as politicians seek to 
cement their power in the local community. Different government departments also 
compete for bureaucratic control over natural resources, including fisheries. For 
example, the Ministry of Land is one of the most powerful ministries in the 
government and has been able to main control over the revenue-raising opportunities 
from fishing bodies, often against the wishes of weaker ministries and departments 
such as fisheries, forests and environment.  
In the wetland region of Bangladesh, including the present study area, thousands of 
traditional fishers finds it increasingly difficult to sell their catch at a fair price and 
armed criminals and dacoits loot their catches. In many instances, they are threatened, 
physically assaulted and injured, and sometimes killed (Mallick, 2003). Major 
conflicts occur when villagers decide to fight back to protect what they see as their 




after the government’s decision to lease inland open water common property fisheries 
through public auction, which transferred common property fisheries resources from 
the traditional fishing community to non-fishing political elites. Government officials 
from the Ministry of Land and the Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock argued that the 
fishers indiscriminately exploit the fish resources, as they are under open access as 
common property resources, echoing Hardin’s claim of the “tragedy of the 
commons”. However, the fishing community of Bangladesh under the leadership of 
its National Association countered that they had fished all their lives as did their 
fathers and their fathers that they were able to protect their fisheries resources and 
that if anyone had the right to fish it was they. They also rejected the idea of a 
“tragedy of the commons” and demanded that poor professional fishers who were 
forced to fish indiscriminately during the fish breeding and growing periods to 
survive should be supported by offering alternative employment opportunities or 
receive financial support to cope with economic hardship during fish breeding and 
growing periods.  
There are many newspaper reports of violent clashes in the inland fisheries, in which 
fishers are usually the victims. The national daily The Daily Janakantha (January 7, 
2001) reported a number of bloody clashes against fishers in the lakes and land 
depressions of greater Sylhet and Mymenshing in the north and northeast. At least 
200 fishers lost their lives and another 2000 were injured in different violent conflicts 
in the region since the late 1980s. The Dainik Ittefaq (23 September 2001), a 
prominent national Bengali newspaper, published a report on the hardships faced by 
fishers in the northeast. It reported many incidents of armed violence, gun fighting 
and false court cases against the fishers by influential non-fishers including lessees 
and dishonest government officials. The Daily Ittefaq (15 August 2001) reported that 
violent conflicts had occurred in Meherpur, a Northwestern region of the country. 
The report says that 115 local fishers had obtained a lease of 103 acres of a 
government water body (Khas land) for fish culture for several years but in August 
2001, influential non-fishers and men working for the local power elites obstructed 
the fish culture. They placed bamboo poles across the water body, secured about 50 




the poor fishers came to protest, armed men hired by the illegal occupants injured 
many of them2. 
According to existing laws, ‘genuine’ fishers were to be awarded the rights of 
catching fish in the lakes and land depressions through lease and licensing by the 
relevant local government departments and ministries. However, of 2000 water 
bodies in 32 sub-districts of the 6 districts in the region, not a single one was under 
the control of a genuine fishing community. Many false and fake fishers’ 
associations, having connections with prominent national and local politicians and 
others,controlled many of these fisheries and often threatened those fishers who 
opposed them and who attempted to bid against them. As a result, many fishers 
became unemployed and gave up their traditional occupation or become fish workers 
for the lessees. This proletarianisation of some fishers has resulted in growing social 
and economic differentiation within fishing communities which has given rise to 
conflict between small elite of well-connected fishers and the mass of fish workers. 
Such a development weakens further fishers’ capacity to mobilise against ‘outsider’ 
intrusions into what they regard as their fishing grounds as political and economic 
pressure on local fisher leaders leads to their cooption into elite networks. 
There are also newspaper reports from Kishoreganj District in which the study 
village of Krishnapur is located. In 2001, Prothom Alo (10 February 2001), a popular 
national daily, printed a story about a mass demonstration against the exploitation by 
a lessee of water bodies and illegal toll collection by police from the fishers in 
Kishoregonj, close to the present study site. It stated that about 3000 men and women 
of the fisher community of Bajitpur sub-district obstructed the boat of the then Local 
government and Rural Development Minister (LGRD), who was an elected 
parliament member from that constituency, to press their demand to stop the 
exploitation by and the terrorism of the lessees against the real fishers as well as to 
punish the corrupted government officials, including the police. A number of violent 
clashes have occurred in Bajitpur fisheries (the study area) of Kishoregonj district 
and caused several deaths and many injuries to fishers (see appendix 3.3, 3.4 & 3.5)). 
In 1991, Golap Mia (pseudonym), owner of one fish processing Plant in Kuliarchar, 




During this period, Golap Mia ordered the fishers of Krisnapur not to fish in Bengla 
Charabadha Fishery and asked them to sell the fish they caught in his Bhairab fish 
receiving centres. The enraged fishers organised a procession with the slogan: “Only 
we, the Krishnapur fishers must be allowed to do fishing. The waterbodies should be 
the properties of us who possess nets (jal jar jola tar)”. In December 1992, when the 
leaseholder placed an embargo on fishing in the open section of the river and raised 
the tax on fishing, local fishers organised a movement led by a college teacher, 
Kanthiram Das, a leftist political leader named Hasnat Kaium, and their followers 
under the banner of the Bangladesh Jele Federation, a wing of a small left political 
party. On 28th December 1992, fishers of the cluster villages staged a demonstration 
in front of the TNO (Thana/ Sub-district Nirbahi (Administrative) Officer) office to 
stop fishing in Bengla Lake by leaseholders and to allow them to fish in the lake and 
sell their catch in the local market. On 29th December, when fishers found that the 
leaseholder’s people had not stopped fishing in the lake, they gathered in the Bengla 
area and tried to physically prevent them from taking some 12 to 15 lakh taka of fish 
to Golap Mia’s Kuliarchar cold storage. Meanwhile Golap Mia’s men confronted the 
fishers’ ‘hajarkee’ (an informal local body of thousand fishing people from cluster 
villages) gathering with the police. Consequently a serious clash and shooting started 
between the two groups and Golap Mia’s son, Sohel, fired several rounds resulting in 
the death of a fisher of Kachuakhala named Sanjib Das (18) and wounding Nagendra 
Das.   
Following the incident, the fishers of the locality organized a more vigorous 
movement and surrounded the Kishoregonj District Administration office chanting 
slogans against their oppression and exploitation. On October 1994 the fishers finally 
obtained the lease of Bengla Charabadha fishery in the name Kaimerbali-Boali-
Shibpur Matsyajeebi Samity. That year, about 15 fisher associations collectively 
obtained lease of the lake and a section of the river.  
3.6.Conclusion 
The history of property rights and management practices in the inland open water 




the common property rights of fishers through the state-directed privatisation of 
particular water bodies and the transfer of such private property rights to mainly non-
fisher leaseholders drawn from the wealthier and politically well-connected members 
of local, regional and national elites. As a result, many fisher communities find 
themselves increasingly marginalised and unsure if they and their children will be 
able to continue as fishers. With this general background in mind, the remaining 
chapters focus on the situation of the Koibortta fishers of Krishnapur village as they 
attempt to retain some control over their fishing activities in changing political, 
economic and environmental circumstances.  
The next chapter introduces the Koibortta of Bangladesh, paying particular attention 
to the Koibortta fishers of Krishnapur and the wider region. It describes the ecology 
and history of the region in which Krishnapur is located, looking at the importance of 
wetlands to the ecology and fishing activities of the region and the threats to these 
wetlands and the fishing communities which depend upon them. Finally, it looks 
specifically at the history and settlement of Koibortta fishers in Krishnapur and its 
environs.   






1 Customary arrangements are dominant in most African countries and in indigenous areas of many 
Latin American and some Asian countries. Systems meant to closely resemble customary tenure were 
re-established in Mexico in the form of ejidos after 1917 revolution and in China and Ethiopia in the 
context of collectivisation. The defining characteristic of customary tenure/ rights is that property is 
owned by the community rather than the individual (World Bank, 2003, pp. 52-53). 
   
2 Other important news of violent conflicts against fishers included: Political Clash and Terrorism 
behind Killing of Two Crore (20 millions) Fish Fingerlings (fish fry) in Jhenaidha (The Dainik 
Janakantha, 17 August 2001); Four People killed in a Clash for Capturing Ghats (fishing ground in 
river) (The Daily Ittefaq, 23 January 2001); Boundless Sufferings of Fishers in Dikshi Lake, Due to 
Exploitation and Terrorist Attacks by the Non-fishers Influential, published in the Ittefaq on 27 
November 2001; Frequent Terrorist Attacks on Fishers in Sylhet, published in the Janakantha on 23 
November 2001; Leaseholders Control most of the Jolmohol (government water body) in Sunamganj 
district (Ittefaq on 26 September 2000); Fish, Nets and Fishing Boats Looted: Terrorist Attack in 
Raypur (Dainik Sangbad on 13 July 2000); Fifteen Injured in a Clash over Fishing in Sunamganj (The 
Independent on 7 April 1999); Hundred Thousand of Fishers are in Grip of Fear from the Leasees in 
Kishoregonj (Bhorer Kagaj on 28 December 1992); Fake Fishers Association of the Non-fishers 
Leasees captured 150 Jolmohols in Upper Riparian (Northeastern part of the country), published in the 
Dainki Bangla on 29 August 1992; The Cooperative Fisheries in Atrai Looted, published in the Inkilab 






Introduction to the study area and the Koibortta of the region 
 
Figure 4.1: Krishnapur: a floodplain village in monsoon period. 
4.1.Overview 
The fishers of Krishnapur inhabit a region rich in ecology and history. This chapter 
provides a background to that ecology and history. It first introduces the village 
Krishnapur, discusses the importance of wetlands to the ecology of the region and 
finally it gives a brief history of the development of Koibortta communities who have 
adapted their way of life to the specific ecological and other conditions found there in 
this Northeast floodplain region covering the whole area of Kishoregang district (see 
figure: 4.1).  
4.2.The village Krishnapur and its setting  
The village of Krishnapur is geographically situated between 24013/ and 24015/ N and 
between 90079/ and 90081/ E. in Bajitpur sub-district of Kishoregonj District in the 
Northeast wetland1 region of Bangladesh. The region is locally called ‘haor’ or 




Mymensingh in the north, Norshingdi in the southwest, Brahmanbaria in the 
southeast, Sunamgonj and Habigonj in the east and Mymensingh and Gazipur 
districts in the west. The district is situated between 24034/ and 25012/ North latitudes 
and 90000/ and 91007/ East longitudes and it occupies an area of 2,688.62 sq. km with 
a population of 25, 25,221. The main rivers of the districts are Old Brahmaputra, 
Meghna, Kalni, Dhanu, Ghorautra, Baurii, Narasunda and Piyain. Bajitpur is one of 
district’s 13-Upazila/ Thana/sub-district with a population of 197081 and is situated 
between 24009/ and 24018/ N and between 90050/ and 91003/ E. Main rivers of this 
sub-district are: Meghna, Baulai, Ghorautra, and Old Brahmaputra (almost dead). 
Bajitpur sub district occupies 193.76 sq. km, of which rivers cover 10.83 sq. km. It 
borders Katiadi, Nikli and Austagram in the north, Kuliarchar, Bhairab and Sorail 
sub-districts in the south, Austagram and Narsingdi and Nasirnagar sub-district of 
Brahmanbaria distrct in the east and Katiadi in the west (Figure 4.2-4.5). The sub-
distrct consists of 12 unions, 92 mauzas and 178 villages.  
The large number of rivers and land depressions make the eastern part of Kishoregonj 
a specific kind of landscape with its evergreen shrubs, berries and bamboos. Rivers in 
the west and south and land depression in the East and North surround the village.and 
tidal waves (especially during the rainy season) are a constant threat to dwellings. 
4.3. Wetland ecology and the inland fisheries of Kishoregonj 
Kishaoregonj district is especially famous for its large area of inland open water 
capture fisheries which include a number of rivers and estuaries, land depressions 
and lakes varying in size from a few hectares to more than two thousand hectares and 
a large area of floodplains (appendix 4.1). The area is flooded yearly by the monsoon 
rains and many parts retain some water throughout the dry season. This floodplain 
region is also a wetland eco-system of major national and international importance 
and plays an important hydrological, biological and ecological role in the natural 
functioning of the region (Hossain, 2002). However, over the last couple of decades, 
the bio-diversity and resources of land depressions and oxbow lakes have come under 










































Figure 4.4: Soils of Bangladesh 
 
 





















According to the DOF (2001), greater Mymensingh (which includes Kishoregonj 
District) has 35,496 hectares of rivers and estuaries and 29,406 hectares of land 
depressions and lakes. Bangladesh has a total of 114,161 hectares of land depressions 
and lake fishing areas of which Mymensingh contains the largest area of land 
depressions and lakes after greater Sylhet district (32,700 hectare) (see figure 4.6-
4.10). In 1999-2000, the floodplains provided about 62 percent of Bangladesh’s total 
inland fisheries catch, of which Mymensingh’s contribution was the highest in terms 
of district wise production (Ali et. al., 2003) (Table: 4.1).  
 









Floodplains Baor Total 
Chittagong 6564  204  17,890  24658 
Chittagong 
H.T. 
39   6,852 754  7645 
Noakhali 19810  1  23,251  43062 
Comilla 21200  819  37,205  59224 
Sylhet 4135  27,217  39,019  70371 
Dhaka 4002  2,590  49,762  56354 
Faridpur 3975  1,663  22,500 542 28680 
Mymensing 8309  18,878  73,479  100666 
Tangail 955  2,387  5,034  8376 
Barisal 53468  17  24,669  78154 
Jessore 2662  2,225  11,902 1,988 18777 
Khulna 6767 11,648 113  17,295 195 36018 
Kustia 553  969  5,986 897 8405 
Patuakhali 11565    9,087  20653 
Bogra 241  1761  14,132  16134 
Dinajpur 104  318  5,406  5828 
Pabna 4248  1,729  8,512  14489 
Rajshahi 3524  8,846  25,430  37800 
Rangpur 1214  3,088  33,488  37790 
Total 150,830  11,648 6,852 424,488  671900 

























Source: Ali et al., 2003. 






































Source: Ali et al., 2003. 
Figure 4.7: Inland waters fish catch (%) of major districts in 1999-2000 
Besides making a significant contribution to the country’s total inland fish 
production, the land depressions and lakes of the study area also support a rich and 
diverse aquatic plant life with extensive floating and emergent vegetation and shelter 




importance to its marsh vegetation and to its large and diverse waterfowl populations. 
The area is particularly attractive to shore birds and several species of herons and 
egrets. It also supports cormorants, purple heron, black-headed ibis, spot-billed duck 
and purple swamp hen. During the winter migratory birds from the Himalayan 
region, Siberia and China use the land depressions and lakes as their feeding and 
resting places while travelling further south (Environment and Assessment of Flood 
Impacts, South Asia-Bangladesh, 2003).  
The region is rich in fish upon which many riparian communities depend. The 
majority of the poor of the wetland area are dependent on the water resources for 
their livelihood in different ways (see figures 4.8 on poultry rearing & 4.9 on dairy 
rearing). For example, in the monsoon months, navigation is an important source of 
employment and both professional boatmen (‘majhi’) and many non-traditional 
boatmen ply boats.  The rootstocks of  ‘taro kachu’ (‘ghechu’: Aponogeton spp), 
lotus (padda), and water lilies (shapla) are rich in starch and a number of species of 
Polygonum locally known as ‘bishkatali’, are effective anti bacterial agents. The 
flowers and seeds of the lotus are prescribed for piles, as a cardiac tonic and for the 
elimination of ringworm. The flowers of water lilies are said to be a remedy for heart 
ailments. The land depressions also yield a number of important biomass products 
such as fuel-wood, timber and bark for fodder and organic manure. In this floodplain 
region ‘patipata’ plants are used for making mats and screens, stems and branches of 
‘jiyal’ and ‘koroch’ are exploited locally for construction of fences, for firewood and 
for making artificial harbours (‘Jag kata’/ ‘Katha’) for growing fish. Heavily grazed 
grassland and rice fields surround the haor of the study area and despite high levels of 
disturbance from bird hunters and fishers, the land depression remains very important 
for ducks and migratory shore birds.  
4.4.Pressures on fish resources in the region 
In recent decades there have been growing pressures on fish (and other) resources. 
Among the most important are siltation, water pollution and the reduction of water 
flow in the major river systems primarily because of the Indian Farakka Barrage, 




suggest that inland fish catches have declined significantly and fish biodiversity has 
been affected with changes in fish species composition. For example, Ali et al. 
(2003) report a substantial decline in the country’s total river catch by species from 
1983 to 2000 (Figure 4.8). Mazid and Gupta (1995) report that over the last few 
decades, fish habitats and yields have drastically declined in floodplain fisheries 
primarily due to the conversion of water areas to cropland and the increasing use of 
pesticides and chemical fertilizers in agriculture to raise crop yields. Elderly fishers 
of the study area also commented that river catches have declined and reported that a 
number of endemic species of fish found in the local rivers, land depressions and 
lakes are today threatened by a variety of human interventions. The nutrient rich 
bottom mud of the local fisheries is increasingly being mixed with the sediment-
laden run-off-water from neighbouring marshes or rivers which is possibly leading to 
massive fish kills. The area has been particularly affected by the introduction of 
phytoplankton communities dominated by blue-green algae resulting in an increase of 
algal blooms.  
     Source: Ali et al., 2003 




























































































Over the last several decades the region’s population has risen rapidly which has put 
great pressure on its capacity to grow crops and fish. The increasing demand for fish, 
combined with a reduction in supply, has made local water bodies more valuable, 
which has increased non-fisher control of water leases, and reduced the availability of 
common pool resources. Fishing effort has intensified, prompting William J Collis, 
natural resources advisor of a USAID-funded fish project, to say that there are too 
many people chasing too few fish (The Daily Star, 7 April 2004).  
Other pressures on the region’s resources include pesticides which contaminate 
ground and surface water, fish diseases such as white spot, effluent and industrial 
waste, domestic garbage and municipal waste, which cause sewage contamination, 
and river siltation. Water quality has declined due to indiscriminate disposal of 
industrial pollutants, agro-chemical residues and organic wastes into the open water 
system, making the open aquatic environment very hazardous for fish (Faisal & 
Parveen, 2002; Mazid & Gupta, 1995). 
 
 





Figure 4.10: Cattle grazing: fishers’ non-fishing assets 
Commenting on the impact of the Farraka Barrage, local fishers say that mother fish 
(fish carrying eggs) stocks residing in smaller rivers, estuaries and canals are 
particularly affected by reductions in water levels, which interferes with migration of 
brood fish and fish fry. Farooque (1997) reports that river siltation is a major problem 
with some six millions cubic metres of water carrying an estimated 2,179 million 
tons of sediment to the sea each year by the Ganges-Brahmaputra river system.  Other 
major sources of siltation are the increased run off during the rainy season, floods and 
increased erosion of topsoil as a result of vegetation depletion, construction of flood 
control water management systems and road embankments.  
The adverse effects of these developments can be seen in the dwindling population of 
natural fauna. In the floodplain region, the common otter (Lutra Lulra), smooth 
coated otter (Lutra pers picillata), fishing cat (Felis viverrina), black pond turtle 
(Geoclemys hamiltoni), black monitor lizard (Varanus benhalensis), rock python 
(Pytholon molurus) and monocellate cobra (Naja naja kauthia) are all under threat. 
Flora such as the Makhna (Euryale ferx) is overexploited for its edible seeds and the 
wild rose of Bengal (Rosa innvolverate) is being depleted rapidly because of loss of 




tremendously in the absence of alternative forms of economic activity. The birds and 
other fauna in the region are subject to an extensive illegal trade, and fish production 
and species diversity have seriously declined (Tsai & Ali, 1985). According to the 
Nature Conservation Committee of Bangladesh ‘the unplanned crop cultivation, 
excessive drainage, and illegal occupation of fisheries resources in the name of 
leasing and excessive extraction of aquatic resources year after year have virtually 
denuded the uniqueness of these wetlands’ (The Daily Star, 13 Oct 2004).  The ‘Haor 
Bachao Andolon’ (a local NGO collective movement organised by the CNRS for 
saving haors) along with local fishers has demanded cancellation of the lease of 
haors, adequate afforestation and involvement of locals in protecting the wetlands.  
Under the existing three year open auction-leasing system which operates in 
Kishoregonj, Koibortta and other fishers have little scope to raise fish production 
except by restricting the use of some of their destructive gear which catch under sized 
fish. Whether or not they catch fish, fishers are required to pay tolls or rent to 
leaseholders for the whole season. Many leaseholders see no reason to conserve fish 
resources as this would require longer-term investment which they are unwilling to 
make as they hold only short-term leases. The Ministry of Land, which owns the 
fisheries and collects revenues from leasing, plays no role in increasing the 
productivity of the fisheries resources, focusing rather on raising as much revenue as 
possible through yearly rental increases. Leaseholders are subject to high legal and 
illegal leasing costs and also to increased lease prices yearly. To ensure a return on 
their investment they exploit the resource to often unsustainable levels by taking as 
many fish as possible regardless of size and rarity and by allowing other fishers to do 
the same. Absence of strong administration from law enforcement agencies, the 
Fisheries Department and others government bodies is encouraging such exploitation. 
Many local fishers accuse the Fisheries Department of not taking due care to protect 
endangered or threatened fish species. Stock assessment statistics are considered 
unreliable as the Fisheries Department is thought to fabricate statistics for total fish 
stocks. Local fishers report the Fisheries Department is supposed to release fish fries 
and fingerlings in open water bodies to boost production but hardly ever does so. 




provide enough rental income for development purposes. This division of 
responsibility between Fisheries and Land is an important contributory factor to the 
poor management of fish resources. 
An analysis of various official reports and extensive discussions with different 
stakeholders of the study area including the leaseholders, fish traders, boatmen, sand 
collectors, bird hunters, snail collectors, ferrymen, public transport owners and others 
identified the following as the major causes of fish loss. Blockages in canals linking 
lakes to land depressions resulting in sedimentation of lakes, have forced many fish 
species to leave. World Bank FAP 2 studies in the region show that infant fish are 
highly reliant on the wide range of energy sources available on the formerly 
cultivated agricultural land of the floodplain at the end of the dry season, and are 
extremely susceptible to even small changes in the timing of over bank flows which 
provide them with access to the floodplain at a critical stage in the development of 
their food preference patterns (Cross, 2002). Destruction and shortage of natural fish 
feed such as roots, herbs and other micro organisms are also resulting in decreased 
production. Snails were once plentiful in local lakes (especially in Bengla) and rivers 
but have declined because of their use as feed in shrimp culture and poultry farming.  
Fisheries leaseholders now sell snails to hundreds of snail boat people (who collect 
snails from the lakes by boat) and to traders from different parts of the country.   
The loss of bird species has an indirect effect on fish resources as they provide 
natural fertilizer eaten by the fish. However, in recent year’s leaseholders on Bengla 
Lake and other water bodies, who own rights over these birds (as they live on the 
water of their lakes), sub-lease out the lakes to bird hunting groups, who during 
Poush-Magh (December-January) catch thousands for sale to different parts of the 
country. Bird hunters are called ‘jele’ as they use nets similar to those used by fishers.  
Fishers of Krishnapur also mentioned that fish stocks are affected by the numerous 
mechanized boats, river craft, fishing trawlers, passenger boats, and steamers which 
ply local water ways and discharge waste oil and other contaminants. Local fishers 
report that twenty years ago there was a relative abundance of big size ‘Pangas’ and 
Ruhi as well as an important species called Nandin in Bengla Lake. These are now 




size fish such as Aire (10/12 kg), Ruhi (20/25 kg), Katal (15/20kg), Boal (15/20kg) 
and Kali Baos (4/5kg), but in smaller quantities. Bengla Lake is also well known for 
Chapila, Air, Kali Baos, Ghainna and Shwarpunti, which fetch high prices for the 
leaseholders. 
4.5.History of Koibortta in Bangladesh 
The wetlands region described above has been the home of Koibortta and other 
fishing peoples for centuries. These peoples have developed distinctive and 
sustainable ways of life based upon an extensive knowledge and understanding of 
local fisheries. Early literary texts provide us with a clear view of a range of fishing 
activities in the region and other parts of Bangladesh and India by the late second or 
early first millennium. For example, fishhooks are found among the earliest 
prehistoric artefacts (Reeves, 2003; Sarkar, 1954) and in the artefacts of ‘Harappan’ 
civilization of the Indus Valley (Piggott, 1950; Sarkar, 1954; Bagchi, 1955). The Rg 
Veda refers to the methods of catching fish by net and to those who catch them (Das, 
1931, p. 294). The Vajasaneyi Samhita and the Taittiriya Brahmana list those who 
lived by fishing, including ‘…the Kaivarta or Kevarta, Puanjistha, Dasa, Mainala… 
and perhaps the Bainda and the Anda’ (Das, 1931, p.  295). 
By the time of British rule in the late 18th century, most rural people in East and 
West Bengal engaged in fishing and most were low caste Hindus. In these early days, 
fishers were often boatmen and engaged in such fish-related work as fish trading, net 
and boat making and the curing and preservation of fish. They also had elaborate 
fishing rites and rituals such as the worship of ‘Ganga Devi’ to ensure a good catch. 
Many of these rituals persist to the present day (Pokrant, 1996).  
Several 19th century British colonial observers such as Gupta (1908), De (1910), 
Jack, O’Malley (1912), Day (1871, 1977), Hunter, Buchanan-Hamilton (1987), Wise 
and Risley (1981, vols. 1&2) noted that almost all Bengalis ate fish and described the 
activities and fishing technologies of more than thirty fishing castes and groups. 
Fishers used over 100 different types of nets and some ten types of boats, which were 
used for both general and specialized fishing. There were many techniques of fishing 




parties were organized in different ways and the catch was often distributed 
according to a share system based on net and boat ownership and labour input (Saha, 
1970).  
Most Bengali professional fishers were low caste or outcaste Hindus who inherited 
their occupation. The main Hindu fishing castes or jatis were the Koibortta, Kewat, 
Karita, Malo/Jhalo, Bagdi, Tiwar/Tiyar (Rajbangsi), some Namasudra 
(Jiani/Charal/Chandal), Das Shikari (Rajbangshi), Berua, Jiani, Karal, Pod, Bind or 
Bindu, Bagdi, Patni, Nadial, Mali, Hari, Gonrhi, Banpar, Gangota, Murari, Surahiya 
and Lohait (Hunter, 1877; Gupta, 1908; De, 1910; O’Malley, 1912; Mitra, 1946; 
Pramanik, 1993; Risley, 1981). 
In different areas of historic and contemporary Bangladesh, Hindu fishers are 
normally refered to as Namasudra, Rajbangshi, Jalo, Malo, Koibortta, Barman, 
Halder, Das, Sarker, and Biswas. Namasudra dominated in Faridpur, Khulna, Jessore, 
Sylhet, Gopalgonj and Chandpur, Sarkar in Barisal, Biswas in Jessore and Khulna, 
Rajbangshi in Rangpur, Dinajpur and Munshigonj, Koibortta Das in Rangpur, 
Rajshahi, Kishorgonj, Mymenshing and Sylhet, Malo in Faridpur and Halder in 
Pabna/Sirajgonj/Rangpur/Bogra.  
Pokrant et al. (1997) identified Malo, Koibortto or Jolodas, Namasudra/ Nomosudra 
and Maimol/ Mahemal as the major traditional fishing groups in historic Bangladesh. 
According to Sanyal (1981, pp. 104-13), among all these fishing communities, 
Koibortta are in a majority and claim higher status2 than many fishing castes. As 
mentioned earlier, Bengal fishing communities belonged mainly to the Sudra Varna 
(Mukherjee, 1963; Dumont, 1987). The Rigveda mentions 18 lower caste 
occupational groups among the Hindus in the 11th century and das (Jolodas) was one 
of them (Alam, 2001, p. 31). The Das were divided into Halik or Halodas (farmer) 
and Jalik or Jolodas (fisher). The Koibortta, while generally considered of Sudra 
status, sometimes claimed Vaisya (merchant/farming) status and were generally 
referred to as chasi or cultivator rather than jele or fisher over whom they claimed 
higher ritual and political status (Bandhyapadaya, 1997; Hutton, 1963; Sanyal, 1981; 




were long regarded as a single caste divided occupationally into Jaliya Koibortta who 
worked as fishermen and Haliya (Chasi) Koibortta who lived by agriculture. Haliya 
Koibortta demanded large dowries for their daughters when married to Jaliya 
Koibortta, while refused to marry Jaliya women.  The Jaliya Koibartas were divided 
into two sub-castes or jatis called Jalo and Malo. The Rajbanshi and Das were two 
other caste communities who are said to have taken up fishing and became jele. 
Marriage of Jalo and Malo to Rajbanshi and Das was not allowed and this attitude 
prevails to the present day. Risley (1981) found in Bakerganj that intermarriage was 
permitted between them but was restricted by certain conditions. Girls of the Haliya 
Das class could marry Koiborttas, but if a Haliya Das male married a Koibortta girl, 
his family was considered guilty of a mis-alliance, and lost status. Such marriages 
frequently took place, but the Koibortta family had to pay a high price to the groom’s 
family.  
Over time the Haliya Koiborttas managed to ban intermarriage with Jaliya Koibortta 
and gained recognition as a separate caste named Mahishy (Gait, 1901). O’ Malley 
(1912) reported that in Jessore District the Koibortta were divided into three groups: 
chasi, Jaliya and other. De (1910) divided Koibortta into three groups: ‘Adi’ meaning 
first, ‘Madhya’ meaning middle (both these groups having given up fishing to 
cultivate) and ‘Antya’ or last who were the fishers. De (1910) also referred to Antya 
Koibortta as Jalia Koibortta (jal means net in Bengali). On the other hand Hunter  
(1877, vol.1) identified 5 categories of Koibortta: 1) Uttararhi or Chasa Koibortta; 2) 
Purba-desi Koibortta who were cultivators, possibly Sudra, 3) Tunte or Dakshin-rari 
Koibortta who farmed and reared animals, 4) Shiuli who were date tappers (date juice 
collectors), and 5) Male or Jele (fishers) who were fishers and boatmen (Pokrant, 
1996). Risley (1981) observed that the internal divisions of the caste differed in 
different districts. For examples, in Central Bengal there were cultivating and fishing 
groups with various names such as ‘Halik’ and ‘Jalik’ or ‘Chasa’ and ‘Jalwah or 
Jaliya’ while in Dhaka there was no ‘Chasa or Halwaha’ division, and the ‘Das 
Koiborttas’ had not then become a distinct caste. In Dhaka, the ‘Jalwaha’ or fisher 




title of Das, but some practised medicine and were known as ‘Baidya’ (Risley, 1981, 
p. 378).    
In addition to Hindu fishers, a minority of Muslims were also specialized fishers 
belonging to low status (atraf) communities, although some claimed a higher status 
(ashraf) origin. It is likely that many of these Muslim fishers learned their trade from 
Hindus. The main Muslim fishers in historic Bangladesh were Mahimal/Maimal, 
Nikari, Gutia, Jelia, Jiani, Dhawa, Abdal, Kalwar, Bebajia/Bediya/Mal Baidya, 
Dalatitya, Chaklai, and Dohuiriya. Today, the Muslim fishers can be classified into 
two groups: the Mahimal/ Mahefarosh and the rest. Mahemal (from the Persian Mahe 
meaning ‘fish’ and farosh meaning vendor and mohol meaning ‘place’ or ‘body’) are 
concentrated in the Northeast region of Bangladesh, including Kishoregonj, 
Sunamgonj and Sylhet, and are probably the oldest Muslim fishing group in Bengal. 
Another fishing community, the Magh, were Buddhist and lived in Southeast 
Bangladesh (see Pokrant, 1997).  
As the largest fishing caste, the Koibortta, consider fishing to be their original 
occupation and claim that their ancestors saved the deity in their boat on the occasion 
of the deluge. In return, they were given the power of catching three or four times as 
many fish as others (see Dumont, 1987; Kotani, 1997; Russell and Lal, 1975; Sanyal, 
1981). Risley (1981) identifies Koibortta as one of the earliest inhabitants of Bengal 
(1981, p. 376). According to one tradition, a few hundred years ago there was a 
Dhiba king on the bank of the Shindhu River and the Koibortta originally came from 
this Dhiba. The Koibortta are said to have once ruled in the North Bengal (Barind/ 
Varendra) region during the Pal dynasty (from 8th to 12th AD) and the whole Barind 
was under three Koibortta kings named Dibba/Divya, Rodhok/Rudoka and 
Vim/Bhima (Ray, 1993, p. 228). They ruled Varendra before Rampala (c 1082-1124 
AD) re-established the Pala dynasty in the area.  
Historical references point to a great rebellion in the Varendra area (the northern part 
of present Bangladesh including Rajshahi Division) during the reign of the Pala 
emperor Mahipala II (c 1075-1080 AD), which resulted in his death and the loss of 




Rampala is the central theme of Sandhyakaranandi’s famous Kavya Ramcharitam, 
the only source of information about the incident, which attributes the rebellion to 
Divya and the Kaivartas against the oppressive rule of Mahipala II. It is also 
mentioned that the Kaivarttas resented the Buddhist rulers who were against their 
fishing profession (Banglapedia, 2004).  
Another Koibortta history remembered by many fishers today is the story of Rani 
Rashmoni of Natore, a zamindar’s wife of Sudra origin, who was very popular 
among the Koibortta fishing people for her role in assisting fishers in the 19th century 
to retain fishing rights on open waterways on the Hugli River. Rani Rashmoni, 
(1793-1861) a philanthropist and religious activist, was born to a peasant family and 
was married to the wealthy Rajchandra Marh. Widowed at the age of forty-three, 
Rashmoni continued to use the family wealth for various social projects and charities. 
She supported the poor fishermen’s struggle to win the right to fish in the 
Ganges/Hugli and eventually forced the British to abolish the tax imposed on river 
fishing. She is said to have laid iron chains across the river to help the fishermen of 
the Hugli whose livelihood was hampered by speeding British steamers 
(Banglapedia, 2004). 
4.5.1. History of Koibortta in Kishoregonj 
The Koibortta of Kishoregonj lives on the delta of the three great river systems of the 
Ganges/ Padma, Jamuna/ Brahmaputra and the Meghna. In ancient times, 
Kishoregonj was included in the Kingdom of Kamrupa. In the 6th and 7th centuries 
AD Buddhist travellers came here from China and it became a predominantly 
Buddhist area. In the 11th and 12th century, the Pala, Varman and Sena kings ruled the 
area. Later there arose several petty independent Kingdoms under the Koch, Hajong, 
Garo and Rajbangshi and in the 12th century the area came under the Hindu King 
Bijaya Sen who defeated the Buddhist Pala King of Gaur. Bijaya Sen and his son 
Ballal Sen consolidated their position by promoting Brahmin immigration from other 
regions of India. Muslims came to the area as settlers and preachers rather than as 
conquerors and Saint Shah Sultan who settled near Netrokona led one of the earliest 




Feroz Shah, but Kishoregonj remained outside its control. It was during Akbar’s 
reign that the greater part of Kishoregonj was included in the Mughal Empire, with 
some areas, which included Jangalbari and Egarasindhur, under the Koch and Ahom 
kings. In 1538 the Mughals defeated the Ahom king of Egarasindhur and in 1580 
Isha Khan3 defeated the Koch chief of Jangalbari (Banglapedia, 2003).  In 1582, 
Todormal, the Revenue Secretary of Emperor Akbar identified Bajitpur as an 
important place of fishing. In Rennell's Atlas4 (one of the earliest atlases of Bengal 
and its adjoining areas), Bajitpur was also shown as one of the important trading 
places for the East India Company.  
Bajitpur was established as a sub-district in 1835 and while little is known about the 
origin of the sub-district name, local tradition has it that during Mughal times there 
was a Royal employee called Baijid Khan who lived in the area and who gave it his 
name. At that time, it was an important trading and administrative centre (Bangladesh 
Population Census 1991) and was part of ‘Sayar Jalkar Porgona’, which later became 
part of ‘Joenshai Porgona’. There is anecdotal evidence that Joenshah Porgona was 
named after either the brother of Bengal emperor Sultan Hossain Shah or the 
employee of Isha Khan’s ‘Sayar Jalkar Porgona’ (there is a land depression in 
Bajitpur named ‘Joenshaher haor’). According to Todor Mol (revenue Secretary of 
Emperor Akbar) revenue records, most of Bajitpur was under the administration of 
Bajuhar Sarkar of Sayar Jalkar Porgona where maximum revenues were collected 
from ‘Sayar, Sayrat Mohol or Jol mohol’. At that time, Nouka or Kushsha (boat) was 
collected as revenue (Kar), which was also known as ‘Jal kar’ or ‘Nouara joma’. 
According to Mughal revenue records, revenue from land was known as ‘mal’, while 
revenue from trading and water bodies was known as ‘sayar’ (from which the word 
‘sayrat mohol or jol mohol’ was derived).  
During the British period, the naval port of Dulalpur in Bajitpur sub-district became 
important and a number of indigo centres were established at Gopinathpur and 
Ghoraghat. Consignments of pearl of the ‘bhati region’ (low-lying floodplain region) 
were sent from these areas. Once Bajitpur was famous for its fine quality ‘Muslin’, 
called ‘tanjab’, and in Rennel’s map of 1781, it was shown as an important place. At 




Junglebari. In 1787 Bagunbari was renamed Mymensingh and in 1860 Junglebari 
became Kishoregonj (Baker 1995; Banglapedia, http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/). 
Today Bajitpur sub-district is noted for its fish, sweetmeat, milk, and boro paddy 
grown largely in the low-lying haor areas. Other crops of this area include: jute, 
wheat, potato, peanut, sweet potato and other green vegetables (Banglapedia, 2004). 
According to historical sources (Baker, 1995), the Koibortta were among the earliest 
inhabitants of Bajitpur, who were attracted by the fisheries resources of the area and 
settled there between the eighth and twelfth centuries. In the early days of settlement, 
the area contained many swamps/ land depressions, lakes, canals, rivers and their 
estuaries and the Koibortta fishers cleared forest, built homes and fished both day and 
night. Koibortta fishers who came from the eastern and south-eastern parts of the 
region first settled in Hilochia, Digheerpar, Dilalpur and other adjacent villages of 
Bajitpur. Prior to this, fishing peoples had settled in Austagram Upazila of 
Kishoregonj and Sorail Upazila of Brahmanbaria and then a section of those fishing 
communities came to Bajitpur and established new settlements. The fishing groups 
who settled first in Kishoregonj included Koch, Koibortta, Jalo, Malo, Tyor and 
others. Many Koibortta Das and Namasudra also settled in various villages in 
Bajitpur, attracted by the abundant fish in the major lakes of the area such as 
Tejkhali, Kadangi Nadi, Zukka, Laondi and Argon. At that time, the deep waters of 
the Brahmaputra, Meghna and Gorauttra rivers and their tributaries made Bajitpur 
famous for different types of fish such as Mrigal, Tengra, Shing, Magur, kai, Puti, 
Shwarputi, Titputi, Ghaura, Kazali, Gachi, Raga, Dhela, Mola, Goinna, Baila, Icha, 
Bacha, Rita, Baim, Chapila, Chanda, Kaikka, Pabda and Batashi. Bajitpur and 
Kuliarchar were especially famous for one fish species named ‘Taka’, a very tasty 
fish, which has since become extinct (Baker, 1995). Baker in his book Bajitpurer 
Itihas (1995) further mentions that in the past, the fishers of Bajitpur used different 
types of fishing gear and technologies for a wide variety of fish species. These 
included Khara, Berjal, Kunijal, Chai, Bora, Daun, Barshi, Topa barshi, Polo, Koi jal, 
Thela jal, Uch, Koach, Aour, and Dutia. Koach and Dutia were used during the 




After the settlement of Koibortta fishing communities in Bajitpur, other occupational 
castes or sub-caste groups such as the Patuni, Sutradhar, Kamar and Kumar came to 
settle in the area. Hailla Das, Namasudra, Jalo, Malo and Barman fishing 
communities also began farming. Following them, Barui, Napit, Matial, Mali, Teli, 
Tati, Jogi, Chamar, Ghosh and other caste groups (occupational groups) came to farm 
and began to exchange food crops for fish. For example, weavers (Tati) exchanged 
cloth for fish with the Napit, Sutradhar and Mali (Baker, 1995, p. 13). According to 
the 1911 census, there were a number of caste groups in Bajitpur. The major caste 
groups and their populations were Brahman (1,407), Goala (1,492), Jogi/Jugi (1,961), 
Koibortta (11,043), Kayastha (2,539), Malo (1,217), Muchi (1,902), Namasudra 
(7,347), Napit (1,366), Shaha (3,946), and Sutradhar (2,420) (Baker, 1995).   
Some of the old fishers of Krishnapur mention that in Bajitpur, fishing communities 
first settled in Kaimarbali, which is adjacent to the study village Krishnapur, some 
300 years ago. Another group of fishing people consisting of Koibortta, Barman or 
Jalo, Malo and Namasudra settled in Noagoan in the mid eighteenth century. Among 
all the fishing communities of Bajitpur, Koibortta were the majority and claimed the 
highest status within the Sudra caste groups. Barmans were generally considered of 
lower status than the Koibortta, which is still the case today. Considered unclean by 
Brahmins and other twice-born higher castes, Koibortta lived in separate 
communities, practiced endogamy and mixed only with their caste equals. Socially 
despised, some tried to leave their fishing profession through accumulating wealth 
and adopting the ritual and social practices of higher caste communities. 
In the 18th century, the East India Company established business centres for trading 
dry fish in Nikli, Gachihata of Katiadi and Hilochia, which were all part of the then 
Bajitpur region (Baker, 1995). There is anecdotal evidence that one of the wealthy 
people of Kishoregonj, Guru Dayal, who established the district’s oldest and biggest 
college in the early 19th century was from the Koibortta fishing caste. Koibortta 
fishers became one of the politically most important and socially powerful groups in 
parts of West Bengal and East Bengal, particularly Mymensingh, in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries, both in terms of population and as a single fishing group. The 




concentrated in Mymensingh with a population of 77,798 and 94,217 respectively, 
and in Rajshahi with 60,440 in 1872 and 63,184 in 1881 (Risley, 1981, p. 382).  
The 1901 Census recorded some 550,000 fishers in Bengal of which over 95 per cent 
were Hindu and Koibortta was one of single largest fishing group among all Hindu-
fishing groups. According to the 1931 census, the total Koibortta population of 
Tangail and Kishoregong was 129,997, of which 49,639 (38%) were ‘Jaliya’ 
Koibortta. The 1931 Census recorded the total population of Bajitpur Thana at 
80,827, of which Hindus accounted for 26,350 and Muslims 53,652. Among the 
Hindu population, 7,105 (37%) were Koibortta, which indicates their strong presence 
in Bajitpur (Baker, 1995, p. 19). 
The Koibortta of Bajitpur and Kishoregonj were also politically important. Baker 
(1995) mentions that in the 1937 elections for the Bengal Legislative Assembly, there 
were three constituencies in Kishoregonj sub-division, of which Bajitpur (East-
Mymensingh) was reserved for non-Muslims and there were three candidates for this 
constituency. They included Satish Chandra Ray Chowdhury (congress nominee), 
Birendra Kishore Ray Chowdhury (son of Zamindar Brojendra Kishore Ray 
Chowdhury) and Advocate Rajmohon Das (a candidate from the Koibortta caste). 
Baker also notes that at that time, the Koibortta were a very large and strong 
community in Bajitpur with about twenty to thirty thousand voters (Baker, 1995, p. 
42). He further mentions that these Koibortta fishing people in Kishoregonj, 
especially in Bajitpur (where Krishnapur is located) belonged to the lowest caste (the 
untouchables’ class, locally called ‘jele’ or ‘jailla’) Hindu population. At that time, 
Muslims who fished were often regarded as suspicious because it was thought they 
were recent Hindu converts. By the 1960s, following the exodus of many Hindus to 
India in 1945 and 1947, Muslims began to enter fishing and compete with the 
remaining Hindu fishers.  
4.5.2. Settlement history of Koibortta in Krishnapur 
Oral histories of Krishnapur village reveal that many of the Hindu Koibortta fishing 
families has lived in the village for at least three to four hundred years. The families 




histories.  For example, Lalkharchar, Kushahati and Railahati (paras/ wards) of 
Krishnapur are not as old as other wards, which date back some three to four hundred 
years. As in other parts of Bajitpur, several Koibortta families left for India at the 
time of partition, during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, and during and after the 
Bangladesh liberation war of 1971. One ward of Krishnapur named Lalkharchar was 
once entirely Koibortta but is now a Muslim ward, consisting of families that were 
originally non-fishers from other villages who migrated to Krishnapur in search of 
better living, especially through fishing. Among the main reasons for such migration 
were river erosion in their home villages, limited or no other opportunities to earn a 
living there and the attraction of Krishnapur as one centre of fishing.  
Since 1931 the total Koibortta population of Bajitpur and Kishoregonj has declined 
significantly, particularly since 1947. For example, according to the 1991 census for 
Bajitpur, the total Muslim population was 172,432 and the Hindu only 22,631 (BBS, 
1996), or approximately 12 percent of the total population. The partition of India in 
1947, the India-Pakistan War in 1965 and the Bangladesh Liberation war 1971 led 
thousands of Hindu families, including an unknown number of Koibortta, to migrate 
to India. In addition, a number of communal conflicts between Hindu and Muslim 
communities in East Pakistan and Bangladesh compelled many Hindu families to 
leave the country. In the case of Koibortta and other Hindu fishing communities, 
migration from Bangladesh to India was very significant in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. In many instances, local Muslims took up fishing and established control over 
the local fisheries, putting pressure on the remaining Hindu fisher communities. 
The author’s household census reveals a history of short and long-term settlement in 
the village. Thus, a majority of the Hindu fishing households trace their settlement to 
two to three hundred years back (about 52%) and 48 percent of households came 
from other villages in the region during the last 50 years. For example, among the 44 
households of Railahati Ward, 27 came from Raila, 5 from Kakoria, 4 from Kusha, 2 
from Fudda and 5 from other villages, with a single household only from the village 
itself. According to local fishers, the ward was actually named after Raila as most 
ward residents are from that area. In Lalkharchar ward, which is entirely Muslim, all 




which Lalkharchar ward derives it name. On the other hand, all 43 households of 
Borobarirhati are originally from the village itself. The ward Kushahati was named 
after Kusha village, while Tekkahati was named after Tiakati as there were some 
households from those villages. The main villages from where some fishing families 
migrated to Krishnapur include Raila, Kakoria, Kusha, Fudda, Laun, Humairpur, 
Kachuakhola, Bahtinagar, Shibpur, Katai Dhanpur, Shahpur, Dattagam, Kurkarai, 
Gunahati, Bamaranagar and Lalkharchar.  
There are several reasons for these patterns of migration of Koibortta households 
which have resulted in a growing spatial concentration of Koibortta and other Hindus 
in the Krishnapur area. As noted earlier, since 1947 there has been a growing 
migration of Hindus from East Pakistan/Bangladesh to India as a result of partition 
and post-partition political developments in the country. The effect of this migration 
was to reduce the size of Hindu populations in some areas which, in turn, encouraged 
some of the remaining families to move to areas of higher concentrations of Hindu 
people. This was made easier in some instances by long-standing intra-caste marriage 
and other links. Families moved to places where they could feel at home and where 
they might be able to obtain a small plot of land to build their homes. Krishnapur was 
a particularly attractive area to migrate as it was rich in fish resources. Since 1947, 
Hindus in Bangladesh have become a political and religious minority which has 
shaped their decisions about their future place in Bangladesh. Shifting to areas of 
higher Hindu concentrations where there also existed opportunities to work as 
fishers, has played an important role in the decisions they have made. 
In Krishnapur village itself, fishers were traditionally Hindus and Muslims were 
farmers and involved in other professions. Some Muslims fished during the lean 
farming season to supplement their income but many others considered such work 
degrading. In contrast, the Hindu fishers of Krishnapur regarded their fishing 
occupation as sacred with traditional and hereditary links to the caste system. 
Historically, Hindu fishers were restricted to their occupation while for Muslims it 
was open to anyone who urshed to practice it.  
The Hindu fishers of Krishnapur today belong to the Jaliya Das/ Jaliya Koibortta, a 




Krishnapur but many of the Jaliya/Jailla Koibortta also farm. They have strong 
marital ties with Jaliya Koibortta of the villages of Subhadrapur, Bisnupur and 
Jagannathpur in Itna to the northwest of Bajitpur.  According to oral testimony, there 
is another Das group called Hailla Das who are not Koibortta Das and with whom 
they have no marital ties. These Hailla Das live in the villages of Koirakanti, Buribari 
and Mirka, which are near to Krishnapur village. The fishers of Krishnapur share the 
same caste designation but are differentiated by title. These are Das, who are the 
majority, and a small group of Rai. Rai claim higher status than Das and seek to 
ensure their status through marriages with wealthier families within the Koibortta. 
While there is limited cultural and social differentiation among Krishnapur fishers, 
there is some economic differentiation among households. Though Koibortta fishers 
have no marital restriction within their caste group, they do restrict marriage with 
Shau, Gosh, Nath and Napit. There is a superiority complex among sub-castes within 
the Koibortta and between castes such as with the Namasudra. In the case of 
Namasudra, marriage with Koibortta is very restricted and they claim higher status. 
Koibortta people do not eat food in the houses of Wrishi, Tior, Kayastha and 
Muslims but in recent years, some young Koibortta are not following these 
restrictions. 
Generally, Kayastha and Tior are not allowed to enter the main ghar of Koibortta 
where they worship. Food is usually given in the ‘bair-ghar’ ('guest house' rather than 
the main ghar). The Wrishi and Sau can enter the main ghar but not the kitchen. On 
the other hand, Koiborttas are allowed to enter the main ghar (room) and kitchens 
(ranna ghar) of Kayastha, Wrishi, Tior and Shau and take food.  In the case of 
Namasudra, Kaibarta cannot enter their houses while Namasudra are allowed to enter 
the Koibortta’s main ghar and the kitchen.  
A group of ‘Wrishi’ (Chamar: Tanner and labourer) live in the village of Shahpur, 
Shau (farmers and business people) live in Bajitpur and Chatalpar, ‘Tior’ (who 
prepare ‘gun’, a rope or chain made of Jute, especially used for boats) live in 
Bajitpur, ‘Jogi’ (Weavers) live in Bashgari and Namasudra (who fish with traps or 
chai) live in Bagi, Chatalpar, Boalia, Koiralpar and other villages. If a Koibortta 




There are no Khaitriya and Vaisya in these areas and there are only a few Brahmins 
in other villages. Marriage between farming and fishing Koibortta is not restricted 
and there are no caste status differences between them. However, in other parts of 
Bengal and India farming Koibortta claim higher status than fishing Koibortta. For 
example, Gustalal Das, a fisherman of Tekkahati of Krishnapur, recounted that 
before 1971, a fishing family migrated to India and during a visit to Krishnapur 
claimed they had become farmers and raised their status to that of Mahishya 
Koibortta.  
4.6. Conclusion 
The rich wetlands of Kishoreganj in which many Koibortta live and in which the 
study village of Krishnapur is located have been centres of fishing for centuries and 
fishing remains the dominant, if increasingly insecure, activity. Koibortta settlement 
can be traced back several hundred years through the limited documentary sources 
and oral historical accounts. The next chapter looks in more detail at Krishnapur 
village itself, focusing on its socio-economic organisation, and gender division of 
labour, types of employment, demographic structure, education opportunities and the 
like. 
                                                 
1 . The wetland ecology of Kishoregonj involves the interaction between a large number of faunal and floral species and a 
range of different habitat types. More than 5,000 floral species are estimated to exist in Bangladesh (MOEF 1991, National 
Conservation Strategy, Dhaka) of which about 158 species are inhabitants of fresh water wetlands (Karim1993, Karim, A., 
1993; Nishat. Hussain, Roy & Karim, IUCN). These wetlands provide habitat to a large number of wildlife animals, act as 
escape cover and food safe nesting for many birds and other wild animals. They also contribute to the biological cycling and 
mobilization of chemical elements. The dry matter and nutrients in wetland plants and other food chains of the eco-system 
directly support a wealth of fisheries resources. 
 
2 . In the 19th and 20th centuries there were a significant number of movements in Bengal within the different caste or sub-
caste groups to secure upper caste and class status in the society, and Koibortta was one of these groups. Their mobility was 
both horizontal and vertical in nature. They claimed a higher position within the sub-caste itself and also within broader caste 
groupings. Koibortta have always claimed higher status than other fishing and non-fishing communities belonging to the Sudra 
caste. Generally Koibortta did not allow intermarriage with Wrishi, Shaha, Ghosh, Jogi, Muchi, Nath, or Napit, who belonged 
to the same Sudra caste group. In some areas, there were two sections within the ‘Koibortta’ called Jaliya/ Jailla/ Jele Koibortta 
and Haliya/ Hailla/ Chasi Koibortta and they competed with each other for higher caste status. The Chashi-Koiborttas broke 
away from the Koibortta between the mid- sixteenth and mid-eighteenth centuries through their professional conversion from 
fishing to agriculture. Thus they elevated themselves from a lower caste to an intermediary caste rank through Sanskritization 
and became known as Mahisyas (Usuda, M., 1997, p. 223). There were also some other Koibortta movements claiming Vaisya 




                                                                                                                                          
status then jele Koibortta after taking up agriculture as their main occupation (Sanyal, 1981; Russel & Hira Lal, 1975; 
Bandhyapadaya, S, 1997; Hutton, J.H, 1963).  
 
3 . Isa Khan, the ruler of Bhati and the chief of the Bhuiyans was the local hero who fought against the Mughals. He was 
probably born in 1529 AD. His father Sulaiman Khan, a descendant of an Afghan chieftain of the region of the Sulayman 
ranges in Afghanistan, had settled in Bengal in the reign of Nusrat Shah and carved out an independent principality in the 
Bhati region comprising the northeastern portion of greater Dhaka district and the southeastern portion of greater Mymensingh 
district. In 1578, when Mughal Subahadar Khan Jahan invaded the Bhati region, Isa stood defiant and a fierce engagement 
took place between Mughals force and Isa’s allies. Following that Isa established his authority over a vast territory by gradually 
increasing his strength and  successfully transformed his estate in Sonargaon and Maheswardi Pargana into an independent 
domain, which comprised a considerable portion of Dhaka district, almost the whole of Mymensingh district and also a small 
portion of Tripura district. Katrabo and Sonargaon were his capitals. Apart from these two, Khizrpur in Narayanganj and 
Janglebari and Egarasindhur in Kishoregonj district were his main outposts 
(http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/F_0096.htm).  
 
4 . Rennell, James (1742-1830) was a geographer and marine engineer who first explored the Bengal river basins and mapped 
them. To facilitate commercial navigation, Henry Vansittart, governor of  Fort William gave him a commission in the Bengal 
Engineers of the company's army and asked him to make a survey of the major rivers of Bengal and their tributaries. Governor 
Robert Clive established a regular survey department in 1767 with James Rennell as its Surveyor General. Originally, Rennell 
was employed to the Ganges delta only with special objective of finding a passage suitable for large vessels from the Ganges to 
Calcutta. From 1763 to 1773, Rennell compiled a set of maps of Bengal for the British Government. His Bengal Atlas, 




The village Krishnapur and its setting: geography, economy and society 
 
Figure 5.1: Krishnapur village during the monsoon 
5.1.Overview 
This chapter introduces the study village of Krishnapur and describes the location, 
physical facilities, housing patterns and other socio-economic and demographic 
aspects. It also looks at the gendered nature of work and relations between Hindus 
and Muslims and finally discusses food security and livelihood strategies and how 
various globalising processes are affecting them.  
5.2.The village location and ecological setting 
Krishnapur is geographically situated between 24013/ and 24015/ N and between 
90079/ and 90081/ E and is located in the Patuli mouza of Digheerpar union in 
Bajitpur. The Digheerpar union consists of 11 villages and 3 mouzas and has a 
population of 15,000 living in 2,400 households. Before 1997 it contained 17 villages 
and 8 mouzas but was divided into two unions named Digheerpar and Kailag. The 




Joanshaher Depression. There are 11 mosques, 3 temple, 3 madrasha, 8 primary 
schools and 1 junior school in the union (appendix: 5.1). 
Krishnapur lies about 5 km east of Bajitpur sub-distrct headquarters, which can be 
reached by a short boat trip from Patuli Port (Patulir ghat) of the adjacent village of 
Hilochia. It is about 30 km from Bhairab Bazar Railway junction and 45 km from 
Kishorgonj district town. The village covers 1.5 square kilometres and consists of 
two main sections both of which are built above the surrounding ground level and 
become flooded during the monsoon, separating the village from the mainland for up 
to six months of the year. During this time water depths reach 10 to 12 feet and 
fishing becomes the main activity. The village has seven wards locally called hati, 
which lie along the bank of the river in a north-south direction. Krishnapur and the 
neighbouring villages have long-established fishing communities with some ten 




Source: Fieldwork in Krisnapur in 2002-2003 
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The village Krishnapur has a specific kind of landscape with its evergreen shrubs, 
berries and bamboos surrounded by river, lake and land depression. Rivers in the 
west and south and land depression in the East and North surround the village. Tidal 
waves (especially during the rainy season) are a constant threat to its dwellings. Since 
neither village nor houses are enclosed by any wall or shielded by soil protectors, 
villagers plant shrubs locally known as behaiya gachh, around their houses. Tall trees 
do not grow in the sandy soil of the area. One block (bari) of the ward of Lalkharchar 
is enclosed by brick walls on its south side to prevent erosion from tidal surge. Other 
blocks are vulnerable, if they cannot place soil under their houses to raise them above 
floodwaters. There is no permanent earthen road in the village but several paths, 
which are inundated during the rainy season. During the monsoon, fishers travel from 
Krishnapur to other villages by boat. 
 
Figure 5.4: Village people crossing the river by ferry boat 
5.3.Village population, family and education 
A village census revealed a population of 1624 consisting of 832 males and 792 
females with an average household size of 5.38. Of the total village population, 1,306 




302 households/ families, 246 have a nuclear family structure (prithak), 55 a joint 
family structure (Joutha/ Ekloge Thaka) and one an extended family structure. 
Household/ family size varies from 1 to 17 members. Of the 302 households, 283 are 
male headed and 19 are female headed (both legal and de facto).  
Family (paribar) is the basic social and economic unit in Krishnapur. It is the 
primary unit of production and consumption and also the basic component of village 
kinship groups. Most families live in a single house but there are some wealthier 
families with two or three houses. In the poorest households, kitchens are not 
separated from the main living area or house and some use open space in courtyards 
as kitchens, especially in winter.  
Nuclear families consist of husband and wife with or without children with some 
consisting of a husband or wife with or without children (single parent family). Joint 
families consist of husband and wife with their married children and sometimes with 
their own parents and children. Most commonly such families are a grouping of 
nuclear families from different generations. Joint family practices are in decline 
because of economic pressures, land fragmentation, and parental death. Extended 
families are made up of a group of nuclear families and related individuals from 
several generations who reside together in the same household. In Krishnapur, 
nuclear families dominate followed by a few joint families. When a joint family 
breaks down into a number of nuclear families, control over fishing assets also breaks 
down. In some cases, separated families both farm and fish. Parents still retain 
control over their married sons through inheritance, village social standing and 
networks of support.  
The general level of public education is low by national standards. For example, the 
rate of literacy in Krishnapur is about 36 percent compared with 53 percent nationally 
(2001 census figures). About 47 percent of the village population is totally illiterate. 
The literacy rate among the Hindu is 40 percent, double that of Muslims at 20 
percent. In addition to public education, there is a maktab (an informal Islamic 
education centre) in Lalkharchar ward run by the mosque and Muslim children 




27 percent have primary education, 7 percent have secondary education and about 1 
percent higher secondary and above. 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Village primary school: the only educational institution for children 
5.4.The village economy 
The fishers’ households of Krishnapur sustain their livelihoods through a 
combination of fishing and farming (water and land). It is mainly local wealthier 
households of the village who own private farming land and use their family labour 
and sometimes non-family labour as sharecroppers. The main farming season is six 
to seven months a year followed by fishing on nominally common property water 
resources for four to five months of the year. Fishing is one of the most important 
sources of livelihood for the majority of poorer households but access to common 
property fisheries resources is restricted through the government implemented leasing 
system (see NRSP, 2004). 10,000 fishers are said to live in this locality and fish in 
Joanshaher depression and Bengla lake during the monsoon and in the Ghorauttra 
River, which is a part of the Meghna (for more details see the description of each of 




also fish in other depressions including Adkubla, Alenjure, Mitamoin, Dubgram, and 
Bed-latenneshwar. Fishers are also occasionally hired on a fixed wage basis to catch 
fish in other waterbodies of the neighbouring Upazilas. From February to March, 
large low-lying stretches of land of the area are cultivated and during the monsoon 
become flooded with waters rising 10 to 12 feet.  
According to the Bajitpur Thana (Upazila/sub-district) Fisheries Officer (TFO), there 
are thirty two governments owned waterbodies in Bajitpur, of which nine are above 
20 acres and twenty-three are below 20 acres. According to existing government 
policy, all the waterbodies above 20 acres are under the District Commissioner and 
those below 20 acres are under the Directorate of Youth. Some basic information on 
the fisheries of Bajitpur1 is given below in table: 5.1. 
The Assistant Commissioner, Land (AC Land), Bajitpur provided a list of water 
bodies in Bajitpur from the 6th Register of the Bajitpur sub-district land office. 
According to the register, the largest waterbodies in Bajitpur is the Bengla-
Charabadha waterbody (1363.5 acres) followed by Digheerpaar Bosti waterbody 
(437.38 acres). Overall, there are 32 waterbodies i in Bajitpur under the leasing 
system administered locally by the Ministry of Land and the Ministry of Youth. Table 
5:2 provide a list of the waterbodies, their size and location in Bajitpur where 
Krishnapur is located. 
The fishers of Krishanapur fish mainly in a number of sections of the Ghorauttra 
River. Each of the sections has a different name and is leased/ sub-leased out 
separately. Bengla Lake, which is connected to the Ghorauttra River, and the 
Joanshaher Depression, links up with the river during the monsoon. On the 
Ghorauttra River, Krishnapur fishers fish mainly in Bengla-Charabadha waterbody, 
Nagnarkhal waterbody and Digeerpaar Bosti waterbody. Others important Jolmohols 
used by the fishers of Krishnapur include Maijchar waterbody, Nuahata waterbody, 








Table 5.1: Basic information on fisheries of Bajitpur  
Annual fish demand  7883.24 metric ton 
Annual fish production  4612.88 mt 
Amount of fish from natural sources 1347.94mt 
Rivers flowing through Bajitpur  Ghorauttra, Daleshwari, Meghna, Daer Nadi 
Waterbodies above 20 acres 9 
Waterbodies below 20 acres 23 
Arots (fish selling center) 12 
Fishers 2200 
Fisher families 510 
Ice mills 10 
Matsyjeebee Samity (Fishers’ Associations) 14 
Percentage of fish obtained from natural sources  25-30% 
Major haors in Bajitpur (big floodplains/oxbow 
lakes/land depression) 
Joanshaher Haor/Adkubler Haor/Elenjuri 
Haor) 
Source: Thana Fisheries Officer (November 2002). 
 
Table 5.2: Water bodies of Bajitpur  
SL Name of the water body Size/area in acres Union/location 
1 Beengla-Charabadha Jolmohol  1363.57 Digheerpaar, Dilalpur 
Homairpur, Maijchar 
2 Digheerpaar bosti Jolmohol 437.38 Digheerpaar 
3 Baherbauli-Ainargup Jolmohol 301.80 Maijchar 
4 Nouhata Fishery 260.00 Maijchar 
5 Nagnarkhal Jolmohol (Nangarkhal) 171.26 Dilalpur 
6 Maijchar Jolmohol 135.75 Maijchar 
7 Pabiadoh Jolmohol 68.67 Shararchar 
8 Deobhangar Lake 22.17 Kailag 
9 Hilochia Khal Patty Bandh Jolmohol 21.86 Hilochiao 
10 Bajitpur Boro Dighee 15.02 Pourashabha 
11 Sharsher Dighee Pukur 13.63 Dilalpur 
12 Dasher Nadi 13.50 Maijchar 
13 Khandaker Dighee 9.65 Dilalpur 
14 Barudia Patty Bandh 6.98 Boliadi 
15 Digha Lake 6.12 Homairpur 
16 Guzar Lake 5.09 Digheerpaar 
17 Arang Jalkar 3.33 Pourashabha 




19 Moradia Khal Lake Patty Bandh 2.13 Digheerpaar 
20 Poilanpur Pukur 1.35 Pourashabha 
21  Pearipodder Jolmohol 1.24 Pourashabha 
22 Misri ThakurPukur 1.21 Pourashabha 
23 Louhogau Pukur (1) 1.16 Hilochia 
24 Nabab Pukur 1.08 Pourashabha 
25 Louhogau Pukur (3) 1.01 Hilochia 
26 Louhogau Pukur (2) 0.82 Hilochia 
27 Dari Ghagtia Pukur 0.79 Pourashabha 
28 Bajitpur Bazar Pukur 0.75 Pourashabha 
29 Bhagalpur Pukur (1) 0.53 Pourashabha 
30 Hilochia Pukur  0.53 Hilochia 
31 Digheerpaar Pukur 0.42 Digheepaar 
32 Bhagalpur Pukur (2) 0.29 Pourashabha 
Source: Assistant Commissioner of Land, Bajitpur (December 2002) 
The major occupation in Krishnapur is fishing. About 58 percent (176 households) of 
the village household heads are primarily involved in fishing, about 13 percent (39 
households) are fish traders, 14 percent are farmers and the remaining 15 percent are 
involved in service, business etc. The majority of the households combine fishing and 
agriculture. For example, only 33% of households are actually headed by full-time 
fishermen yet many more participate in fishing. Families primarily involved in 
fishing also have secondary occupations. Thus, of 176 fisher households, 97 fish 
only, 17 fish and trade, 40 fish and farm, and the remaining 22 have other secondary 
occupation besides fishing. Those 39 ‘non-fishing’ households are primarily fish 
traders but they also have some involvement in fishing, agriculture or other activities. 
Few household heads are involved in activities other than fishing, fish trading or 
farming (Figure: 5.6 & Table-5.3). These include teaching, day labourer, carpentry, 
tailoring, medicine, other government and non-government services and small- scale 
business. Most fishers use traditional fishing equipment and fishers’ incomes vary 
according to the types of fishing gear used, fishing practices engaged in and 
variations in fishing seasons, which cause changes in fishing yields.  
For example, in Railahati, out of 44 households, 39 are directly involved in fishing, 
10 have no boats and nets, and 5 have nets but no boats, which they rent from others. 




fishing related activities. Of 302 household heads, 218 had fathers who were fishers 
and 78 had fathers who were farmers (Fig: 5.7).  Except in Lalkharchar, the majority 
of the household heads’ fathers and/ or grandfathers of other wards were fishers. In 
Lalkharchar, of 53 households, 44 had fathers and grandfathers who were farmers. 
This is mainly a Muslim ward and unlike other wards, has no tradition of fishing. 




















Source: Fieldwork in Krishnapur in 2001-2  










Source: Fieldwork in Krishnapur in 2001-2  
Figure 5.7: Occupation of forefathers/ ancestor of the household heads 
 
Table 5.3: Distribution of fishers by primary and secondary occupation 
 
Name of 
































Railahati 27 2 4 6 2 0 0 0 0 3 44 
Kushahat
i 
14 3 4 2 2 1 1 0 5 6 38 
Tekkahat
i 
15 2 3 4 2 5 0 4 3 2 40 
Company
hati 
9 2 10 4 2 3 6 3 6 6 51 
Modoilla
hati 
13 2 3 2 3 3 1 0 0 6 33 
Barbarih
ati 
9 3 8 2 2 0 0 7 4 8 43 
Lalkharc
har 
10 3 8 2 3 1 2 5 6 13 53 
Total 97 17 40 22 16 13 10 19 24 44 302 









The fishers of Krishnapur divide the year into four fishing seasons: over wintering 
dry season, spawning migration season, nurseries grow-out season, and flood 
recession season. The over wintering season is from December to March when fish 
do not migrate and no heavy fishing of breed stock and juveniles in river mouths and 
the lakes occurs. The spawning migration season is from April to June when fish 
move from deeper to shallower waters. Some species breed in rivers, some in the 
flood plain and some in both river and floodplains and swim from/to rivers to lakes/ 
flood plains. The nursery grow out season is from June to September when fishes 
grow rapidly and are found throughout the region, despite high predation. The flood 
recession season continues from September to December, when fish begin to shift to 
deeper waters to escape being caught. Boishakh-Jaistha (April-May), Asharh-Bhadra 
(June-August), Katrik-Augrahan (Oct-Nov), Poush-Magh (Dec-Jan) are the seasons 
during which fishers of Krishnapur catch different types of fish using various types of 
nets and boats.. During Kartik –Augrahawn- Poush and Magh, is the best fishing time 
for the fishers of Krishnapur (Table 5.4). Fishers catch large quantities of fish and 
earn their highest income with which many can save some money to meet their 
family needs of the lean season when they have no fishing or have less income from 
fishing. Many fishers spend their savings during the lean season from Asharh- to-
Ashwin (June-Sept), when there are less fish. During this time, most fishers become 
idle and spend their time sitting at home, gossiping at the tea- stall, playing cards, 
repairing nets, visiting relations.  
 
Table 5.4: Yearly fishing cycle of Krishnapur fishers 
Month Fishing related activities Other activities 
January/ Poush-Magh Less fishing because of less water 
and less fish in the waterbodies. 
Pile/Kata fishing starts. Fishers, 
mostly old who do not like 
agriculture work or cannot do that 
type of work, do some fishing and 
hardly get 40/50 tk/ per day. 
Most of the fishers work as agriculture 
laborers because this time agriculture needs 
more laborers for the preparation of land. 






Less water and less fish. Can 
hardly earn 40/50tk per day 
Fishing is not lucrative for the 
majority of the fishers. Pile/jag 
fishing continues. 
Day laboring for land preparation. Wage is 
80tk per day without any food 
March/ Falgoon-
Chaitra 
Less water and less fish. Fishing 
with big nets starts during this 
time. For big nets, the leaseholders 
prefer to share the catch instead of 
fixed rent.  
Paddy planting and winnowing. Wage is 50-
55tk.per day without any food. 
April/Chaitra-
Baishakh 
Fishing season starts. Some fishers’ 
fish with Kona Ber jal and some 
use other big size of nets to fish 
Jhatka, Chapila and Chingri fish. 
This is peak time for agriculture. About 50% 
of the fishers do some agriculture as well as 
work as day laborers.There are about 60/70 
fishers in the village who work as day laborers 
in agriculture and get 50/60 tk/perday during 
lean season and 80-120tk/perday during peak 
season. Some fishers also work as contact 
laborers for about 8 months period of time and 
get 7/8, 000 tk with 3 times meal. There are 
about 15/20 people in the study village who 
work as contact laborers.  
May/Baishakh- 
Jaistha 
A small numbers of fishers with 
special nets do some fishing. 
Peak time for agriculture. Fishers are found 
very busy for harvesting paddy and other 
crops. Paddy harvesting continues. 
June/Jaistha-Asharh Rainy season starts and river and 
haor become full of water. Only a 
small number of fishers fish in the 
river during this time  
No agricultural work. 
July/Asharh-Srabaon A few numbers of fishers who have 
big nets can fish in the river but 
majority of the fisher with small 
nets fish in the floodplains. Some 
fishers fish by hooks. Fishers can 
earn 100-125tk/ per day during this 
time. 
No agricultural work. 
August/Srabon-
Bhadra 
Fish in the haor. No agricultural work. 
September/Bhadra-
Ashwin 






Fishers return to the river for 
fishing because this time haor starts 
drying. Fishers usually fish in their 
sub-leased water areas or other 
areas of the river by paying some 
rent/toll to the leaseholders or sub-
leaseholders. 
No agricultural work. 
November/Kartik-
Agrahayan 
Fish in the river. Some fishers start 
preparation of Pile/Jag: a special 
method of fishing through 
developing a temporary fish 
sanctuary where fishes are given 
feed and other physical 
environment. For pile fishing 
fishers get 40 % and leaseholders 
get 60 % of the catch value. 
No agricultural work. 
December/Agrahayan-
Poush 
Fish in the river. About 30-40% 
fishers fish with their small 
net.They mainly catch small 
species of fish. Fishers’ usually 
fish by paying some toll to the 
leaseholders. Leaseholders employ 
some guards to protect illegal 
fishing. Leaseholders take 20tk per 
day for fishing with small net and 
50tk per day for medium net. It 
continues up to February.  
Prepare land for agriculture. 
Source: Fieldwork in Krishnapur 2001-2002 
5.6.Income, landownership and types of work in Krishnapur 
The fishers of Krishnapur fall into three main categories: professional (traditional) 
fishers, part time or seasonal fishers and subsistence fishers. Most are professional 
and some own nets and boats and employ poor fishers, who do not have any nets and 
boats, on monthly or daily wage or share of the catch basis. Part-time or seasonal 
fishers are those who derive only part of their income from fishing. They have few 
fishing assets and rely on family labor or relatives. Some fishers borrow money 
(dadon) from the fish traders (beparis) and fish wholesellers/ commission agents 




are usually the poorest do not have their own nets and boats and work for other 
fishers, getting a share of catch. Some work as general labourers. 
Fishers’ incomes vary across and within the above categories. Better-off fishers (28.5 
percent) earn between 5, 000 tk. and 8, 000. tk per month, medium-income fishers 
(41 percent) earn from 3, 000 tk. to 5, 000 tk. per month, and poorer fishers (30.5 
percent) earn from 2,000tk to 3,000tk per month. These income figures are based on 
verbal reports of earnings from fishing and non-fishing activities. Earnings 
estimations were based on two weeks in the fishing peak and low seasons 
respectively. Better-off fishers include a small number of professional fishers with 
big nets, a boat, other fishing equipment and small plots of land, some fish traders 
and wholesale commission agents. They are able to meet most of their basic needs 
and lead a modest life. Middle-income earners include fishing households who own a 
single net or boat and who sometimes rent a boat or share nets with others. They may 
also own small plots of land. The poorer fishing households live from hand to mouth 
earning between 2, 000 tk. and 3, 000 tk. a month. Most own no nets, boats or land, 
often sharecropping other’s land. Most rely on taking advance from local fish traders, 
commission agents and moneylenders to see them through the year. Case studies 
conducted among a cross section of fishers, fish traders and commission agents give 
some idea about their income and expenses. For example, Ramkrishna (55), a poor 
fisher of Krishnapur has a family of seven and has one Patni jal (worth 5, 00 tk.) but 
no boat. On the day interviewed he earned eighty taka (80 tk) from fishing, from 
which he spent seventy one taka (71 tk.) for buying rice (48 tk.), vegetable oil (4 tk.), 
kerosin oil (4 tk.) and tobacco (3 tk.). He had earned taka 150 and 180 over the 
previous two days from which he bought other essentials and repaid money received 
from the fish traders. Like him, there is another small fisher named Krishnadhan (40) 
with a family of seven and who owns one net (worth 6, 000 tk.) but no boat. He had 
rented a boat at 1, 600tk for 4 months. The day he was interviewed he earned 75tk 
from fishing and 64tk to buy four kilograms of rice (4x12), onion (4 tk.), salt (4 tk.) 
and vegetable oil (7 tk.). For previous three days, he earned 150 tk., 70 tk and 60 tk., 





This picture is different for local fish traders and commission agent. While talking 
with a number of fish traders on the river when they were buying fish from the 
fishers, one named Jogeshwar (50) said he had been trading fish for the last 20 years. 
He had three Muslim partners and an investment of 75,000 tk.Beside this, he owned 
one boat (worth.40, 000 tk) and a net (worth 15, 000 tk.). His group got fish from 40-
50 local fishers with whom they had financial transaction. Everyday he supplied 100 
to 150 kg of fish to Bhairab and Kuliarchar fish wholesale commission agents from 
whom he took 3-lakh taka loan. He used his own boat for collecting fish and received 
50tk per day as rent from the ezmali (their group). He also rented out his net to other 
fishers. He informed me that on average, he earned 6-7, 000 tk a month.  
Another local small fish trader (choto paikar) named Jitendra (45), who bought fish 
from local fishers and sold in the local retail fish market, earned only 80-150 tk per 
day less than Jogeshwar. He has a family of five with a small boat but no net. He 
mostly sold his fish to the local fish market but sometimes supplied fish to Jogeshwar 
for which he earned 5-10 tk profit per kg. He has received a small amount of dadon 
from Jogeshwar. Beside fishers and local fish traders, the commission agents have a 
different mode of earning and expenses and a number of Bajitpur wholesale 
commission agents were interviewed during the peak trading season. Ratan Kumer 
(40) informed me that he had been a wholesale commission agent for last 5 years 
with another partner. They were supplied by 40 to 50 local fishers, including from 
Krishnapur, to whom he distributed two hundred thousand taka as loan. Trading is 
done from a ‘godi’ (fish transferring centre) in the wholesale fish trading centre (arot) 
and everyday morning local small paikars and fishers bring their fish to his trading 
centre. He received 5 tk. as commission for sale of 100 tk. fish and after paying 
mintis (labourers who load and unload fish and take weight), arot tax, and covering 
the office expenses, he could earn 5,00-1, 000 tk. a day, depending on fish quality 
















Source: Fieldwork in Krishnapur 2001-2002 
Figure 5.8: Distribution of households by number of earning members 
Some family members are both farmers and fishers and about one third of households 
having more than one income earner (Figure: 5.8). Income earners include the father 
with his adult son or young child. Earnings are not always from the same source and 
the father may be involved in agriculture and the son in fishing, fish trading, business 
or other services.    
Land ownership is an important indicator of economic and social status in the village.  
55 percent (167) households have no land and only 3 percent (9) have more than 5 
acres. Of these 167 landless households, 97 are entirely dependent on fishing. Among 
landholding households, 8 percent have less than 50 decimals (shotok), 14 percent 
between 50 and 100 decimals, 11 percent between 100 and 200 decimals and 9.27 
percent 200 to 500 decimals.  
Besides fishing, fish trading and farming, there is a small ‘modern’ sector, which 
includes government and non-government workers and non-fish businesses and 
traders. One or two households obtain income from family members in other parts of 
Bangladesh and overseas. People in this sector are regarded locally as an economic 




With the exception of a small minority of better-offer villagers, most find it difficult 
to accumulate money for investment or other purposes. Money ‘burns a hole’ in 
people’s pockets and the smallest note is immediately spent. A village income 
balance sheet would show a permanent deficit with many households reliant on credit 
of one kind or another. Illness, dietary deficiency and poor hygiene are facts of 
everyday life.  Life is a daily struggle to earn enough money to buy rice, and the 
irregular nature of fishing makes this struggle even harder. Fishers usually sell the 
fish they catch to buy rice and other staples. While the poorest spend a high 
percentage of their income on basic staples, they also purchase tea, toys for children, 
spend money on card playing, cigarettes, alcohol or movies. 
Food constitutes the most essential expenditure of fishing people. A typical meal is 
made up of rice or rice water, accompanied by some vegetables, fish, dry fish or 
green chillies with a piece of onion. As the villagers are mostly fishers, fish is 
regarded as an important part of their daily meal. However, in the past, they used to 
eat more of their catch than they do now. People of all economic classes eat fish 
regularly. At certain times of the year, when there is no other food and other income 
sources, poor people (both traditional and non-traditional fishers) must catch fish to 
eat to survive. Poor fishers consume the low-grade part of their catch and sell the rest 
to buy other essentials. Rich fishers dry some of the fish, if the catch is exceptionally 
good. Poor families also dry any available fish and keep it as a reserve. Dry fish 
provides variety, when fresh fish supply is limited. Families who fish mainly for their 
own consumption are unlikely to invest as much money as professional fishers in 
fishing gear. They use very simple and inexpensive gear for monsoon fishing (fishing 
hooks/ borshi, Jhaki jal, etc.) and dry season fishing in shallow waters (Chai, Polo, 
Thela jal etc.). Fishers also buy fish for their own consumption. A sample survey of 









Table 5.5: Weekly fish consumption by different categories of fishers 
Categories 
 
Ate fish (fish caught 
 by  H.H Members) 
 Ate fish (bought  
from the Market) 
Did not 
eat fish  
Total no of  
Respondents 
Better-Off             5              4             1            10 
Middle             8               1             1            10 
Poor             6              0             4            10 
Source: Fieldwork in Krishnapur 2001-2002 
During the lean season (Jan-Feb), fishers’ incomes decline and poor fishers mostly 
eat cheap cereals called ‘muta chaler bhat’ (low quality rice). Rice is an essential 
expenditure, which can represent half of household income. People talk about the 
price of rice, qualities are compared, and it is common to show a visitor the rice that 
has just been bought. People complain about the perpetually rising price of rice.  
Vegetable prices are quite high and many poor fishers rarely eat vegetables apart 
from their own produce. They buy chillies, red peppers, onion and essential spices. 
They also do not buy clothes very often and most of the times wear threadbare 
garments. A ‘sari’ (women’s main dress: a 5-6 metre long clothe for wrapping the 
women body) costs 300 to 500 tk. and a man’s shirt and ‘lungi’ (men’s main dress 
for wrapping the bottom part of the body) about 300-400tk. Medical costs are very 
high, even if they consult village doctors (folk healers). If a woman stops producing 
milk, she has to buy expensive powdered or cow-milk to feed her baby. Children 
sometimes have to buy books for school. From time to time fodder has to be bought 
for the cow and the house needs regular maintenance.  
Inviting guests at different festivals, buying new dresses for children, stocking the 
home with necessary items, including a television and furniture, providing children 
with an education, giving dowry when a daughter marries and so on have great social 
value in village society. These special items of expenditure are a heavy burden on the 
household budget. 
5.7.Fishing and non-fishing assets 
Access to fishing gear is central to the livelihood strategies of Krishnapur fishers. 
They utilise a wide range of fishing nets, which are designed to catch particular 




nets, drag nets, cast nets, dip nets, stake nets, and fixed purse nets. There are also 
various types of boats made from local trees are designed for different fishing 
purposes, cargo haulage, and passenger traffic. Among the boats, ‘kussha’ and 
‘dingee’ are most common. The ‘dingee’ is the second largest fishing boat with an 
average length of 20ft. and a width of 3-4 ft, while the ‘Kushsha’ is the smallest at 15 
ft. long and 2.5 ft. wide. Professional, part-time and non-fishers (including fish 
traders, farmers, service holders and businessmen) own or use different types of 
fishing equipment 
Ownership of nets and boats, which is unevenly distributed in the village, takes two 
forms: private and group sharing. In addition, some fishers hire equipment. Only 33 
percent of households have no fishing equipment, while the majority (68 percent) 
own some fishing gear such as a boat, net, chai or hook (borshi).  
Krishnapur fishing households own very few non-fishing assets such as agricultural 
land or livestock. Three types of income generating non-fishing assets are important: 
homestead and agricultural land, agricultural implements, dairy and poultry. Many 
families rear fowl for commercial purposes with some households rearing hundreds 
of ducks and swans. Ownership of non-draft animals such as goats, sheep and poultry 
does not depend on the ownership of land, as is the case with draft animals (cows and 
buffalos). A sample survey of 80 households in the study village revealed that 5 
percent had no non-fishing assets and 60 percent had non-fishing assets or 
implements worth less than 5, 000 tk. The remaining 35 percent owned non-fishing 
assets (dairy and poultry) of more than 5, 000 tk worth.  
The people of Krishnapur work in agriculture, both as a primary and secondary 
occupation. A majority of households, including those with the largest land holdings, 
work in the fields during the months of Baishakh and Jaistha (see figure: 5.9).  Fisher 
families mainly do single cropping, as their faming areas are regularly flooded for 
about 6 months of the year. Rice and wheat are the main crops taking up 70 percent 
and eight percent of gross cropped area respectively (1983-84 Agricultural Census). 
Fishing families with land try to supplement their earnings through farming and 
sometimes by leasing out land. Fishers without land usually work as hired labourers. 




but many work as hired labourers during Baishakh and Jaistha. A few work as hired 
labourers (chukti based) winnowing on paddy fields in the land depression.  
 
 
Figure 5.9: Fishers harvesting in the pady fields 
Winnowers earn 100-to150 tk/day and ten labourers can winnow one acre of land a 
day. During the month of Falgun, 60 to 70 fishers from Krishnapur work as  hired 
labourers (locally called ‘Muni’) and do paddy plantation and harvesting work from 
which they can earn 50-to 60 tk. per day without meal. Only 113 (37 percent) 
household heads farm as their primary and secondary sources of income.  
Other household heads are primarily fishers or fish traders with some involvement in 
agricultural activities. Compared to other wards, the families of the Muslim ward of 
Lalkharchar are mainly farmers. Of 53 households of this ward, 29 are directly 
engaged in farming and the remaining 24 are landless. The distribution of agricultural 

















Source: Fieldwork in Krishnapur 2001-2002 
Figure 5.10: Ownership pattern of agricultural land 
The organisation of agricultural production takes several forms. One arrangement is 
‘chukti or chukaiya’ (contract based) where land is cultivated by village and other 
landowners or family labourers and by families and hired labourers. Here the contract 
farmer bears all the cost involved in the production process and the landowner gets 
10 to 15 maunds of rice from each crop (figure: 5.11-5.14).  
 


















A second arrangement is called ‘aiddha chukaiya’ (sharecropping) where the 
landowner and the cultivator cooperate. It works in two ways. Either the sharecropper 
(bargadar) bears all costs involved with production and receives two thirds of the 
total product or both landowner and sharecropper bear the costs equally and share the 
product equally. Under the ‘pattan or bandhak’ system a landowner leases out his 
land for a period of one to three years. A fertile piece of land of 100 decimals is 
leased out for about 20 thousand taka for three years with one crop a year.  
74 fisher households cultivate land under the chukti system, 14 under the aiddha 
system and 9 landless fisher households work under the ‘pattan or bandhak’ system. 
Moreover, a significant number of poor fishers work as hired agricultural labourers 
during the fishing lean season. 
Many of the landless fishers work as seasonal agriculture labourers on the land 
depression in the batan, which is a temporary encampment or place for farming 
agricultural land. Rich farmers generally hire labourers for 8 months from mid-
October to mid-May and they are usually paid 6 to 8, 000tk with meals for the 
season.  There are about 20 Krishnapur fishers who work as batan labourers and they 
usually live at the batan and visit their families two to three times a week.  
 




5.8.Village infrastructure: housing pattern, household utensils, water and sanitation 
The houses of each ward, in some cases two wards are attached to each other and 
usually built a little upland from the flat land. The construction and design of the 
village houses is adapted to such weather and natural conditions, but when showers 
are heavy roofs bend, exaggerating their curved cornices and dislodging palm leaves. 
Some of the villagers take precautions against rain and flood. One type of tall tree 
locally called Rain tree and some other tall tree species mark human habitation, 
where the village homesteads are punctuated by banana groves and kitchen gardens. 
Mud-built structures are absent because of the sandy nature of the soil. Straw and tin 
are the most common building materials with mud used in some cases for plastering 
over straw and bamboo thatches.A village home is generally a cluster of several 
houses and is used for different purposes. Separate dwelling houses, kitchen, 
storehouse, and cattle sheds are found mainly in wealthy households, as poor fishers 
cannot afford them. Poor fishers especially repair the roofs of their homes every year. 
Bamboo made fences and straw and palm leaves are used widely to protect their 
dwellings from flood and tidal waves. The roofs of houses are sloping and undulating 
but peaked at the centre (figure 5.13). 
 




A random sample survey of 80 fishing households shows the distribution of different 
types of houses in Krishnapur. About 76 percent of fishers live in thatched houses 
(costing 1, 000 to 10, 000 tk.), 9 percent live in bamboo, hay and straw made houses 
(costing 5, 000 to 15, 000 tk.), 12 percent live in tin roof and straw/bamboo fenced 
houses (costing 15, 000 to 30, 000 tk.) and the remaining 3 percent live in floor 
pucca, half wall/ tin fenced and tin roofed houses (costing 30, 000 to 120, 000 tk.). 
The average living space of a poor family is between 0.5 and 1 decimal (.05 and 
0.1acre).  
The household utensils/ materials used by fishers include cutting equipment made of 
iron, aluminium and earthen utensils, wooden furniture and consumer durables. Iron 
made cutting equipment includes the chopper the axe and spade. Aluminium and 
earthen utensils are widely used during household work. Only a few houses have 
earthen plates locally known as ‘bashon’ while almost all jars and pitchers are made 
from clay. Some well- to- do families use aluminium and bell metal utensils, and 
ceramic plates and dishes (teacups, urns, saucers etc). Spoons are used rarely. The 
villagers use their fingers to eat. The household furniture includes cabinets (almirah), 
tables, chairs and benches. A few families have furniture made of better wood and 
fine art decorated. Pictures of various animals, birds and plants are sometimes drawn 
on the frame and legs of bedsteads by skilled artisanals. Some households have black 
and white television sets and a few have watches, radios and bicycles.  
The main source of water is the river Gorauttra, which is used for cooking and 
washing clothes and other utensils. Some fishers use river water for drinking. In 
Krishnapur, there are only 18 tube wells for 302 households (1,624 people) of which 





Figure 5.14: Open-air toilet in the village 
There are only six sanitary (pucca) latrines / toilets, five half-pacca latrines (using 
rings) in the village and sixty-six kacha latrines made of bamboo and coarse cloth 
made of jutes on four pillars of bamboo in an open place. These Kacha toilets do not 
have any rings and during the monsoon excrement is discharged into the water. Most 
toilets are close to the river and near the places where people bath, wash clothes and 
utensils and take water for cooking (see figure: 5.14). Overall, in Krishnapur, for 
every four households, there is only one toilet, that is, one toilet for twenty-one 
persons and many households have no private toilet at all.  
5.9.Fish catch and consumption 
Fish is a crucial element in the diet of a population, particularly in countries where 
the staple crop (such as cassava or plantain) is particularly low in protein. In 
Bangladesh, fish plays a significant role in both providing fish food to the local 
population and earning foreign exchange. Official statistics (BBS, 2001) show that 
with an increase in national fish production fish consumption has also increased 
during the last two decades with per capita daily fish consumption increasing from 22 
gm. in 1981 to 38 gm. in 2001. Ali et al. (2003) report higher consumption for pond 




consumed the same amount of fish in the late 1990s as in 1982 (Thompson et al., 
2002). Chowdhury (2000) mentions that freshwater fisheries are crucial since access 
to common property provide a vital source of essential nutrients and means for 
increasing household incomes. Of particular importance in this regard are the small 
indigenous fish species (SIS) which contribute up to 80% of the fish eaten by low 
income households in the rural areas (also see Capristrano & Stackhouse, 1997).  
The poor fishers of Krishnapur catch fish but cannot afford to take fish as a major 
item of their diet. In the past, fishers consumed more of their catch than they do now. 
Today, they mainly eat ‘small indigenous species’ (SIS) of small fish (‘chotomaach’) 
rather than large fish or ‘boromaach’. Of the 260 species of freshwater fish in 
Bangladesh, over 140 species are classified as SIS 
(http://www.itdgbangladesh.org/knowledge/reports/reports.html). In contrast, 
boromaach (generally considered to be a commercial crop, either wild caught species 
such as Hilsa or exotic/imported species of carp fishes), are mostly consumed by 
richer people. 
Case studies on the dietary habits of poor fishers of Krishnapur show that around 80 
percent of fish eaten are small indigenous species. Eight fishers were interviewed at a 
fish landing spot in the morning about their diet during the previous three days. In 22 
out of 48 meals (lunch and dinner), they ate small fish with rice, in 17 meals they ate 
dry fish (sutki) with rice (small dry fish) and in 9 meals, they ate only vegetables with 
out any dry fish or any small fish. Chicken curry is a special item and only one fisher 
took one meal with chicken when he had guests (see Appendix: 5.2).  
When fishers return from fishing in the morning, they sort their catch on the 
riverbank or lake by size and variety. The men keep part of their catch, mostly the 
small fish, for their own consumption and sell the rest. Rich fishers use a part of their 
catch for their own consumption. Sometimes part of the catch is processed as dry 
fish. Poor fishers also dry some fish (mostly low quality/ rotten fish) and keep it as a 
reserve. Fish is preferred over meat in almost every household. It is an integral part of 
the diet on all festive occasions among Hindus. Among Muslims sending large size 




essential part of the ceremony (see Ali, 1991; Islam & Dewan, 1987). In recent years 
with an increased demand for freshwater fish from Bangladeshis living overseas, the 
export of fish and fish products has increased significantly. 
5.10. Food security and livelihood strategies of Krishnapur fishers 
There was time when Bengali people had an abundant fish and rice supply and had 
fish almost in every meal. Fisheries records show that up to the 1960s, inland water 
resources could fulfil the national demand for fish but today the situation has 
changed considerably.  Although some 90 percent of the protein needs of rural people 
still come from fish, its importance is diminishing rapidly with population growth 
overwhelming the productive potential of Bangladesh fisheries. Since the 1960s, per 
capita availability of fish has dropped from 12 kg to 7 kg and among lower income 
groups per capita fish consumption is only 4.4 kg2.  Fish perhaps plays the most 
crucial role in diet as a source of minerals and Vitamin-A, Calcium, Iron and Zinc 
and is particularly important for children and lactating mothers. Bangladesh has the 
highest level of malnutrition in the Asia-Pacific region, which affects 70 to 80 
percent of the children, and infant mortality rates are high (over 1 in 10 up to one 
year of age).  
Although many fishers cannot afford to eat fish, it continues to play an important role 
in food security3. Fisheries provide people with an income to buy other foods. 
However, fish is crucial in supplementing the minimum diet of the fishing 
populations. They are important to the nutrition and supplement the income of the 
vast majority of the rural people including the poorest of the poor, the landless and 
the destitute. Small-scale exploitation of a wide range of species provides crucial 
sources of protein, fats, oils and vitamins, as well as a resource in times of hardship 
for the people of the study village.  
These resources are under threat from numerous environmental pressures ranging 
from over-fishing to pollution of waterways. The food security of Krishnapur fishers 
is closely related to fishers’ access to their local fisheries resources. Increasing 
population, pollution and environmental degradation are placing critical pressure on 




poor and traditional fishing households. Older fishers in the study area claim that fish 
habitats have been lost and degraded due to man-made and natural causes. According 
to a DOF report, employment opportunities for some people have increased with the 
growth of aquaculture (including coastal shrimp) and marine fishing. However, 
inland open water capture fisheries production and employment are declining. For 
example, in 1983-84 the total river catch was 207,760 metric tons but only 150,129 
metric tons in 2000-2001 (Ali et al., 2003). Such a decrease in fish catch has 
significant consequences for the sustainable livelihoods of Krishnapur fishers who 
depend on fishing in the local rivers, estuaries, lakes, and the land depressions. 
For the majority of Krishnapur households, fishing is a part of a complex food 
production system, which underpins a rich and diverse livelihood pattern. Secure 
access to fishing grounds, including secure including property rights, is essential to 
the sustainability of that livelihood pattern. However, in the study area, leasing of 
open water fisheries to a small elite does not ensure fishers obtain an income 
sufficient to live. A fisher’s livelihood is not only related to fish production but also 
to the inland fisheries ecosystem on which a majority of people depend. A growing 
demand for fish in local and global markets4 has encouraged greater 
commercialisation of inland fishing, creating conflicts with small-scale fishers in the 
study area. It has also created an imbalance in resource exploitation between 
traditional and commercial fishers. A small-scale fishery makes a substantial 
contribution to the employment, income and food security of the fishing people but a 
growing influx of people from other sectors, including farming, into fisheries is 
increasing the levels of poverty and vulnerability of the traditional fishing community 
and threatening access rights to fisheries resources. Increasing demand combined 
with a reduction in supply of fish has made water bodies more valuable and increased 
non-fisher control of water bodies reduced the availability of common pool resources 
and increased the use of indiscriminate fishing methods. 
The globalisation of fisheries is also transforming the structure of local, regional and 
national markets. During the last decade, the share of export earnings from fish and 
fish products varied from 6 percent to 13 percent of the total export earnings of 




almost doubled since 1988-89. The average annual growth rate of the fisheries sector 
in the recent past has been about 6.5 percent, which is likely to increase due to 
growing local and global demand for fish and fish products (see BBS, 2000; Faisal & 
Parveen, 2002). In 2000-2001 38,988 metric tons of fish and fish products were 
exported (mostly shrimp and shrimp products with a small percentage of fresh water 
fishes) with a value of 20, 327.5 million tk. The volume and value of fish and fish 
products exported and their value between 1991/ and 2001/2 is shown in Fig. 5.14. 
However, nearly 97 percent of total fish produced in the country continues to be 
consumed domestically of which inland fisheries contribute 72 percent of total catch 
and 28 percent comes from marine fisheries.  
Since there is a wide gap between supply and demand, all types of fish, irrespective 
of the price, are marketed easily due to the presence of a heterogeneous mixture of 
buyers. Export of fresh water fish is a very recent development for Bangladesh.  
Source: Ali et al. 2003. 
Figure 5.15: Export of fish and fish product from Bangladesh 
With increases in the human population and consequently in the demand for fish, 
fishing pressures are intensifying every year, and the poor fishers are becoming 
vulnerable and looking for alternative non-fishing survival strategies including 

































































While the specific impact of increased exports of fin fish on Krishnapur is not a main 
objective of the study, several local leaseholders either own fish processing plants or 
have commercial links with fish processors and exporters in the local area. Some, but 
an unknown, proportion of the total catch of Krishnapur fishers is sold to these 
processors and exported to the UK, Australia, USA, Canada and the Middle East. 
One of the biggest fish and shrimp processing and exporting business in Bangladesh, 
the Kuliarchar Group, has plants close to Krishnapur and in Chittagong and Cox’s 
Bazar. The father of the owner of the Kuliarchar Group formerly held leases in a 
number of water bodies in the Krishnapur area, including Bengla Lake. 
5.11. Life and culture in the village 
The lives of local fishers and their families are closely related to rivers and boats, and 
these have effects on their cultural practices and social relations (figure: 5.16-5.19). 
The fishers are very conscious of their cultural identity and distinctiveness, have a 
strong belief in the rightness of their values and maintain strong bonds of kinship in 
their social and economic life. Fishers consider their kin to be more dependable than 
others when at work on the river. Hindu fishers believe that God has entrusted them 
with a sacred duty of fishing to enable them to supply others with fish. Hence, any 
deviation from their ‘jati-pesha’ (caste occupation) is thought to be sinful. Fishers 
speak of flowing rivers having a softening and relaxing effect on their mind and body 
and have developed various songs and folk stories, sayings and folklores, jokes and 
riddles. When fishing, fishers gain pleasure from singing folksongs such as 
‘bhatiyali’ and ‘shari’ songs (gaan), which have vigorous rhythms, and utilize folk 
dialects and themes taken from their everyday life. Inspired by rivers, boats and 
water, there is a song called Shari (boat race song), which is sung by the gaoty/ gaity 
(special sari singer) as an accompaniment to a boat race when oarsmen sing a Shari 
song in chorus. One of the festive seasons of the bhati (low lying) areas of 
Kishoregonj, Netrokona, Sunamgonj, Habigonj, and Brahmanbaria is during the mid 
monsoon month of Sraban (July-August), when all the fields are flooded, rivers and 
canals merge with the depressions and harvesting is long over. The whole area 




It is variously referred to as Nouka Puja, Srabani Puja or Bisha Hori Puja. As the 
names imply, the festival centres on the boat, waterways and other traditions. 
Everywhere there are hectic activities. Friends visit friends and married daughters 
make long awaited journeys to their parents’ home, the trip referred to as Nayar 
(Gupta, 2001). Bathing in the Old Brahmaputra River was once a popular activity for 
the thousands of poor Hindu people of the area who could not afford an expensive 
Durga Puja. The event is commonly known as ‘Asthamir Snan’ and is held on 
Janmasthami, the birthday of Lord Krishna, when people travel to Hoshenpur on the 
banks of the Old Brahmaputra (river) in Kishoregonj. Others bathe in the Buriganga 
on the same occasion.  
 








Figure 5.17: Young boys relaxing on the net 
 
 






5.12. Women and children in fishing and agriculture 
A traditional pattern of gender role allocation, which is found in many fishing 
communities, also prevails in the fishing community of Krishnapur with fishing itself 
an exclusively male domain and women carrying out important ancillary tasks such 
as weaving nets, salting and drying fish (Ram, 1991; Hornell, 1950; Anderson & 
Wadel, 1972; Janet Carsten, 1997; Danowskys, 1980; Inge Tvedten & Bjorn 
Hersoug, 1992). Koibortta women not only manage household activities, they make 
nets, prepare Gub (one type of glue for dyeing nets), dry fish, repair nets, sort the 
catch, and do some agricultural activities (paddy and nut plantation, threshing, 
winnowing and harvesting) (Table: 5.6 & 5.7 and figures:  5.20-5.24). Young girls 
also prepare nets. They are taught from early childhood by their mothers and 
grandmothers and in some cases prepare nets for sale. Small nets sell for a minimum 
of tk.200-300 while larger ones can sell for tk 1000. They take orders from local 
fishers and also sell to other village people or in the local market through their 
husbands. Raw materials are purchased in local markets at Bajitpur, Kuliarchar and 
Bhairab. Women use this money mainly for family purposes. Such net weaving work 
is done during the monsoon when other work is unavailable. One woman, Gita Rani  
(35), was paid 15 to 20tk for making one hat (18 inches) of net and could  make 20 
hats a month after performing all her other household activities. Although these 
activities directly contribute to fish production, their male counterparts hardly 
recognize them as their contribution to fish production process. Fisherwomen are not 
encouraged to fish as they are said to lack the physical strength to work big nets in 
poor weather conditions, are subject to restrictions on mixing in public places and 
have little time to do much else besides household duties. 
Many women, young boys and girls also work as hired agricultural labourers and on 
family farms. During Kartik-Poush, they plant paddy and earn 70 to 80 tk. per day for 
working from 8 a.m. to 16.00 –17.00 p.m. (without any meal from the employer). 
During Magh-Falgun, women mainly plant, winnow and thresh paddy and nuts for 




Table 5.6: Daily activities of fisherwomen 
     5 a.m-6 a.m. Wake up, wash, say prayer, clean dishes in the river 
 
6 a.m.-9 a.m Carry water from river/ tube well, clean house and kitchen, take goat/ cattle to graze, 
clean courtyard, stables, milk cows, prepare breakfast 
9 a.m.-11 a.m Boil paddy, lie out to dry, husk paddy, grind spices, husk rice before cooking, and 
prepare chata (indigenous fuel) from cow dung. 
11 a.m.-16 p.m Prepare meal, cook meal, wash clothes in the river, bathe and take lunch, if three meals a 
day. Make nets, sew kantha 
16 p.m-19 p.m. Bring cattle back, feed and secure them, cook evening meal (if any), take preparation for 
evening praying i.e. puja, light the   lamp (Harican/ Kupi) with fuel. 
19 p.m-22 p.m. Feed everyone and then retire 
Source: Fieldwork in Krishnapur in 2001-2002 
Both Muslim and Hindu women and girls work in the fields or outside the home 
although very few work as agricultural labourers. The more pious Muslim women 
and girls prefer to work in their homesteads or a nearby house rather than more 
distant places. In contrast, Hindu women and girls work as hired and self-employed 
agricultural labourers. Some wives and daughters of rich fishers, fish-traders and 
farmers work mainly within their house as self-employed workers in both agricultural 
and non-agricultural jobs. They are involved in both planting and harvesting paddy 
and nuts. Widows work for pay in the homes of other women who themselves take 
care of the major domestic duties. In a few cases, women in poor families take their 
young daughters with them to work as agricultural labourers. More senior women are 
paid a little more than younger women but both are paid less than men. Some 
fisherwomen expressed their concern about this wage gap.  
Shachi Rani (45), Uzzala Rani (60), Lakhmi Rani (35) and Rita Rani (13) who 
worked as hired labourers (called ‘muni’) in nut and rice planting, winnowing, 
harvesting, drying and boiling earned 30 to 35 tk per day without meals while male 
workers were paid 40 to 60 tk with meal. Srabonti Das (55), a widow, worked as a 
muni and faced severe hardship during monsoon when work in the fields was not 
possible. Rita Rani Das (13) of Companyhati lost her father three years ago and she 
and her mother worked as hired and self-employed labourers. They were paid 30 tk 
each (without meal) for working as hired labourers in the nut and paddy fields to 




loans from wholesale commission agents and moneylenders which had been incurred 
by brothers in the family. Dewalla Rani Das (45) of Companyhati is married with a 
married daughter and her husband sold dry fish locally but earned some 40 to 50 tk 
per day. Each monsoon season she borrowed money, which she attempted to repay 
during the dry season from work as a hired labourer.  Like other village women, 
fisher women do not have enough land to grow vegetables. 
 
Table 5.7: Year round (seasonal) activities of a fisherwoman 
Baishakh 
(15th April-14th May) 
Thresh, dry, clean, parboil and husk rice, harvest and dry nut 
Jaistha 
(15 may- 14 June) 
Dry and stack paddy, stocks for cattle 
 (locally called kher/ nara), prepare net and kantha 
Ashar 
(15 June- 14 July) 
Make nets and kantha, visits relatives (especially parents or maternal uncles  
(mamar bari) 
Srabon 
(15th July-14 Aug) 
*Do 
Bhadro 
(15 Aug – 14  Sept) 
Prepare food for the fishers who go fishing in the early morning at 3-4 a.m. 
Weed and make trellis for vegetables, and raising seed. 
Ashwin 
(15 Sept. – 14 Oct.) 
Do 
Kartik 
(15 Oct. – 14 Nov.) 
Dry and soak seed, sow seedbed, water and take care of seedbed, cultivate 
vegetables and pulse. 
Agrahayan 
(15 Nov- 14 Oct.) 
 Grow vegetable (winter) in and around the homesteads 
Poush 
(15 Dec. – 14 Jan.) 
Take care of winter vegetable, prepare chata fuel from cow dung, plant paddy and 
nuts 
Magh 
(15 June – 14 Feb.) 
Harvest winter vegetable, harvest potato, winnowing and cleaning of nut and 
paddy fields 
Falgun 
(15 Feb – 14 march) 
Nut & paddy field winnowing, winnowing and cleaning of nut and paddy field  
Chaitra 
(15 March – 14 April) 
          -Do- 
Collect fuel (made from cow dung), Harvest paddy and nut. 





Figure 5.19: A fisher girl weaving a net: mother helping 
 






Figure 5.21: Fisher girls drying paddy 
 






Figure 5.23: Both men and women working together drying paddy 
5.13. Relations between Hindu and Muslim fishers 
Hindus are a minority in Kishoregonj but in Krishnapur, they are in the majority with 
Muslims living in only one of the seven wards (hati or para) and working mainly in 
agriculture. Generally, relations among Hindus and Muslims are amicable and there 
have been no riots or clashes between them for fifty years. The 1965 riots during the 
India-Pakistan war did not reach the village. At the time of fieldwork, Muslims were 
reported to have exploited Hindus, when some days earlier several nets of a Hindu 
fisher had been stolen by local Muslims. The fisher recognized all of them but could 
not take legal actions. While overt conflicts between Muslims and Hindus are rare in 
the village, there are social, psychological, political and economic differences which 
manifest themselves in, among other things, differences in national and local political 
allegiances, restrictions on marriage, spatial segregation, and tensions over fishing 
rights and access to fishing bodies and religious practices. 
A majority of Hindus are political supporters of the Awami League (at the time of 
writing the main opposition party) and have good relations with local Awami leaders. 
The current local Member of the Parliament who is a member of the ruling 




since the election of the BNP coalition government in 2001, Hindus have felt more 
insecure and have been subject to some political and economic harassment.  
Marriage between the Hindu and Muslim girls and boys is usually not allowed and 
those who breach this informal rule are subject to sanctions. For example, two young 
Muslim men, who married Hindu women 10 years ago were actually rejected and 
expelled by their parents and not allowed to live with their respective families. To the 
present day they reside in separate homes.  
As a minority community, Hindus feel some insecurity in engaging in financial 
transactions with Muslims and do not wish them to know of their true financial status. 
In reaction, Muslims say Hindus are secretive and do not express their true motives to 
anyone. Muslims also accuse Hindus of being unpatriotic for leaving their homeland 
for the Indian state of Tripura. Such charges of lack of patriotism have sometimes 
resulted in bloodshed and looting of their properties. Many Hindus say they feel like 
strangers in their homeland and are treated as second-class citizens.  
5.14. Conclusion 
The chapter has described the main features of the social, economic and demographic 
organisation of Krishnapur village. It shows that the village consists largely of 
landless workers, many of them fishers, who own few assets and earn limited and 
often irregular incomes from a small range of economic activities. There are a small 
minority of fishers and traders, who own land, fishing gear and other assets, control 
local fish trading networks and organise group fishing, hiring fish workers from 
Krishnapur and other villages. It also discussed the role of women and children in 
fishing and other fishing household activities. Women were shown to play a 
subordinate but important role in providing ancillary services to fishers, but that 
rarely if ever did they accompany male fishers on their fishing expeditions. Finally, 
relations between Hindu fishers and their Muslim neighbours were discussed. While 
relations were general good, the Hindu fishers of Krishnapur regard themselves as a 
religious and economic minority in the region and as such were sometimes subject to 




The next chapter takes up this theme and broader debates about fisher’s local or 
indigenous knowledge, beliefs and practices. The chapter focuses on Krishnapur 
fisher’s knowledge and management practices related to their fishing environment, 
fish ecology, stock enhancement, fish habitat, fish breeding and other fishing 
activities. It goes on to describe various indigenous fishing practices, resources 
management techniques, and beliefs and ritual practices related to fishing.




1.  Data and information on Bajitpur fisheries provided by the Thana Fisheries Officer and Thana Land Officer are not similar. 
According to Thana Fisheries Officer, there are 8 large fisheries (above 20 aces in Bajitpur, while according to the Thana Land 
Officer, there are 9 large fisheries. Differences in the size of the Jolmohals are also very significant (Jolmohals) (see annexure: 
6.1). Information provided by the TFO about the total number of fishers, fisher’s samities, fish production, demand and others 
are also quite misleading. For example, according to the local fishers, there are about more than 10,000 fishers in Bajitpur but 
according TFO, it is only 2200. On the other hand, according to AC Land the size of Bengla-Charabadha Jolmohal is 916 
acres, while according to the TFO, it is 1363.5 acres. Information collected from the Thana and District Fisheries office do not 
match with information of Thana Nirbahi Officer, Thand Land Officer and other sources. For this study, many of the estimates 
or data provided by the Thana Fisheries officer was crossed check with the information gathered from the field and were found 
either overestimated or underestimated. While talking, the Thana Fisheries Officer expressed his resource limitations in 
collecting actual data from the field. He mentioned that they are always asked to provide some information on fish production, 
consumption, resources, market, fishers and other issues related to fishing without giving them all the necessary technical and 
financial supports. To him, this situation leads them to produce fabricated information and data.   
 
2 The FAP-16 environmental study (Minkin et al.,1993) states that rural people in every area consumed large number of 
species, most of which were small sized fish belonging to the category of miscellaneous.  
3  The food security is defined as “ secure access to enough food at all times “ (Maxwell & Frankenberger, 1992). The FAO 
World Food Summit held in Rome in 1996 defined food security as existing”…when all people at all times, have physical and 
economic access to sufficient,safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy 
life.Food security  by this definition relates to security at the individual  level. . Amartya Sen has elaborated how an individual 
can achieve the entitlements needed to attain the accessibility and affordability to food security. Sen enumerates four 
entitlements to give an individual the direct and indirect means to achieve food security: i) production-besed entitlement—
producing food for themselves, ii) trade –based-entitlements—selling or bartering goods or other assets, iii)  labour-based 
entitlements—selling the labour power, and iv) transfer-based entitlements—receiving gifts or transfer of food (Sen,1981). 
 
4 Global production from capture fisheries and aquaculture and the food fish supply is currently the highest on record and 
remains very significant for global food security, providing more than 15 percent of total animal protein supplies (See 
annexure: 6.1:Tables 1 and 2). Fish provide roughly 40 per cent of the protein consumed by nearly two-thirds of the world 
population. For example, over a billion people throughout Asia depend on fish and seafood as their major source of animal 
protein. But, fish have moved into luxury-style, high-priced food class. The United Nations educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) warns that fish, long regarded as the “poor man’s protein” is diminishing globally as a result of 
increasing market demand and over fishing. The developed nations are winning in the consumption stakes 
(http://archive.greenpeace.org/~comms/fish/part9.html, 13/05/2003). Unlike capture fisheries, aquaculture production has 




                                                                                                                                          
somewhat lower average annual growth rate (5.3 percent) in the 1990s than it did in the 1980s (7.1 percent). It is believed that 
aquaculture potential still exists in many areas and for many species. For example, the frequent lack of basic data on 
subsistence and small-scale fisheries, such as those in many inland waters, contributes to failures in management and policy-
making directed at preventing overexploitation, stock decline and exacerbations to rural food insecurity and poverty.   
CHAPTER SIX 
Indigenous fishing knowledge of Krishnapur fishers: the social and ritual 
organisation of fishing activities 
 
Figure 6.1: Fishers repairing their nets  
6.1.Overview 
This chapter discusses Krishnapur fishers’ knowledge of the fish they catch, the 
techniques they use, the ways in which they organise their fishing activities, market 
their catch and obtain credit. It also includes a discussion of their beliefs and rituals 
and wider understandings they have of their relations with the natural and 
supernatural worlds which give shape and meaning to their fishing practices.  
6.2.Indigenous Fishing Knowledge of Krisnapur fishers 
The Krishnapur fishers possess a wide range of nets, hooks, boats and other fishing 
equipment which has accumulated over the generations and, in some instances, is 
quite recent in origin. These fishers have depended largely on locally available raw 
materials and technology to make and repair their nets and boats and also assess the 
cost effectiveness of using different technologies. Fishing gear is adapted to varying 




year round, while others are used more selectively for relatively short periods, mainly 
during the floods to catch particular target species. Smaller mesh gill nets (puti jal, 
koi jal) are used during the early season (June-August) to catch younger fish after 
which they use large mesh gill nets (pata jal, fash jal) to catch larger fish, mainly 
during September to December (Figure 6.2 & 6.3).  
  
Figure 6.2: Fisher using cast net (jhaki jal) for small catch 
 




Krishnapur fishers have their own fishing calendar. Fishing times vary between 
seasons in different types of fishing spots and are related to the weather. Fishers 
mainly fish at night, when fish are said to prefer to come to the surface where they 
can be caught more easily using shorter nets. A full moon is also believed to bring 
fish to the surface. The fish gather close to the surface when there is no disturbance 
from boats and other sources. Moreover, small fish feed at night close to the surface. 
Fish like to play in the early morning and in the evening from 4 p.m. to 7 p.m. when 
the water /fishing area becomes very calm and quiet but in the afternoon they remain 
submerged and relatively stationary.  
Some fishers believe they get more baila fish after the eleventh day of the lunar 
fortnight (purnima). They also say it is easier to catch certain species of fish such as 
Bacha, Gaura, Aluni and Chapila during the night when the fish usually swim close 
to the water surface. Fishers believe that the weather on the last day of Chaitra, 
locally called ‘Har Bishu Din’, influences the quality of fish or snake eggs, with good 
weather causing an increase and bad weather a decrease in quality. Fishers also 
realize that larger fish follow the smaller ones, which swim in the river when the 
water level is high. The fishers then throw a cast net (jhaki jal) into the water. During 
the late rainy season, when the water has a strong current and becomes muddy, 
Dimwala Chingri (Shrimp with egg) is easier to catch.  
Local fishers also have detailed knowledge about fish habitat and fishing 
environment. They know the environment in which different species of fish live and 
what type of gear can be used to catch particular species. According to them, almost 
all fish species breed from March to May and large fish spawn in deep water, close to 
the riverbanks, where the current is weak. Small fish are said to breed mainly in 
floodplains close to rivers and in the shallow water of lakes and riverbanks. The 
fishers say that because of the strong water flow in the river, the sand on the bottom 
shifts, creating deep depressions, which are an ideal environment for fish. Local 
fishers can identify these depressions by their ‘logui’ (a bamboo pole used for 





Fishers claim that different fish are characterised by different smells. When fish 
move scent produced by the skin passes into the water and by smelling the water, 
fishers can guess what types of fish there are. Fishers are also able to estimate how 
much fish will be found in a certain lake and land depression and what types of fish 
can be found in a particular year. 
The movement of a particular fish discloses its identity to a traditional fisher. Fishers 
try to follow the movement of large cat fish (Pangas) near the Kashbon from the boat. 
Big Pangas are known to search for food near the riverside water reeds (Kashbon), 
locally called Khailla (species of tall grass with tuft of soft and white flower). 
Bubbles, which slowly rise to the water surface, reveal the presence of Pangas.  
Carps (rui) shake the water with their tails, Black Carp (Baus) shake the bamboo pole 
with their tails, the Ghagat catfish make certain sounds with their tails and Chital 
shake the water with their tails at regular intervals. Big fish such as Rui, Katla, and 
Boal shake water vigorously and disperse it and small fish sometimes make similar 
sounds. Aluni, Bacha, Chital fish may come to the surface for short intervals, while 
Bamosh swim close to the surface for long periods. Fishers also believe that fish fry 
move in their thousands towards the high tide. Some fish species can swim long 
distances but prefer to stay in a particular spot while others prefer to swim close to 
the water surface. 
Over time, Krishnapur fishers have developed an understanding of the inter-
relationships between the lunar cycle, river currents and migratory behaviour of fish, 
and also of the dynamics of the bottom topography of the river, including the pattern 
of sedimentation and soil quality. In Bengla Lake, at the beginning of the fishing 
season, the fishers find out where the fish are and, in the case of large fish, follow 
them to discover their hiding places in caves (locally called Khari). Fishers describe 
how koi, a type of catfish, during thunderstorms in the rainy season swim from ponds 
to the flooded area or to another marsh, sometimes crossing land, where fishers can 
easily catch them with Koi nets, Polo traps, spears and sometimes by hand.  
The local fishers also know what fish feed upon and that species differ in their 
feeding habits. In general, fish eat cockles (abalone) the skin of the hizal bush, fungi, 




both eat tiny animals and plants found in mud, encrusted poles and other water 
plants. Fishers also say that nowadays some people use artificial feed as fish bait, 
including a mustard seed mixture (khoil), sodium chloride (chuna), fertilizer, muri 
(popped rice), rice, shells, worms (kecho) and small prawn.  
Fishers have very clear knowledge of the productivity of different fishing spots and 
know which area produces what species of fish. In Bengla Lake the most common 
fish are Chapila, Air, Kalibous, Gainna, Swarputi, Behushi Kata, Guchi kata, Rui 
(medium), Mrigal and Silver Carp/Grass Carp. In Digheepar Bosti water body, Rui 
(7-10 kg), Bacha-Ghaura, Icha/Chingri, Air, Kalibaus, Ilish, Keski, Baim are 
available while in Joanshaher Depression fishers mostly fish for Baila, Chirka, 
Chanda and other small species (see appendix 6.1) . 
Fishers also have detailed knowledge of whether a particular species is abundant 
during a particular season or is found throughout the year. Hilsha fish, an ocean fish 
species which migrates to local rivers when the breeding season is close, are caught 
during the rainy season (May to August). During the monsoon season when it 
drizzles, Hilsha are caught in large quantities but when the heavy rains begin the 
water becomes muddy and Hilsha are rarely caught. Young shrimp, locally known as 
Icha, are also caught at this time, especially in turbid water.  
Older fishers regard summer (March-May) as the fish-breeding season when all the 
fish spawn and shelter in reservoirs in the northern areas of the Ghorauttra River. In 
the rainy season, all the water bodies become submerged and the rapid water flow 
from flooding prevents fishers from fishing. Fishers consider that fish are easier to 
catch when the monsoon waters start receding. During this draw-down period, 
instead of fishing by nets, some forty percent of Krishnapur fishers lay out hooks to 
catch Bailla, Baim, Kailla, Boal and similar fish. Current jal (a plastic net made with 
thin thread and small mesh) is popular. If the water is not clear, the current jal is laid 
out because the net threads are fine which makes catching fish easy. Other fishers use 
a triangular net (kona jal) to catch Leski and shrimp (chingri maach). Another 
circular-shaped net called Gora or Goira jal is set up at night as its threads are coarse 





Keski, Aair and Boal fish are caught between rising and falling tides when the water 
becomes calm with no current. Shrimp swim on the surface at night and are fished 
using Vim jal and Goirajal.  Fishers use cast nets (Uther or Jap Jal) to catch Chital, 
Aair, Rui, Boal, Mrigal and Kailla in winter when currents are less strong. A 
fisherman reported that a Chital weighing 22 kilogram was caught in the year 2002 
using Ber jal. A large net with small and thick mesh (Gana jal or Ghurti jal) is used 
for catching small species such as Chapila, Puti, Kaikka, Chela and Chanda. 
Generally speaking, Krishnapur fishers’ choice and intensity of use of gear depends 
on the population of target fish available in the local water bodies (figure 6.4). The 
intensity of gear use varies with the abundance of fish, which, in turn, is determined 
by the presence or absence of water currents, aquatic weeds and the topography of the 
locality. For instance, the intensity of use of Veshal Jal is always greater inside canals 
or in their vicinity. Ber jal is used in large numbers in relatively clear water. Bamboo 
traps are used in the canals, paddy fields and across land depressions. Cast nets are 
used mainly in clear waters of canals (see Ahmed, et al., 2004).  
Fishers’ knowledge has not remained static. Over the past 40 years they have begun 
to use imported thread and machine made nets of small mesh size which are cheaper 
to buy than hand made ones and are more readily available. They also use fishing 
gear for non-fishing purposes such as boat engines to pump water in paddy fields, 
grind spices and supply electricity. The introduction of imported engines on locally 
made wooden country boats has allowed fishers to fish in more distant locations and 
to supply regional fish trading centres (arots) more quickly. Such trade has gone hand 































































Source: Fieldwork in Krishnapur in 2001-2002 
Figure 6.4: Types of net used by Krishnapur fishers 
 
6.3.The organisation of fishing activities  
Fishing activities are organised in a variety of ways using different gear in different 
fishing environments and can be divided into three broad types: collective or large 
party fishing, small group fishing and individual fishing. Collective or large party 
fishing such as ‘ber’ and ‘jag’ fishing (see below) is the most profitable fishing 
activity in which a group of fishers, preferably from the same village or ward, who 
are closely related to each other, forms a fishing party and organizes fishing activities 
on different waterbodies on the rivers, land depressions and lakes. Fishers are usually 
hired seasonally from Krishnapur village and, if necessary, from other local and 
distant villages by water body leaseholders on a ‘chukti’ (literally ‘contract’) basis. 
Both Hindus and Muslims work together as members of a fishing party or as 
leaseholders/ owners (figure: 6.5-6.7). However, most prefer to work with people 
from their own religion. 
In Krishnapur, it is usually the wealthy fishers who own nets and boats individually 
or collectively and who run these fishing parties. For example, Rajeshwar Das (70) is 





has 4 sons and 4 daughters. Two sons’ fish with him, one is studying at Jagannath 
College in Dhaka and the fourth is too young to fish. All his daughters are married. 
Rajeshwar has accumulated his savings over many years and now has four boats and 
some nets. Each boat has one fishing team with a team leader over which Rajeshwar 
has general control. However, he considers his income from fishing insufficient and 
derives income from other sources such as his wife and his sister-in-law who rear 
fowl and ducks. For the last six months (during 2002), Rajeshwar made a profit of 
20, 000 tk. From a fish catch worth.500, 000 tk. He earned 18, 000 tk. from his boats 
and another 30, 000 tk.from his nets as rent. To organize the fishing activities, he 
spent 432, 000 tk. on payments for the fishing team leaders and crew members and 
on food and security. However, fishing party leaders are not always fishers and 
include ex-fishers, fish traders, wholesale commission agents and non-fisher 
leaseholders. 
In addition to fishing locally in Bengla Lake and other water bodies, Krishnapur has 
about fifteen fishing parties with some fifty to 100 members, which travel to other 
regional sub-districts where they work for other leaseholders and stay there for the 
whole season (October-February). To organise such fishing parties, fishing team 
leaders require a lot of money to rent or buy boats, nets and other assets, to hire 
labourers, and cover the costs of food and other living expenses. Such fishing 
expeditions are often unprofitable, because of problems of access to productive 
fishing spots and the decline in fish resources. These fishing party leaders prefer to 
recruit fishers from their own families and extended kin and fish outside the local 
area. For example, one fishing party of Krishnapur, consisting of 3 team leaders and 
10 general fishers, organises fishing in northern Bangladesh every year and recruits 







More generally, the most important types of large party fishing in Krishnapur are 
large seine fishing, large aggregation fishing and screen barrage fishing. They are 
described in more detail below. 
6.3.1. Large party fishing using large seine nets (Ber fishing) 
‘Ber fishing’ is one of the most common types of large party fishing mainly 
organised by leaseholders employing 20 or more fishers in demarcated sections of 
various water bodies such as lakes and rivers. Every year, a particular group of 
fishers under the leadership of a senior or ex-fisher (known as fishing party) is 
invited by the leaseholder to organize fishing activities in Bengla Lake, one of the 
important waterbodies of the study area which is famous for pile fishing (see below 
for a detailed description of pile fishing). Bengla Lake is part of the Bengla-
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Charabadha fishery, an area of over 1, 000 hectares and one of the major fishing 
areas for about 10, 000 fishers in the Digheerpar union and adjacent villages. The 
lake was created naturally along with the river and one part of it has converged with 
the river and looks like a large ditch. November to March is the peak season for 
fishing in the lake.  
The fishing party and the leaseholder have formal and informal agreements regarding 
the distribution of the catch, the cost of food to feed the fish, security and other 
expenses.  During the first period of fishing, from November to January (Agrahawan 
to Chaitra), a group of fishers consisting of 10 to12 members fish using the encircling 
technique with a large seine net. Different sections of the lake are surrounded by nets, 
placing bamboo poles within the area (Kata) and slowly enclosing the encircled area 
until the fish are unable to escape. 
 
 






Figure 6.7: Fishing party organizing ber fishing in Bengla Lake 
 
The fishing party organizes four or five catches in each of the bers or circles one after 
another using a smaller dhal Jal (circular net) inside the circle. Each catch within the 
ber takes about one month and gives a first catch-value of 200-300, 000 tk, which 
decreases from the first to the last. Besides large-scale ber fishing, fishers also do 
regular fishing in the big ber or outside the ber using jhap or other types of small net. 
In Bengla Lake, fishing by an organized party starts in Kartik (October).  
Fishing on large lakes and land depressions upstream from Krishnapur involve the 
organisation of fishing expeditions, where one or more fishing parties are required to 
organize the total fishing activities. The fishing party often draws on people known to 
each other from the same village, different villages or the region. The different tasks 
and duties (fishing, cooking, organisers, security guards, and accountants) are 
allocated to different people. Both Hindu and Muslim fishers in the fishing parties 
work together using a place on the bank of the river or lake, known as a ‘khola’ from 
where they organise their fishing. The khola has its own fish-drying yard surrounded 




area of the khola there is a tea stall and small shop.  Fish traders visit the khola using 
small trawlers to buy fish.  
The fishing party organizes nets, boats and employs fishers and fishing party 
members have different investment shares which take the form of nets, boats and 
cash. Some fishing party members have financial connections with non-fishers such 
as commission agents and moneylenders who act as financiers. On Bengla Lake, the 
catch is divided between the main fishing party, which receives 6 shares out of 16 
(choy ana) and the leaseholders (malik pokkho), who receives 10 shares (das ana) out 
of 16. The catch distribution between the leaseholders and the fishing party depends 
on the costs involved which can include placing branches of Hizol tree and muli 
baash (a kind of bamboo used for making brush piles in the deeper parts of the lake 
and river), salaries of guards (paharadars) fishers, sarkar /manager, cooks and others, 
construction of living places on the khola, setting of tube wells, kitchen and toilet, 










Figure 6.9: A Koibortta fishing party leader from Krishnapur 
 
During the fishing season, 30 to 40 people live on the khola and are recognisable by 
their function (figure: 6.10-6.12). The main fishing party recruits a number of 
fishermen (20/25) and several women, usually widows, who prepare meals for the 
khola residents, dry fish and manage the kitchen. Fishers earn a salary between 5, 000 
to 10,000 tk and women receive 2, 000 to 4,000 tk for five months. Managers keep 
accounts of daily fish catches, fish selling prices, food expenses, salaries, advances 
etc for which they are paid between 2,000 and 3,000 tk a month. . They enjoy higher 
status than fishers in terms of salary and sleeping arrangements (manager sleep on a 
bed while fishers sleep on the floor). Managers are employed who are considered 
honest and experienced in accountancy.  
Fishers are divided into different categories in terms of the nature of work performed 
and their work capabilities and skills. The fishers who can fish in the deepest parts of 
the water are considered the most skilful, receive a higher salary and are referred to 
as ek nombor boral (number one divers) or boro boral (senior divers). Below them 




Number one divers set the nets on the river or lake bottom. The head fisher (sardar 
muni) sorganises the crew and takes the main decisions. He is identified by a cloth 
called gamcha wrapped around his head and he receives 11,000 to 12,000 tk. per 
season. All head fishers have a great deal of fishing experience and have risen 
through the ranks, being promoted to head fisher from chotta bora, moddham boral 
and boro boral.  
 
Figure 6.10: Drying fish on the Khola 
 
Figure 6.11: The Khola: temporary 
administration for lake fishing 
 
 




6.3.2. Jag Fishing 
Another type of large party fishing is that done through the use of large aggregation 
devices and is carried out by both Hindus and Muslims. Locally, it is called Jag katha 
where sections of the Ghorauttra River close to the bank are surrounded by large 
bamboo poles or tree branches and tree branches or thick twigs are then thrown into 
the surrounding area (see figures: 6.13 & 6.14). After two months during the daytime 
in winter fishers set their nets and enclose the area and the fish are caught.  In 
Brahmanbaria, this fishing practice is known as Katha. Jag/Katha is an important fish 
aggregation device consisting of brush piles used in Jag fishing. The size of such jag 
or katha is between 0.1 and over 1 hectare. Fish congregate around the bushes where 
they feed on various algae. Fishers say that the Jag/Katha acts as a mini sanctuary for 
small and large fish before they grow to a mature size and as breeding ground for 
local species. Most Kathas are prepared with cheap and easily available materials 
bought from local farmers.  
Katha materials are of two types: materials for shed and for sheltering fish. Fish also 
congregate under floating aquatic vegetation Long bamboo poles and nylon rope are 
used to encircle and anchor such vegetation.  
 







Figure 6.14: Kata piled for preparing jag 
6.3.3. Patty Bandh Fishing 
Patty bandh (screen barrage fishing) is a type of large party fishing, done mostly by 
Muslims, where a bamboo-made fence is placed along a stretch of water. 
Traditionally it had one inlet called a valve but has been modified and the number of 
valves have increased, the effect of which has been to increase the catch per unit of 
effort. The fence is usually placed in small canals/sanctuaries with flowing water and 
with valves towards the water flow. In large water bodies such as lakes, depressions 
and large rivers, a series of fences are placed close to the embankment.  Such fishing 
is considered by both fishers and the fishing authorities as very destructive. It is 
usually leaseholders who organise such fishing. Concern over the use of fences is of 
long-standing and in the Fisheries Act of 1950, it was prohibited in open water 
fisheries.  
The leaseholders of Bengla-Charabadha, Digheerpaar Bosti and the Nagnarkhal water 
bodies organize such fishing and sometimes sub-lease certain sections of their fishery 
to local specialized fishing. Screen barrage fishing is also done by mosque and 
temple committees as a means of raising money for religious activities. These 




land depressions in the area. Some Muslim fishers from Kurkarai, Dilalpur, Patuli 
and Kailag villages in the area have also begun to specialize in screen barrage 
fishing, which has further restricted the access of Krishnapur Koibortta and other 
fishers to what are ostensibly open access waters.  
6.3.4. Other forms of fishing 
There are several small groups and individual forms of fishing done by both 
Koibortta and Muslim fishers and include using traps, hooks and baskets. There is 
some degree of specialisation in such fishing by village and even ward. For example, 
Muslim fishers of Lalkharchar para of Krishnapur specialize in shrimp (chingri) 
fishing using traps and hooks throughout the year. The Hindu Koibortta fishers of 
Kaimerbauli village fish with hooks and catch Kuicha (snake like fish). The fishers of 
Shafanto, Choudanto and Halalpur villages have expertise as ber fishers on lakes.  
Trap fishers are generally the poorest members of Muslim communities, and the 
majority have neither boats nor nets. In Krishnapur there are 14 full-time hook fishers 
(4.3 percent of total households) living in Railahati, Kushahati, Tekkahati and 
Lalkharchar wards. Fishers who fish with hooks or traps, generally own up to a 
couple of hundred hooks or traps. Traps cost about 30 tk. each and hooks cost only 
two to three tk. About seventy seven percent of hook fishers take advance money 
from the local fish traders and commission agents during the monsoon and supply 
their catch to them. Fish caught by net are sold to a variety of buyers, including but 
not exclusively, fish traders. Advance ranges from tk. 1, 000 to 5, 000 tk.  
6.4. Fish marketing  
Trading and marketing of fish are dominated by leaseholders, small local fish traders, 






















                               Jele (fishers) +Ijaradar (leaseholders) 
 
Bepari (fish traders) 
Buy fish from fishers and transfer to the arot 
 
                        Paikar (retailers)  
Buy fish from the arot and sell directly to consumers 
in the retail market 
Arotdars (commission agent) 
 Transfer fish to the Paikars of different regions 
(Wholesale market)  
Direct sale to consumers in the local 
retail fish market 
(Maach Bazar) 
                Consumers (country wide) 













Figure 6.16: Fish trading and marketing network  
Krishnapur fishers sell their catches primarily to local traders who sell it on to 
different local and regional fish trading centres in Bajitpur, Kuliarchar and Bhairab or 
sell direct in local markets.  A few fishers directly retail their catch on the local 
markets. The small traders of Krishnapur mostly supply fish to the fish trading 
centres of Bhairab and Kuliarchar. Some ex-fishers in Krishnapur and other 
neighbouring villages run some fish trading agencies in these two big regional 
trading centres. Of these, Bajitpur Matsya Arot and Sheba Matsya Arot are very 
prominent. There are 14 fish traders in the village who supply fish to the Bhairab and 
Kuliarchar fish trading centres.  
In Krishnapur, 39 (12.91%) of the 302 household heads are directly involved in fish 
trading. Of these, 16 trade in fish only, 13 both fish and trade fish and 10 trade in fish 
and farm. Another 17 are primarily involved in fishing but also do some fish trading. 
An example of a small-scale fish trader in Krishnapur is that of Bireshwar, a Hindu 
works three Muslim traders from Shahpur village who have been trading together for 
five years. They supply fish to two wholesale commission agents in the Bhairab fish 
trading centre from whom they receive advance money. Fish are bought on rivers, 
lakes and land depressions using one engine boat (Charanga) owned by Bireshwar. 
Bireshwar gets 50 tk. a day rent for the boat from the collective fund (locally called 
ezmali). The fuel cost is also paid from the collective (ezmali) fund. The group has 
connections with 40 to 50 fishers in the area and Bireshwar and his partners collect 
fish daily from Lalkharchar in Krishnapur and on the river in the northern part of the 
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village. A study of several days’ trading activities during the high season in 2002 
revealed that they earned 984 tk. on a single day. The previous day they had bought 
over 83 kg of fish from several Krishanapur fishers for 6, 187 tk., which they sold for 
8,023 tk. After paying out for ice, transport to the Bhairab arot, boat rent, fuel, meals 
and wholesale commission charges, they were left with a net profit of 984 tk., which 
was divided equally among them. During the high season, Bireshwar can buy up to 
50 thousand taka of fish a day. Bireshwar owns a hilsha net and a 0.2 hectare of land 
he cultivates himself. Bireshwar buys fish from other smaller traders who buy direct 
from fishers on the river using small dingi boats. These smaller traders also sell direct 
to the local retail markets. For example, one such Hindu trader of Krishnapur, 
Nitananda, earns about 80 to 150 tk. per day during the high season. He neither takes 
nor gives advance money but rather buys regularly from eight fishers, most of who 
are his relatives or lineage members and who deal only with him. Nitananda 
sometime borrows from Bireshwar who buys on his behalf, earning 5 to 10 tk. profit 
for each kg of fish.  
Krishnapur also has several small fish wholesale commission agents who run their 
businesses from the main local and regional fish trading centres. For example, Dilip 
Kumar works in partnership with another Hindu resident of Krishnapur and 
distributes advances to about 50 fishers in Krishnapur and other local villages who 
bring their catches to him. He charges 5 tk. as commission for transferring each 100 
tk of fish from a seller to a buyer. He also sells fish to other fish traders and retailers 






Figure 6.17: Small fish traders buying fish on the river 
 
 
Figure 6.18: A local fish trader buying fish from the fishers on Gorauttra River 
The three main wholesale fish trading centres are Bajitpur, Bhairab and Kuliarchar.  
Bajitpur centre, which is about two kilometres from Krishnapur, has 10 commission 




demand for fish. Previously, fishers came to the site and sold fish directly to retailers 
who transferred fish to the capital city, Dhaka, and other big markets. Today every 
commission agent has one chamber (godi) in a room (ghar) and one sarkar/ 
accountant (locally known as tohori) who maintains the daily accounts. Commission 
agents pay a 10 tk tax daily. October to December is the peak season water bodies 
begin to dry up and fishers catch more. Generally a commission agent in Bajitpur 
handles 70 to 80,000 tk of fish per day compared with 50 to 60, 000 tk during the 
lean season. On average, each commission agent invests between 40 and 50,000 taka 
as advances to local fishers.  
Bhairab is the biggest regional fish trading centre and one of the most important river 
ports of Bangladesh. It is a regional fish-trading centre for the fishers of Krishnapur, 
Mymensing, Kishorgong, Sunamgonj, Sylhet, Brahmanbaria, Comilla and 
Narshingdi. The fish market, which is situated on the bank of the River Meghna next 
to the Ferry Landing Place (ghat) has an old and a new section with about 100 
commission agents. Trading begins at five in the evening and ends at midnight, the 
busiest time being between six and ten pm. Besides record-keeping accountants and 
cashiers, there are auctioneers (becha), weighers (nikti or kairal) and child labourers 
(mintis) who carry the fish baskets to and from quayside. Depending on the fish 
supply, a weigher can earn 300-400 tk. a day, a labourer .50-100 tk a day and 
accountants and cashiers 60-100 tk. per day. Commission agents receive 3 tk. for 
selling a 100 tk of fish and 2 tk. as khoraki or daily meal money from fish traders for 






Figure 6.19: Local fish retailers with fish in the boat 
 





Figure 6.21: Fish trading in local fish trading centre 
 
 





Figure 6.23: A fisher going to the fish trading centre with his catch 
 
Fish retailers come to Bhairab from all over Bangladesh and both wholesale traders 
and retailers are connected with specific wholesale commission agents and buy fish 
on credit on a short-term basis, repaying within one or two days. 
During the high season, one core tk. (10 million) of fish is distributed daily to 
different parts of Bangladesh from Bhairab. The large-scale wholesale commission 
agents transfer between two to three lakh tk. (2 to 300,000) of fish daily and some 
have an investment of one crore tk.in their business. The majority of fish have 
connections with one or more agents and take advances. Some agents buy fish direct 
from leaseholders as advances, sometimes paying lease money to ensure a large and 
regular supply. Some also lease water bodies in their own name or in the name of a 
fishers association.  
6.5. Social networks and the advance system   
Since most Krishnapur fishers struggle to earn a living, they often rely on formal and 
informal sources of credit such as banks, NGOs, commission agents and 
moneylenders. Generally, fishers take loans during October to December and repay 




preferred to borrowing from moneylenders of other villages as village moneylenders 
charge low, even zero, rates of interest, in contrast to other moneylenders where rates 
can be eight to ten times higher than government bank rates and four to five times 
higher than those of non-government micro-credit providers. However, an 
unexpected illness, demands for the immediate payment of dowry, boat and net 
repairs may compel poor fishers to accept high interest rates. Jewellery and property 
may even be pawned or sold.  
Advancing money is one of the most common forms of financing in fish trade, 
accounting for more than 75 percent of financing in the study area and enables fish 
traders and commission agents to procure the required quantity of fish. Fishers who 
receive advance money do not usually pay any interest but agree to sell a fixed 
quantity of fish at a price lower than the market price. Thus, they trade off free access 
to the market for long-term credit, which helps them survive during the lean season.  
Krishnapur fishers have access to six different types of money lending sources. These 
are the six village societies with capital from 20,000 to 300,000 tk, 10-15 
moneylenders who provide loan in exchange for rice / paddy and they include rice 
traders, big cargo boat owners, shopkeepers, rich farmers and other business people, 
fish traders, fisherwomen's societies, NGOs and commercial banks. The most 
common source of loans for the local fishers is the fish traders and wholesale 
commission agents (see table: 6.1 & figure 6.23 & 6.24). 
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Source: Fieldwork in Krishnapur in 2001-200 
Figure 6.24: NGOs and their activities in Krishnapur 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork in Krishnapur in 2001-2002 
Figure 6.25: Amount of money distributed by NGOs 
Krishnapur women receive loans, but it is usually their husbands who use the funds 
for running small businesses and repaying debts. There are a few fisherwomen in the 
village who run small-scale businesses such as grocery shops in their neighbourhood, 
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rear domestic fowl, trade cosmetics and make nets using NGOs money. Many male 
fishers complain that they are not getting any financial support from these NGOs to 
buy, repair or invest in nets or boats at low interest rates. They criticise the high 
interest rates charged which can be 100-200% higher than those of other local 
informal money lending bodies and government organizations. On the other hand, 
NGO staffs complain that fishers do not repay on time or use loans for other 
purposes.  
6.6. Fisher’s knowledge related to fish diseases 
The fishers of Krishnapur have their own understanding of fish diseases, particularly 
the epizootic ulcerative syndrome. Many think that the use of current nets 
(monofilament nets) is related to epizootic ulcerative syndrome disease, which 
fishers refer to as khata roog or spot on the skin. They say that a type of chemical 
used to make current nets causes fish ulcers, athough there is no sicentific evidence 
to support this view. Some fishers argue that this disease is of recent origin, having 
been reported for the first time in Chandpur in February 1988, spreading to districts 
in the southern and north eastern parts of Bangladesh. The disease affected the 
naturally occurring fish species in closed waters such as Taki, Shol (snake heads), 
Baim (Eel), Koi, Kholisha, Meni (Perchus), Punti (Barshs), Bele (Gobics), local 
major carps (Rui, Catla, Mrigel etc.) and their juveniles (Farooque, 1997). Fishers 
also believe that careless disposal of plastic bags in drains, canals and rivers results in 
fish diseases. The fishers say that plastic bags cover the river bottom, scratching the 
bodies of fish and threatening their food sources in alluvial deposits. . Some fishers 
also believe that extensive application of pesticides and chemical fertiliser causes fish 
diseases, which affect Soal, Gazer, Baim, Puti, Boal, and Tengra etc. The residues of 
these toxic materials are said to mix with water and attack fish.  
6.7. Fisher’s knowledge about the use of fish as food and medicine 
The fishing people of Krishnapur consider that fish possess various medicinal and 
other properties. For example, various species of carp and catfish such as Sing, 
Fala/Fali, Kali Baus and Nandin are said to increase the supply of mother’s milk. 




the development of children, while Mola, Dhela and Ukil Ladu work effectively to 
improve their eyesight. They also believe that some cat fish species such as Sing and 
Magur can cure women with anaemia (sutika) as they contain much iron and 
therefore help to increase haemoglobin (rockto /blood) in the body. Many fishers say 
that big fish bones contain phosphorous which help to strengthen the bone and teeth 
of young children. However, few children in Krishnapur eat fish bones as their 
parents are unable to afford large fish from the market and usually sell any large fish 
they catch.  
Krishnapur fishers also eat fish to cure a number of other diseases and ailments. For 
example, boal is good for relieving stomach pain, turtle meat and oil from porpoise 
(shishu/hoo, now an endangered species) cure trauma (baat) and anemia. Fala/ Fali 
cures fever and increases bodily strength, while Kuchia is a good medicine against 
diarrhoea or dysentery. Bengra provides relief from a dental disease locally called 
daat kotkoti beram (teeth gnashing disease). Mrigal (carp) fish is very good for curing 
anemia and faintingMrigi diseases (mrigi). Fishers also use the bone of Mrigal fish 
for epilepsy.  
Fishers and others consult rural kabiraj (mental physicians/ healers) who use fish and 
fish products for healing physical and mental diseases. The kabiraj use amulets made 
from various fish parts (fish bones, fish oils, and fish bloods and fish substances) or 
rely on exorcism as part of the therapy.  
6.8. Fisher’s religious beliefs and rituals related to fishing 
Krishnapur fishers do not draw a hard and fast distinction between the material and 
immaterial worlds and are convinced that many of their religious beliefs and rituals 
support their fishing actions in numerous ways. Many rituals deal with unexplained 
misfortune (for example, small catches or natural calamities such as storms and 
floods) in their fishing expeditions. Similar to the fishers of Tokugawa Japan (see 
Kalland, 1995), the fishers of Krishnapur have beliefs related to ‘fortune and 
misfortune’ governed by supernatural powers (God or other divinities). Like the 




religious rites and practices help to control dangers and uncertainties in stormy rivers 
or land depressions.  
Krishnapur fishers’s rituals and ceremonies are observed daily, weekly, monthly or 
yearly and, although not directly related to fishing, they provide the broader spiritual 
context within which fishing activities are carried out. They also perform various 
types of devotional songs and dances at regular or occasional religious ceremonies 
such as nam kirton, manot or mansa and puja (figure 6.25). Fishers receive spiritual 
guidance through a number of spiritual teachers and their disciples in the village.  
Many fishers believe fishing is a gamble, its outcome depending to a great extent on 
the will of nature and the willingness of fish to be caught. Fishers believe in the male 
and female ghosts called ‘bhut’, and ‘petni’.  ‘Azars’ are both Muslim and Hindu 
spirits that live in the water and are said to manifest themselves as fish. Some old 
fishers believe that big fish become azar and other fish move behind them. They say 
that sometimes fishers who attempt to catch fish by putting nets in the water cannot 
pull them up because of attacks by azars under the water. There is a story of fishers 
who were unable to pull their nets up and went to a priest/ spiritual teacher for help.  
The priest started a special worship (puja) with different types of chants (mantra) and 
advised the fishers to perform some rituals with ‘dhup’ (smoke). After performing 
these rituals, the fishers were able to pull the nets up. Many old fishers speak of 
fishers who fished with a big net such as the Dhal jal in deep water and found 
something strange and mysterious on the water bed. They informed the leaseholders 
of the water body who organized special worship by Brahmans or spiritual teachers. 
In some cases, sheep or goat are sacrificed during the worship.  
Krishnapur fishers also use fish and fish products/substances as amulets (tabiz) for 
both physical and mental healing purposes. One local fisher said that if somebody 
wants to do harm to another person, he could ask the village person who prepares the 
amulet. He then attaches it to two ‘Sing maach’ (cat fish) by a thread and releases 
them into the water. If the two fishes go in two different directions, the amulet is 
working and means that the person for whom the amulet is prepared will be adversely 




between husband and wife or between two friends or two families. However, other 
fishers doubt that this type of magic works.  
The fishers of Krishnapur perform various rites and rituals and maintain certain 
religious practices not only to get a good catch but also to reduce the risks of life 
involved in fishing (figure: 6.27). Two examples are given below. 
6.8.1. Ganga Worship 
The wealthy fishers of Krishnapur arrange Ganga worship to ensure a large catch. 
Ganga is a sacred river for all Hindu religious in India and Bangladesh and plays an 
important role in fishers’ fishing activities.  For example, when fishers do not get 
enough fish or cannot catch fish, they believe they have offended Mother Ganges 
(Ma Ganga or Ganga Devi). To make Ganga Devi happy, they arrange Ganges 
workship (Ganga Puja). Every year fishing parties on Bengla Lake arrange Ganges 
worship on the banks of the Lake. Such worship costs 5 to 15, 000 tk. The worship is 
usually held during winter and to satisfy the Ganga Devi the fishers sacrifice a sheep 
or goat. A statue of Ganga Devi (thakurer murti) and a place of worship (Mondop) 
are constructed and a large fish is presented to Ganga Devi. All villagers participate 
in this festival and during the fieldwork in 2001 two separate Ganga Pujas were 
organised by Gowri Lal, one of the leaseholders of a section of Gorauttra River, and 





Figure 6.26: Puja Mondop (worship place) in the village 
6.8.2. Shani (Saturday) worship 
‘Shani’ means ‘bad time’ or ‘bad situation’ and also Saturday. Worship is usually 
performed on a Saturday. Fishers attribute an unsatisfactory fishing trip either to bad 
luck or to the impact of Shani (the symbol of bad luck). In order to ward off evil, 
male fishers read the Shanir Pachali (a book) every Saturday evening near the basil 
plant or on a boat. They use candles, incense and aromatic vapour and prepare 
Prashad (a special food offering to an idol). About 20 to 25 men perform the worship 
on a boat beside the riverbank. People on the bank accompany the worship with 
‘Uludhani’ (Hindu women ululating). The person who leads the worship keeps some 
incense and sweets on the galui or prow of the boat. Before offering food to the boat, 
people who want to worship have a shower and after the worship the food is 
distributed among the people on the bank. Wealthy fishers also sacrifice sheep during 
the worship.  
6.8.3. Bipad Nashi (danger remove) worship 
Fisher wives and mothers perform this special worship for the safe return of a fisher 




batasa (a kind of sweet).  During the worship, somebody recites verses from a holy 
book called Bipadnashi Thakurer Pachali. Women who want to perform the worship 
have to fast until the worship is over and the reciter of the holy verses has to fast for 
one or two hours before the worship.  
The fisher women of Krishnapur practice several rituals. They beg gods to bless their 
fisher husbands and normally worship two times a day. In October, they worship 
Ganga in a very festive manner. Fisher women also worship the sun for their 
husband's better life and health and worship one kind of tree called Chandi tree, 
which their goddess Chandi planted to ensure better health, a peaceful life and 
economic improvement. The fisherwomen perform two kinds of worship for fishing 
to Ganga and Kali to ask for the safety and security of their husbands, fathers and 
sons while they are away fishing and for a good catch.  
6.9. Conclusion 
The chapter has described various aspects of fisher’s knowledge which shape the 
ways in which they fish and make up core features of their identity as fishers. It was 
argued that the IK of fishers includes actual fishing practices and the organisation of 
fishing production, fishing times and seasons, fish habitats and environment, fish 
nutrition and the use of fish as medicines as well as a range of beliefs, rituals and 
practices. It also discussed the ways in which fishers market their catches and depend 
upon various types of advances and loans to ensure their survival from year to year. 
Fishers regard all of these as defining elements of their fishing life and their place in 
society as Koibortta.  
The next chapter examines the ways in which Krishnapur fishers seek to obtain and 
maintain what they consider to be equitable access to fishing resources. In these 
efforts they draw on long-standing local social networks which include specific kin 
and community-based networks and institutions of lineage, ward, village and multi-
village informal committees. The chapter shows that their use of these institutions 
and networks has had limited success largely because as a fishing minority their 
efforts have been constrained by more powerful networks and institutions operating 
at the local, regional and national levels.
CHAPTER SEVEN 




Figure 7.1: Fishers showing researcher a seine net (ber jal) 
7.1.Overview 
Krishnapur fishers are a small part of a Hindu fishing community which is a 
religious, economic and demographic minority within the region and in Bangladesh. 
In this respect they constitute a marginalised group within a broader marginalised 
category of both Muslim and Hindu fishers.   
The chapter gives a brief history from 1950 to 2001 of the struggles Krishnapur and 
other local Hindu fishers have had with leaseholders, politicians, government 
officials and others over control of private water bodies in the study area. This 
section shows that during this time, the fishers had limited direct access to water 
bodies and were forced to enter into sub-leasing and other arrangements with non-
fisher leaseholders and their financial and political backers.  
It goes on to describes the three main water bodies central to the present-day 




networks at lineage, ward, village and multi-village levels, which fishers use to 
mobilise other fishers and negotiate with leaseholders and their political and 
commercial backers. The multi-village level committees are of particular importance 
as they organise fishers from different social and economic backgrounds and 
locations to deal with issues such as fishing access, catch distribution, outsider 
political and economic pressures and other matters (figure: 7.1-7.3). A detailed 
examination is given of the role played by this multi-village committee in helping 
fishers to establish an informal community management regime nested within the 
wider formal leasing structure. Finally, the chapter assesses the strengths and 
limitations of these collective efforts to accord greater significance to their own ideas 
and practices on how best to manage fish resources.  
  
 









It is argued these efforts are powerfully influenced by wider political, trading and 
communal interests such as political parties, money-lenders and farmers, which 
through such means as cooptation of some of their leaders, political threats which 
sometimes take a communal form, and a broader financial and political control of the 
leaseholding system. The pressures from these interests, combined with other internal 
divisions within Krishnapur and across villages, have made it very difficult for 




Figure 7.3: The village café: the people’s meeting place 
7.2.Changes in control of private waters in Krishnapur area: 1950-2003 
As in other parts of Bangladesh, Krishnapur fishers have experienced many changes 
over the past two hundred years in the types of property rights regimes they have 
lived under. During British times, local water bodies were under the control of local 
talukdars/ zamindars (landlords) to which fishers paid nominal tolls of two thirds of a 
taka per day for the right to fish in specified water bodies.  For example, one such 




Mia who owned a half of the land and water bodies, Hani Mia who owned an eighth 
and the remainder was owned by other influential individuals. These landowners 
were able to tax fishers for the right to fish locally. During that time, the major 
fisheries on the estate were the Bengla-Charabadha, Ghorauttra River and the Kowa 
and Kadangi Rivers, both of which were sections of the Meghna whichf lowed into 
the Bay of Bengal.  
In 1950 the Pakistan Government abolished the zamindary system and introduced 
during the 1950s an open auction leasing system for water bodies. However, Hindu 
landlords and other wealthy Hindus continued to control many water bodies until 
1965 when the India-Pakistan war broke out and led to a flight of many local Hindu 
people, including fishers, to India. Before 1965 Hindus were a much larger 
proportion of the local population and played a more important role in the political 
system (see chapter 4 for more details). Also, the Hindu population was dominated 
by the Koibortta caste.  
In the early 1950s, Mahananda Das was the first Koibortta bidder from Krishnapur. 
Das, who was a wealthy fisher, had conflicts with local fishers as he did not want to 
share the fisheries with them. During the 1950s a court case was also filed against 
him by local fishers regarding illegal occupation of water bodies. Monoranjan Dhar 
who was the first Awami League MP (Member of the Parliament) in the area assisted 
the fishers who finally obtained half of the waterbodies. During the late 1950s, the 
fishers organised a multi-village committee which controlled almost 50 percent of 
local fisheries, the remaining half being controlled by Babu Mia. Babu Mia faced 
opposition to his control from local fishers, many of whom refused to pay local tolls.  
After Babu Mia, the fishers of the multi-village committee managed to occupy one 
half of the waterbody by force while Mahananda Das occupied the rest with the help 
of the military. Following that, Jogesh Chandra Barman, who was a fishers’ leader 
and who belonged to Mymensingh District Cooperative Society, occupied several 
water bodies and later Lalmohon Sutradhar, who represented other local fisher 
groups, bought the lease from the government. He shared the lease with Fazlul Haq 




East Pakistan and a highly communal politician). A section (one sixteenth) of Fazlul 
Haq Khan’s lease was owned by Monsoon Chowdhury who sold his section to the 
multi-village committee.  Fazlul Haq Khan refused to hand over possession and a 
violent clash, between the two groups, which included the military,  followed during 
which two fishers were injured. Fazlul Haq Khan managed to retain control and in 
the aftermath of the incident many Hindu fishers migrated to India. 
Formal leasing by the government of the Bengla-Charabadha fishery began in 
1960/61. It was leased under an oral agreement to one of the traditional Hindu 
fishers’ cooperative societies. At the time, the cooperative society received taxes/tolls 
from fishers fishing in the Bengla Lake while the adjacent part of the river was open 
to all.  
According to Krishnapur informants, a local fishers’ association called Kaimerbauli 
Fisher’s Association controlled by a multi-village committee leased Bengla-
Charabadha fishery from 1972 to 1981. From 1982-1991, it was leased out to the 
Kaimerbauli multi-village committee and from 1992-1994 to Golap (a contractor 
from Kuliarchar) in the name of the Noahata Fisher’s Association. Fishers from the 
villages of Goradhora, Gupinathpur, Ainargup, and Burichara supported Golap’s 
leasing.   
From 1995 to 1997, another local fishers group, the Kaimerbauli Hazarkee (made up 
of fishers from Kaimebauli, Boali, and Shibpur villages close to Krishnapur), under 
the leadership of Ananda Babu leased the fishery for 3 years for 10.8 lakh tk. per 
year.  During their leasing period, they defaulted on payment and were issued a 
number notices by the Government to pay their outstanding debt. When they failed to 
do so, the government decided to lease the waterbody to individuals rather than to a 
cooperative society. Murshed Alam, a contractor from the Bajitpur area, under the 
banner of Shibpur Fisher’s Association, got the lease for 3 years (1998-2000) for taka 
7.56 lakh tk. per year.  
After 1997, Bengla-Charabadha fishery was divided into a number of sections and re-
topsiled (new demarcation of the sections). For the last 3 years (2000-2003), the 




under the leadership of a wealthy Hindu fisher for fourteen lakh tk. per year. He is 
backed by a local MuslimAwami League leader and local MP in the ruling 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party. 
According to local fishers, fishers’ interests were given greater consideration in the 
1980s when Lt. General Ershad (the then President and Military ruler of Bangladesh 
from1982-1990) declared all waterbodies as open, giving free access to fishers. 
Ershad is said to have visited Krishnapur pronouncing that fishing activities could be 
carried out without the payment of rents or tolls. However, from 1991, after the 
return of the country to civilian democratic rule, conditions deteriorated when the 
secretary of the Nayahata Fisher’s Cooperative Society, backed financially by an 
important local businessman with leasing and fish processing interests, held the lease. 
In 1992 there was a bloody clash between the leaseholders and the local fishers, 
which resulted in the death of a fisherman. The Cooperative Society lost the lease for 
the next tenure period (1994-1996) and it went to the Kaimerbauli-Boali-Shibpur 
Fisher’s Cooperative Society after 1996. The new Society, which was more 
representative of local fishers and backed by a local left-leaning political group, 
demanded punishment for the murderers of and the General Secretary of the Society, 
opened an inquiry into the case. Local and outside fishers continued to fish freely 
until 1996 when the case was settled without anyone being punished and the lease 
was bought by the Society. 
In 1995, following a number of fishers’ movements in different parts of Bangladesh, 
the Ministry of Land abolished the leasing system on flowing and open water bodies 
and that fishers would have free access to them.  
Following this decision, fisher from the area, including Krishnapur requested the 
District Commissioner and the Secretary of the Land Ministry to release a large area 
of the Ghorauttra River from the Bengla-Charabadha Fishery, which continued to be 
leased out illegally despite it being an open and flowing water body. In 1997 the local 
Jolmohol Committee decided to release about 1600 acres in the Ghorauttra River. 
The District Commissioner refused and later divided the Bengla-Charabadha Fishery 




From 1997 to 1999, a local contractor of Shahapur village near Krishnapur purchased 
the lease of one section called Bengla-Charbadha in the name of the Shibpur Bowalia 
Fisher’s Cooperative Society for 7.56 lakh taka. The second section, Digheerpar 
Basti Fishery, was leased by a Krishnapur fisher on behalf of the Krishnapur 
Cooperative Society for 4.55 lakh tk. (see appendix 7.1) and the third section, 
Nagnarkhal Fishery was taken by another association for 3. 86 lakh tk. Many local 
fishers said that under a previous leaseholder, fishers received one quarter, a third or 
in some cases, a half of the profit and had open access to the river section of the 
Bengla-Charabadha Fishery. This ended with the purchase of the lease by the 
Noahata Fisher’s Cooperative Society, which was controlled by Hindu fishers but 
backed financially by the contractor/fish processor mentioned earlier. The Society 
again sub-leased sections of the lease to other fisher groups, which effectively 
stopped fishing without payment of tolls on the river. This resulted in economic 
hardship among many poorer fishers.  
The poorer fishers of Krishnapur and other villages continued to press the 
administration for the return of fishing rights and demanded that the State Minister of 
Land declare 1586.93 acres of water bodies as open fisheries. They argued that some 
30, 000 fishers were economically dependent on fishing in this waterbody and that it 
was an open water body forming an active part of the perennially free flowing river 
Ghorauttra, which extended from the Garo Hills in the North to the Meghna in the 
South. In 2001, the Deputy Collector of Revenue recommended that a part of the 
waterbody, consisting of 586 out of 1363 acres be declared open with the remaining 
777.38 acres to be kept as closed water bodies.  
However, between 1999 and 2001, the District Commissioner again leased out these 
open water sections of the river  for another 3 years without reporting to the Ministry 
of Land in time. In 2001, fisher leaders again requested the State Minister of Land to 
declare the 586.22 acres an open fishery (see appendix: 7.2) and demanded a stop to 
leasing In 2000, on behalf of the fishers of several villages of Digheerpaar Union, 
which included Krishnapur village, the Secretary of Digheerpaar Charabadha Fisher’s 
Cooperative Society Ltd applied to the State Minister for Land to hand over the 




system. They estimated that the fishery would give a gross profit return of 30 million 
tk. from a total fish production of 100 million tk. (see appendix: 7.2). However, the e 
government refused without providing any grounds.  
This brief historical account of changes in leasing arrangements on water bodies in 
the Krishnapur illustrates the role played by fishers’ associations in the struggle for 
fishers’ rights and the . Government policy was that the first two bids were to be 
restricted to fishers’ cooperatives but if there were a third bid, any individual could 
do so. Most fishers were not financially and politically powerful enough to bid at 
these auctions and in most cases the poorer fishers were the financial and political 
clients of local leaseholders, fish traders, moneylenders and other local political and 
economic elites. Under such circumstances it was easy for the more powerful to 
establish fake cooperatives to bid for water bodies using genuine fishers as a cover. 
In fact, the Assistant District Commissioner often colluded with these interest groups 
in return for financial and other rewards.  
In the study area, of 15 local fishers’ association or cooperatives, not a single one was 
independently run by genuine fishers1 but were under the control of industrialists, 
fish exporters, fish traders and fish wholesale commission agent, present or ex-
minister/ parliament members, political leaders, fishing party leaders, and 
construction contractors (see appendix: 7.3 & 7.4). Many of these de facto 
leaseholders were Muslim who preferred to employ Muslim fishers, which placed 
additional pressure on local Hindu fishers in Krishnapur and other villages. In 
addition to fake cooperatives, another way in which local fishers were deprived of 
direct control of local water bodies was through the sub-leasing system. According to 
section 8 of the District Commissioner circular on Sayrat Mohol Leasing2, leasing is 
strictly prohibited (see appendix 7.5). The circular states: 
Leaseholder, in any situation, cannot sublease the jolmohol or any part 





Figure 7.4: Fishers drying nets on the banks of Bengla Lake 
7.3.Major fishing water bodies of Krishnapur fishers 
The three main water bodies which are central to the lives of Krishnapur fishers are 
the Ghorauttra River, Joanshaher Depression and Bengla Lake, all of which are 
connected to each other during the monsoon season. Sections of the river are 
officially under open access but are, in fact, controlled by private leaseholders. 
Bengla Lake is privately controlled the year round while the Joanshaher Depression 
is officially common property and open to all but sections are controlled by private 
non-fisher interests  
On the Ghorauttra River, Krishnapur fishers fish mainly in 3 sections, Bengla-
Charabadha, Digheerpaar Bosti and Nagnarkhal, which are leased out as three 
different waterbodies.  They are both closed and open and leased to individuals or 
fishers’ associations, most of which are financed by non-fishers or do not exist at all 
except on paper. Such financing is done because Government gives priority to 
fishers’ associations over individuals in bidding at auctions for water body leases. 
There has been a long dispute over Bengla-Charabadha and Nangarkhali (see field 
report of A.C Land (10/6.1997, Circular no: 258, and appendix. 7.6), which were 




years, Charabadha, an open section of Bengla Charabadha Fishery has been sub-
leased illegally to the local political leaders, businessmen, contractors and and other 
local influentials who charge higher tolls and employ security guards to confront and 
sometimes attack fishers who cannot pay the toll.  
 
Figure 7.5: Fishers waiting to depart for a fishing expedition on Ghorauttra River 
 
Bengla Lake forms part of the Bengla-Charabadha fishery which, at 1,000 hectares, is 
one of the major fishing areas for about 10,000 fishers in Krishnapur and and other 
local villages. November to March is the peak season for fishing in the Lake, which 
is famous for its pile fishing which involves creating small brush and branch 
sanctuaries for fish to congregate. On the banks of the Lake, temporary buildings and 
fences (khola) are constructed by the leaseholder for administrative purposes and to 







Figure 7.6: Fishing party organizing fishing on Bengal Lake 
 
 
Figure 7.7: Drying fish on the Khola 
 
Figure 7.8: The Khola: temporary 
administration for lake fishing 
 
Under the formal leasing system Krishnapur and other local fishers cannot fish 
individually but can only work through a fishing party.  The fishing party, which 
receives 40 percent of the total catch, is usually composed of local and well-off/ 
senior fishers, fish traders or ex-fishers (who are shareholders in a small fishery), 




The fishers are paid either with cash or catch share on the Bengla and Ghorauttra 
fisheries. Catch share is preferred by leaseholders for large-scale fishing as catching 
methods takes large quantities of fish and the leaseholders fear that their profit share 
will be lower if they accept pre-catch negotiated rents only. Fishing is dominated by 
Hindu fishers and only a few specialised Muslim fishers are allowed by the 
leaseholders to fish during the monsoon using traps as fish catches are low using this 
type of gear. 
On the Joanshaher Depression, which is several thousand hectares in size and is 
considered an open fishery, fishers usually fish at night during the monsoon period.  
In dry season (October to March) the depression is used for growing paddy and other 
crops. Some richer Krishnapur fishers control land in the depression and farm and 
keep cattle during winter, employing poor fishers as contact (chukti) labourers who 
live in a temporary house built on the depression.  Small sections of the depression 
close to villages located both on and to the side of the water body are controlled 
informally by groups of fishers and others. Also, some larger leaseholders extend 
illegally their river and lake leases into the depression to widen their catch area. 
 
Figure 7.9: Fishers grazing cattle on the 
land depression during the winter 
Figure 7.10: Krishnapur fisher drying 
straw on the land depression 
 
7.4.Krishnapur fishers and their social networks 
There are several local Hindu social networks which operate at ward, village and 




political activities, including fishing. The three most important are the lineage (Gwati 
gushti), ward/village (Doshok) and a cluster of villages (Hajarkee).  
The lineage is made up of anywhere between ten to twenty kin-related fishing 
families who can trace their descent patrilineally who live in the same ward or in 
different wards within Krishnapur. Lineages perform several functions, including 
fishing, and several have long histories. For example, according to Gouri Lal, a forty 
five year old leaseholder and senior member of the Rajram lineage, his lineage is 
three to four hundred years old. Gouri Lal is a key leader among Hindu fishers in 
Krishnapur and in the region  He began as a fisher, inheriting his occupation from his 
father, grandfather and great grandfather who were all involved in fish trading and 
fishing, leased local rivers and lakes and organized fishing parties. Other important 
lineages in Krishnapur include Sikdar Lineage, Dayaram Lineage, Nibu Miar Lineage 
and Jainal Miar Lineage, all of which are named after their ancestors.  
Generally, well-off fishers with nets and boats prefer to organize fishing activities 
with members of the same lineage or rent out boats and nets to other lineage 
members and sometimes invite other lineage members to work with them as hired 
labourers or co-workers. Normally, a lineage contains members related by blood and 
marriage ties but a fishing family and individuals in a few instances can change their 
lineage membership and a new family from another lineage may join them. The most 
reasons for changing lineage membership is conflict among families within the 
lineage over asset sharing, land and personal disputes. A family may have business 
relations with members of another lineage and seek to join the lineage to improve 
their economic prospects.  
To become a member of another lineage, a member of one lineage asks members of 
another lineage if he and his family can become members. Prospective members must 
entertain with tea, biscuits, sweets, lunch/ dinner or whatever they can afford. All 
members of the enlarged lineage are considered brothers, maintain close social 
contacts and pledge help when necessary.   
In Krishnapur, 15 such lineages were identified in seven wards. Lineage members 




a daughter, burying a deceased member, organising a religious ceremony and so on. 
Lineages are economically and politically stratified and the most powerful lineage in 
Krishnapur is the Das Gwati (see appendix: 7.7).  
A number of lineages in each of the wards make up what is called a ward committee 
(doshok: lit. ten persons). It also operates at village level when several wards come 
together. The ward committee is an informal grouping run by a number of fisher 
leaders from different lineages of the ward. This ward committee primarily works as 
a body for resolving social problems within the ward. It also operates at village level 
when all ward committees in the village come together. The ward committee’s role is 
to settle disputes within the ward and to make decisions on fishing activities such as 
organising large fishing parties, disputes with leaseholders and political harassment. 
The ward committee meets at the house/bari of an aggrieved person or group who 
initiates the meeting. A number of ward committee leaders, including the senior 
persons of the ward, selected family heads and leaders of other wards (educated and 
older members of elected bodies and other informal institutions) are invited. People 
gather in the courtyard of the house and the issue is discussed with one of the ward 
committee leaders presiding over the meeting. The ward committee leaders are the 
most respected people in the village and are selected for their knowledge, seniority 
and leadership qualities. The ward committee leaders may ask person found guilty of 
an offence to pay a penalty and apologise.  
Like the lineage, the ward committee leaders differ in their social and economic 
backgrounds. Using key informants, 53 ward committee leaders were identified of 
which eighteen were wealthy fishers who own big nets and boats, twelve were 
wealthy farmers, six were leaseholders/shareholders of waterbodies, twelve were 
bepari/local fish traders and three were regional fish traders/ commission agents, one 
was a teacher and one a Union Council member.  
Some ward and lineage leaders also work as village leaders. For example, in 
Krishnapur there are 23 senior and wealthy men who are village leaders drawn from 
the ward committees. These leaders are fishers, leaseholders, fish wholesale 




Council. A ward committee also exists in the Muslim ward and is led by fish traders 
and farmers. Poor fishers or farmers usually do not lead the ward or village 
committee. 
Generally, it is the prominent leaders who have good speaking skills and who lead 
the ward or village committee at higher organisational levels such as the multi-ward 
committee (hazarkee) (see below). Usually two to four persons from each village are 
members of the multi-village committees.  
Some of the the leaders of the ward from each of the villages, including Krishnapur, 
also represent their respective villages within what is called the hazarkee or multi-
village committee. The multi-village committee is an old Hindu fishers’ institution 
through which fishers protect and promote their fishing and other interests. Kawai in 
his study of 19th century zamindary rights (1987) has argued that the multi-village 
committee has existed for at least 150 years in various parts of Bangladesh. For 
example, he states:  
…the fisherman who worked in the river Meghna used to pay rent to 
the collectors of Dacca and Tippera, but since the jalkar [fishing lease] 
was awarded to the zamindars by a Rubikari (written proceedings) of 
1860 the fishermen became refractory/disobedient. Some paid rents, 
while others continued to fish without payment of rent. Some who did 
not pay were sued and decrees were obtained against them. However, 
they formed a strong combination (committee called hajarkee/ 
hajarkee; a committee of thousand) and fought up to the High Court 
(Kawai, 1987: 153).  
Roy (1940) also reported the existence of a multi-village fishers’ movement in the 
Meghna area during the 1930s. During that time the fishermen along the river 
Meghna formed a movement committee and established a fund from subscriptions. In 
the 1930s whenever any fisherman was in trouble they fought up to the High Court 
and legal costs were paid out of the fund.  
Today, the multi-village fishers’ committee is an informal grouping which can 
include thousands of members, usually fishers who live in a number of neighbouring 




represent them. The committee leaders invite all the fishers of the cluster villages to 
meetings where fishing and fisheries issues are discussed.  
In the study area, the multi-village fisher’s committees are very active and several 
meetings have been held in recent years to organize local fishers to collect funds to 
pay for the lease or sub-lease of Bengla Lake, the Gorauttra River and other 
waterbodies. Most of the multi-village committee meetings were held in Krishnapur 
and brought together the representatives of the neighbouring villages of Boalia, 
Kaimarbauli, Digheerpar, Kachuakhala, Noagaon, Goradhora, Gopinathpur, Dilalpur, 
Burichara, Shibpur, Ainargup and Shahpur. These villages share a common interest 
through their location close to the main fishing grounds and because of their 
dependence on those fishing grounds for their livelihood. These associational ties are 
strengthened by cross-village marriages, other kin-based relations and religious links. 
This multi-village committee works as a regional apex body in the wider locality and 
in each ward and village has representatives on it. 
In Krishnapur, if disputes and conflicts cannot be settled at the ward or village level, 
they can be taken to the multi-village committee. It is most important in the case of 
disputes over land, fisheries, and other resources. The leader of the multi-village 
committee concerned, but also other leaders and important persons of the village, 
may be called upon to preside as judge during a conflict. The verdict is usually verbal 
and declared publicly in the presence of fisher leaders.  
Krishnapur village is represented at multi-village committee meetings by ex-fishers 
who include Jitendra Babu a teacher, Brozendrea Ray, a wealthy farmer and Joy Dev 
Babu, a leaseholder. In the wider study area, there are eleven multi-village committee 
leaders who are particularly important. Three are leaseholders, three are fishers 
(wealthy fishers who own big nets and boats), two are farmers, two are fish traders 
and one is a large fish trader and commission agent. Hindu Krishnapur fishers play an 
important role in the multi-village committee while Muslims fishers are less 
important and rarely attend the multi-village committee meetings held in the village. 
Muslims prefer to use their own networks with other Muslim fishing party leaders 




An example of how lineage, ward and village leaders are selected as multi-village 
committee representatives is given below for the three Krishnapur wards of Railahati, 
Tekkahati and. Modoillahati. Kushahati, Companyhati and Borobarirhati also have 
multi-village committee representatives selected through the same process.  
Of these three networks, the multi-village committee plays the most important role in 
fishers’ struggles within the broader political and economic context and is discussed 
in greater detail below. However, it needs to be remembered that whenever a multi-
village committee is activated, it has to work through the ward and village levels. For 
example, leaders in each village first meet with people in their own lineage, ward and 
village before moving to the multi-village level.   
7.5.Common property fisheries resources, property rights and management of water 
bodies: Krishnapur fishers and their networks.  
At the time of the field work, three main systems of management of water bodies 
operated in the study area. The two dominant systems were open water fisheries 
under nominal open access in Joanshaher Depression, and open water fisheries under 
the open auction leasing system in Bengla Lake and the Ghorauttra River.  The 
informal community management system was found in two sections of the 
Ghoaruttra River, namely, Digheerpaar Bosti Fishery and Charabadha Fishery. This 





Figure 7.11: Water Body Administration and interest groups 
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7.5.1. Common property fisheries resources (CPFR) under nominal open access  
When no property rights are assigned, the situation termed ‘open 
access’ exists (Allessi, 1998).  
Sections of Joanshaher Depression were used by Krishnapur fishers during the 
monsoon.  From October to January the water level declines and the land depression 
becomes dry by late March and fishing is not possible. Since the land depression is 
legally an open fishery, fishers’ access should be free. However, this is not the case. 
Krishnapur fishers complained that access to the areas of the depression adjacent to 
Bengla Lake was controlled by the lake leaseholders and fishers were either not 
allowed or required to pay the leaseholder to fish. Some parts of the depression were 
also controlled by social and religious groups in the name of the development of 
mosques/temples under the wakf3 system and leased to small fishing groups usually 
backed by the local commission agents, traders and others.  
In 2002, wakf holders and leasing parties organise large-scale catches using big nets, 
boats and screen barrage fishing (patty bandh4) in five areas. Some Muslim fishers 
from villages close to Krishnapur also specialized in screen barrage fishing. They 
openly criticised the role of District Administration and Fisheries Department for 
allowing wakf and other groups to use barrage fishing. The effect of these activities 
was to restrict the access of Krishnapur and other Hindu fishers to what were 
ostensibly open access waters.  
7.5.2. CPFR under open auction leasing system 
Three sections of the Ghorauttra River and Bengla Lake where an open auction 
leasing system is in operation has experienced a number of social and environmental 
problems over the last 30 years. Between 1950 and 1970, lease auctions were open to 





Local fishers argued that short-term leases for one to three years contradicted 
conservation of fish resources, encouraged conflicts between fishers and non-fishers, 
Hindu and Muslim fishers, locals and outsiders over access rights and made poor 
fishers dependent on non-fisherleaseholders, fish wholesale commission agents, 
small and medium fish traders and local moneylenders. Fishers commented that the 
Ministry of Land only collected revenue from the local fisheries but did nothing to 
conserve fish stocks. The Department of Fisheries was also criticised for its failure to 
release sufficient fish fry to raise the production in open water fisheries, hiding its 
actions through fake statistical reports about fish fry releases. Fishers argued that 
such a system could not ensure the increase of productivity of fisheries resources and 
protect their rights.  They also stated that local waterbodies now under the open 
auction leasing system were once under their control and that they had customary 
rights based on a system of mutual understanding regarding ‘who will fish where’ 
which had an important conservation effect. In the past, they argued, they knew that 
in following years they would be able to continue to fish as they left certain areas as 
sanctuaries which ensured a good supply of fish in the next season. This conservation 
effect had been destroyed by leasing to non-fishers interested only in short-term cash 
returns. Some local fishers expressed themselves this way:  
We the fishers by tradition possess the knowledge about fish species, 
their growth, their movement, productivity, catch time and period, fish 
feed, fish habitat and environment but unfortunately we are not given 
the jolmohol to manage by ourselves and that is why we are suffering 
from a variety of problems (somoshsha) and our fisheries resources 
are now under threat (humkir mukhe).  Time is coming when the non-
fishers will throw us out (chure-fele dibe/ mere felbe) from our age-
old traditional fishing profession (sonatoni pesha). 
7.5.3. Informal community management in sub-leased and sub-sub-leased fisheries  
One area in which Krishnapur and other fishers have had more success in ensuring 
better and to some degree more equitable access to leased water bodies is in two 
small sections of the Ghorauttra River. This success was an indirect and 
unanticipated result of the introduction in 1986 of a formal state initiated community 




New Fisheries Management Policy (NFMP). Krishnapur fishers, who earlier had 
obtained a direct lease of Bengla Lake but were unable to retain control of it (see 
below), later managed to gain informal access through the multi-village committee to 
sections of the Ghoauttra River   
In the 1990s Krishnapur and other fishers from fifteen local villages leased in for 
three years a community based fishery called the Bengla-Charabadha Fishery under 
the name of Kaimerbali-Boali-Shibpur Fisher’s Cooperative Society. The fishery was 
leased from 1994 to 1996 under the open auction leasing system. Bengla Lake and 
Charabadha, a section of the Ghorauttra River, jointly formed the fishery. The multi-
village committee obtained the lease after a period of resistance from the former 
leaseholder. It was first formed in 1994 but was unable to get legal and financial 
support from the government, was opposed by local vested interests, suffered from 
fishers illegally accessing the water body and and from the misuse of funds by some 
of the leaders of the committee.  The committee not only lost the lease but also was 
unable to pay the 35 lakh tk. lease money to the Government.  
Despite this failure, in 2000, the Krishnapur Fishers’ Cooperative, organised through 
the village level committee, sub-leased from a local leaseholder the Chatirchar Mora 
Ganger Mur fishery, a section of Digheerpaar Bosti fishery for 120,000 tk for the first 
year with an increase of 10,000 tk per year for the remaining two years. Leaders of 
the Cooperative negotiated with interested fishers what tolls each fisher was to pay 
according to the type of fishing gear used. The Cooperative collected 60,000 tk in 
tolls from 47 units of fishing gear which included 40 Gura net (small net for small 
fish species) (40x1000), 2 keski net (big net for small fish species) (2x5000), and 5 
Utar net (big net for small fish species) (5 x 2000). Another 70,000tk came from 
fishers doing pile fishing (based on 20 to 25 catches or kheo) and shared the catch 
with 20 units of Bhim net, with a 60:40 catch split between fishers and leaseholders, 
and one unit of Jhapa net with a 75: 25 split between fishers and leaseholder.  
To obtain the sub-lease, the fishers first asked their leaders to negotiate with the 
primary leaseholder, Ajit Babu. This was considered a less costly option than 




financial and social influence and the capacity to pay bribes to administration 
officials to protect the fisheries from outside intervention. In addition, fishers felt that 
local leaseholders were easier to deal with and more considerate of fishers’ interests, 
even when they knew that leaseholders made considerable profits from them.  
A second example in which fishers sub-sub leased a water body is that of a multi-
village committee which organised about 350 fishers in seven villages near 
Krishnapur (Kaimerbauli, Dilalpur, Boali, Gupinathpur, Boroichora, Goradhora and 
Shibpur). The committee sub-sub-leased the Ghoradhora section of Bengla-
Charabadha fishery for a rent ranging from 120,000 to 140,000 tk between 2000 and 
2002. The sub-lease holder was the brother of a local BNP MP who had obtained the 
original lease from Rasha Raj, the primary leaseholder of Bengla Charabadha 
Fishery, who got his lease in the name of Bengla-Charabadha Fisher’s Cooperative 
Society Limited.  
In getting the sub-sub-lease, fishers of each of the villages selected their leaders from 
their own lineage, ward and village and finally from the cluster of villages making up 
the multi-village committee. One of the leaders stated that before obtaining the sub-
sub-lease, the fishers of these villages sat together to discuss how to obtain the lease 
and how their catches were to be shared. Before taking a decision, each of the village 
leaders had to consult with ward and village level committee leaders and then discuss 
the issues at the multi-village committee meeting to decide on broader action. During 
the lease period leaders maintained a register of the fishers who agreed to fish in the 
sub-sub-leased fisheries under this community management system. Fishers’ leaders 
sometimes gave special consideration to poorer fishers who had problems paying the 
rent. So different fishers in different villages paid different rents for the same type of 
gear on the basis of decisions taken in each of the villages, taking into account 
fishers’ economic and other circumstances. In some cases, poorer fishers were 
allowed to pay their toll/ rent in instalments. Many of the fishers pointed out that in 
the multi-village committee meeting they could express and share their problems, 
feel more freedom in fishing and not be exploited.  Their leaders sometimes managed 
to pay the lease money by instalments and to bargain for certain concessions. For 




the first instalment and requested a waiver on the remaining.50, 000 tk., which they 
were granted. 
The distribution of rent for different types of nets and net sizes in 2002 is given 
below: 
 
Table 7.1: Rent for fishing gears by type in 2002 
Name of the village Type of gear Number of gear Rent per unit (tk) Total rent in tk. 
Kaimerbauli Keski jal 10 2500 25,000 
Kaimerbauli  6 (4+2) 600 
400 
  24,00 
    8,00 
Kaimerbauli Gura jal 43 240 (average) 10,424 









  2,000 
-do- Ghono Ber jal 4 600-700 24,75 
Dilalpur Dholla jal 3 4,000 12,000 
Boali Bhim jal 16 800 12,800 
 Kona jal 8 4,00 3,200 
 Dholla jal 1 2500 2,500 
 Keski jal 1 2500 2,500 
 Gura jal 45 500 22,500 
   Total 146,699 
 Source: Fieldwork in Krishnapur in 2001-2002 
Like other leaseholders, these fishers were also careful in protecting their fishing 
areas from ‘illegal’ fishing by fishers from other areas. They had their own security 
boats and guards and outside fishers were allowed to fish in their fishing areas after 
paying rent or sharing catch. While there were some tensions over outsiders fishing 
in leased areas, several multi-village committee members considered that allowing 
such fishing was a useful tactic as they themselves might need access to the fishing 
grounds of fishers from other areas. Also, they considered that fishers from other 
areas might become valuable allies in any future multi-village movements  
7.6.Conclusion 
The above discussion shows that Krishnapur fishers have very little direct access to 




Bajitpur and especially in Digheerpaar Union, a predominantly Koibortta 
administrative area, which includes Krishnapur. The dependence of Krishnapur and 
other fishers on working within a private auction leasing system where they are 
subordinate partners means they do not have secure and legally enforceable rights 
over fisheries. In addition, the Ministry of Land, the leasing authority, does not 
require local fishers, leaseholders or the District Administration to ensure the 
sustainable management of fisheries. It collects revenue from leasing, increases rents 
yearly to maximize revenue but does no development work. The Ministry of 
Fisheries and Livestock is more concerned about the sustainability of the fisheries but 
is politically subordinate to the Ministry of Land. While there are rules and regulation 
within the leasing documents relating to protection of fish stocks, these are not 
enforced. Thus, fishers and leaseholders do not feel any obligation to protect fish 
stocks. Leaseholders, who play a major role in the over-exploitation and destruction 
of resources, complain that the combination of increasing yearly rents and bribes paid 
to government officials compels them to demand greater rents from fishers. Fishers, 
in order to meet higher rents, fish more indiscriminately by taking all sizes of fish 
(which is illegal) using fine mesh nets which are banned but easily available in local 
markets.  
Within this hierarchical system, fishers’ of Krishnapur and other villages have used 
several strategies to gain access to a limited number of water bodies. One strategy has 
been to collectively lobby government to prevent the illegal leasing of open access 
water bodies, especially the free-flowing sections of local rivers. Another strategy has 
been to enter into informal and illegal sub-leasing and sub-sub-leasing arrangements 
with leaseholders within the wider system of formal leasing. To do this they have 
often drawn upon local village and multi-village networks which has enhanced their 
capacity to negotiate with more powerful local interests.  
The next chapter summarizes the main findings and conclusions of the study and 
discusses briefly the broader policy questions of sustainable rural livelihoods, food 
security and the growing impact of regional and global changes upon local fishing 




fisheries management regimes for increasing production, promoting a more equitable 
distribution of resources, and sustaining the livelihoods of local fishing peoples.
                                                 
Endnote 
 
1. ISPAN (1992, FAP-16) states that though there exist fisher cooperative societies in many areas, 
these cooperatives are in the name only. Local rich and influential people who get the lease of the 
water bodies using the cooperative societies as a front control them.  
  
2 . Sayar means tax/revenue on trade or water, and Sayar Jalkar means tax on the Jal Mahal 
 
3. The word wakf as per Islamic law has two meanings: i) inalienable lands belonging to the 
Government which are charitable, and ii) pious endowments with reference to the subject matter of 
trusts. 
 
4. Patty bandh is a massive and a very destructive fishing method mostly organized by the leaseholders 
themselves or their close associates in the rivers. According to the Fisheries Act of 1950, Patty bandh 
is strictly prohibited in open water fisheries. The leaseholders of Bengla-Charabadha Jolmohal, 
Digheerpaar Bosti Jolmohal and the Nagnarkhal Jolmohal also organize such Patty bandh fishing or 
sometimes they sub-lease certain sections of their fishery to the local specialized fishing groups for 




Summary and conclusion 
8.1.Summary 
A key issue facing both marine and inland artisanal fishers around the world today is 
that of ensuring secure and sustainable access to productive water bodies. This is 
particularly the case in many parts of South Asia where fishers have historically 
played a major role in supplying an important food item to large rural and urban 
populations but who are now increasingly subject to various environmental, 
economic and political pressures that threaten to undermine their ways of life. In 
South Asia over the past thirty years there has been a growth in the academic 
literature that documents these ways of life and the threats they face. These studies, a 
high proportion of which are of marine fishers, cover a range of issues such as the 
impact of new technologies upon traditional fishing practices, conflicts between 
small-scale fishers and trawling and industrial fishing, the physical risks and hazards 
of coastal fishing, the social organisation of fishing communities, environmental 
degradation of coastal and inland fishing grounds and growing state and global 
regulation of fishing activities. Two important research areas in which 
anthropologists have played an important role and which have constituted the central 
focus of the thesis, have been those of changing property rights regimes and their 
impact on fishers’ access to water bodies and the role played by indigenous fishing 
knowledge in the organisation and meaning of fishing practices.    
Academic interest in both these areas has been, in part, a reaction to models of 
modernisation that treated traditional fishing peoples as at best irrelevant to the 
modern world of fishing and at worst an obstacle to their modernisation, often 
defined as the introduction of highly capital-intensive fishing practices serving global 
markets for fish. These studies of property rights and of indigenous fishing 
knowledge have attempted to show that artisanal fishing peoples have ways of life 
worth preserving, albeit in a modified form and that they are capable of managing 




debate in the anthropological and related literature on these issues, some of which 
was reviewed in chapters two and three, and it was this debate that stimulated the 
present study. 
Chapter two argued that in the general and specialised literature on marine and inland 
fishing communities, there had been little ethnographic interest shown in inland open 
capture fisheries, particularly in Bangladesh, which contains some of the richest 
inland fishing grounds in the world and is home to some of the oldest fishing 
communities in the region. Furthermore, little was known of how these fishers gained 
access to and managed water bodies and the kinds of knowledge they possessed in 
organising their fishing practices. In the light of this neglect, it was argued that there 
was a need for a detailed ethnographic study of the Hindu Koibortta caste which 
constitutes the oldest and largest of the inland Hindu fishing communities in 
Bangladesh. The village of Krishnapur located in the Koibortta heartland was chosen 
for detailed study. 
Chapter three provided a brief historical account of the changing property rights 
regimes which have regulated Koibortta fishing activities since 1793. It was shown 
that under the British, Pakistani and Bangladeshi governments there were several 
legal and other changes in property rights which resulted in a removal of fishers’ 
customary common property rights in many lakes, land depression and river fisheries 
and the introduction of a state-directed privatisation of particular water bodies and 
their transfer to mainly wealthy and politically connected non-fisher leaseholders.  
Chapter four described the rich wetland environment of Northeast Bangladesh in 
which Krishnapur village is located and summarised the history of Koibortta 
settlement in the area. It showed how the village and its environs have been affected 
in recent decades by various environmental, economic, social and legal changes 
which have made fishers’ lives more insecure. Among the main environmental and 
demographic changes contributing to growing insecurity were siltation caused by 
flooding and run-off, water pollution and the reduction of water flow in the major 
river systems primarily because of the Indian Farakka Barrage, pesticide run-off from 




declining water bodies. Reinforcing these trends was the growing control of the 
diminishing water bodies by non-fisher interests. 
Chapter five provided a broad introduction to village life in Krishnapur. It showed 
that fishers own few assets, including land, and that they attempt to diversify their 
sources of income through various petty activities such as farm labouring and small-
scale trading. However, local opportunities are few and incomes from them low.  The 
village was shown to be stratified with a small minority of fishers and traders who 
own land, fishing gear and other assets, control local fish trading networks and 
organise group fishing, hiring fish workers from Krishnapur and other villages. 
Women play important if subordinate roles providing ancillary services such as net 
making, itself a declining activity. They did not fish, except for some hook fishing 
close to the shore. Finally, relations between Hindu fishers and their Muslim 
neighbours were discussed. While relations were generally good, the Hindu fishers of 
Krishnapur regard themselves as a religious and economic minority in the region and 
as such were sometimes subject to political and economic pressure which 
occasionally resulted in violence and looting of properties. Their minority status also 
made them cautious in their dealings with leaseholders, the majority of whom were 
Muslim.  
Chapter six focused on the indigenous fishing knowledge of the villagers of 
Krishnapur and examined in detail the main kinds of fishing activities engaged in, 
including types of fishing gear used, the relationship between fishing activities and 
types of water bodies, the size of fishing parties, the main actors in the organisation 
of fishing parties and fish marketing and the financial and other relationships with 
fish traders and commission agents. It was shown that fishers are part of extensive 
production and marketing activities which extend all the way to the country’s main 
cities and even overseas. Again, the Krishnapur fishers depend on non-fishers to 
dispose of their catches, which further increases their economic dependence in the 
absence of any fisher marketing cooperatives or other collective means to market  
catches. Finally the chapter looked at fishers’ knowledge of water bodies, fish 
movements, fish diseases and the various rituals which focused on ensuring fishers’ 




were shown to be embedded within specifically Bengali Hindu notions of the 
supernatural which helped define their identity as Hindus and as fishers.  
Some of the evidence presented in the chapter suggests that despite the many changes 
that have occurred in their fishing environment, Krishnapur fishers have managed to 
adapt to some of these changes through integrating them into their fishing practices 
and by widening their fishing networks to include fishers from other Hindu villages 
in the study area. For example, they have selectively adopted more sophisticated 
fishing gear such as current nets, modified traditional gear by using new synthetic 
fibres in their production, in some cases shifted to larger scale fishing using large 
nets, mechanized traditional boats, introduced freezing compartments into boat holds, 
and used artificial feed substances in sanctuaries to enhance fish growth. As a result, 
many fishers now utilize a variety of different fishing technologies, whereas they 
previously used a more limited number of capture methods.  
These technological and organisational changes again have developed in parallel with 
modified forms of credit arrangements between fishers, traders, commission agents 
and micro-credit agencies (largely used by women). For example, the shift to larger 
scale fishing, the introduction of freezing compartments and the greater use of 
mechanised boats to transport catches more quickly to markets, have generated a 
greater demand for loans from fish traders and commission agents. These changes 
have meant a greater integration of fishers into a nation-wide market for fish and fish 
products, which also extends overseas. The shift to more group fishing has required 
greater coordination of fishing effort which has resulted in a more complex division 
of labour and greater economic stratification in fishing parties. There has also been 
an extension of Krishnapur fishers’ relations with the growing number of Muslims 
who have entered fishing over the past 50 years.  
In the face of these changes, Krishnapur fishers have retained a strong sense of their 
identity as professional Hindu fishers of long-standing. An important means by 
which this identity has been maintained has been through their use of specifically 




Chapter seven examined the history of struggles since 1950 between Krishnapur and 
other fishers and Government authorities and leaseholders over access to local water 
bodies. This was followed by a description of present-day negotiations and conflicts 
between local fishers and the leasing authority and leaseholders. Finally, the chapter 
examined how Krishnapur and other local fishers used social networks linking 
lineages, wards, villages and clusters of villages to mobilise fishers and to negotiate 
with leaseholders to gain access to selected water bodies.  
Despite the use of local Hindu social networks of lineage, ward, village and clusters 
of villages, Krishnapur fishers have never been able to obtain secure and long-term 
direct control from the government over any significant or highly productive water 
bodies in the area. Rather, the only way they were able to gain limited access was 
through sub-leasing or sub-sub leasing of some of the sections of already leased 
water bodies, some of which were of lower productivity than sections retained by 
leaseholders. Three examples from two water bodies were given to illustrate the 
strengths and weaknesses of fishers’ collective efforts in gaining access and 
managing one lake and sections of a river.  
Part of the reason for fishers’ lack of success in establishing some form of 
community management was the failure of government to provide them with 
effective and continuing political and technical support. This was illustrated in the 
case of cooperative societies where government made no effort to ensure that such 
cooperatives were established and run effectively by fishers themselves or that they 
had sufficient finances from their own members to pay for leases. What usually 
happened was that non-fishers financed what were, in fact, fake cooperatives, 
sometimes in collusion with fishers’ leaders. Government and NGO bodies provided 
no support for capacity building or technical staff to work with fishers to improve 
their fishing practices.  
Another example of government failure to support fishers was the 1995 decision by 
the BNP Government to allow open access on flowing rivers. This populist move, 
which was aimed at convincing fishers that the government was pro-fisher, had a 
contrary impact. Both fishers and non-fishers saw this as an opportunity to fish at will 




conflicts between fishers and non-fishers and even among fishers themselves. Hindu 
fishers, in particular, felt very insecure as they were pressured not to fish in many 
river sections that they had fished previously. This open access policy did not last in 
many of the free flowing sections of the rivers because the Ministry of Land 
experienced a drop in its official leasing revenues and wished to recuperate those 
losses. Also, many local officials connected to the Ministry were deprived of 
lucrative illegal commissions from leasing.  
Many of the changes described in the thesis point to the declining economic and 
political status of Hindu fishers in Bangladesh and their growing dependence on the 
majority Muslim community. They rely increasingly on patron-client relations with 
leaseholders, the majority of whom are Muslim and strongly linked to government 
officials and politicians. The changes they have made in their fishing practices and 
organisation of fishing through the use of new technologies and through drawing on 
long-standing social networks in their relations with the powerful interest groups that 
control fishing leases have helped them adapt to changing political and economic 
realities. However, this adaptation has not given them greater long-term security of 
access to fishing grounds. Without such security, something that requires greater 
national and local government commitment to implementing community-based 
management systems, the Koibortta fishers of Krishnapur will remain a relatively 
poor and socially stigmatised religious, economic and political minority.   
8.2. Conclusion 
Among the various questions raised by the thesis, two are of particular importance 
and relate to the capacity of small-scale fishers to manage collectively their own 
resources. One is to what extent  are small-scale fishers like those of Krishnapur 
village capable of managing their fishing resources and the second is to what extent 
they can do this in a more sustainable and equitable way than under other 
management systems such as private leasing or state fisheries? 
With regard to the first question, the evidence from two of the case studies suggests 
that fishers possess variable capacity to manage their own resources. In the case of 




fish catches in an agreed manner and accommodated a large number of fishers from 
several local villages to fish on a small area. To achieve this they drew on multi-
village and other social networks. However, they were unable to retain control of the 
water body for more than three years as they lacked sufficient funds to pay the lease 
and bribe money; were often indebted to commission agents who sold on their 
catches; were subject to looting of catches and illegal fishing by political hooligans 
backed by local leaseholders and their supporters; and were given no legal, financial 
and physical protection by government and non-government organisations.  
In the case of the informal sub- and sub-sub leasing arrangement with the primary 
leaseholder, they drew on collective bargaining skills developed over a long period, 
arranged the distribution of catches with the leaseholder and sub-leaseholder and 
member fishers, and through village and multi-village level discussions decided on 
catch shares, rent for specific gear and fishing spots.  However, this was on a limited 
scale and was, in fact, an illegal arrangement which reduced fishers’ longer-term 
security. Also, informal leasing was much more expensive than formal leasing and 
drained their financial resources rapidly.  
These examples show that in a few instances fishers did gain access to particular 
water bodies, were able to exert a degree of autonomy from leaseholders and others 
in organising fishing activities and possessed the fishing skills and knowledge to earn 
a modest living. What they lacked was an institutional framework that provided 
financial, logistical and legal incentives to support their longer-term and more secure 
control of productive water bodies. This observation lends support to other studies of 
fisheries in Bangladesh which point to a lack of governmental support at all levels, a 
failure to take into account broader ‘community’ interests that go beyond fishers (the 
multi-stakeholder approach), a history of poor conflict management resolution 
mechanisms, and a lack of a well defined communities and water bodies over which 
territorial rights are to be exercised as among the key factors in fishers’ lack of 
success in managing collectively fish and fish resources.  
Whether Krishnapur fishers can manage their resources more equitably and 
sustainably; that is, in such a way as not to undermine the fish carrying capacity of 




modern times Krishnapur fishers have rarely had direct control over any local fishing 
grounds for a sufficiently long period to demonstrate their capacity as fair and 
environmentally responsible managers. The limited evidence presented suggests that 
in those instances where Krishnapur and other local fishers drew on local social 
networks to mobilise fishers and organise fishing activities, many fishers expressed 
satisfaction with the allocation of catches. However, such allocations were always 
within an asset ownership framework which favoured the better-off fishers with 
larger nets and better boats.  
Whether Krishnapur fishers can manage their fishing resources sustainably is less 
clear. Many fishers said their and other’s fishing practices were putting a 
considerable strain on the carrying capacity of the various water bodies they fished. 
However, within the existing property rights regime, they considered that they had 
little choice but to catch as many fish as possible in order to survive. Krishnapur 
fishers’ fishing effort was only a small component of a much larger body of fishers 
and ‘outsider’ interests such as leaseholders, traders and government officials. To 
assess properly  Krishnapur fishers’ impact on fish stocks and the broader carrying 
capacity of particular water bodies would require a more comprehensive, 
comparative and multi-disciplinary analysis of the relationship between fishing 
practices, fish stocks, broader environmental changes and the wider national and 
international political economy of fisheries than was possible in this study. Such an 
analysis should be given high research priority. 
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APPENDIX 1.1: INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
   Participants in the Study of Inland Fishers Community 
My name is Saifur Rashid and I am currently enrolled in PhD studies at Curtin University in the School of Social Sciences. To 
the best of my knowledge, the fishers of Bangladesh are one of the most important occupational groups but until recently the 
policy makers, planners and researchers largely ignored them. Still there is still no ethnography on inland fisher community of 
Bangladesh.  Thus the primary objective of the present ethnographic study is to provide a detailed ethnographic report on an 
important but little researched fishing community of Bangladesh. The data and their analysis under this study will be of 
particular value in uncovering the different social, economic, political and environmental aspects of the fishing community. It 
will also help to know how professional fishers construct and organize their fishing environments; the nature and organization 
of their production process with its gender, class and age based aspects and to know the ways in which fishers organize their 
access to water bodies and their relationships with leaseholders, traders, farmers and other non-fishers intermediaries. All the 
collected data and information will be used for writing the Ph.D. thesis and thereafter to publish articles and books prior to the 
permission of the participants. The research findings will be of important for the future policy planners and development 
workers in making plan and taking development program for the betterment of the fishing people of Bangladesh.   
Information for this study will be collected during fieldwork through census, survey, interviews, formal and informal 
discussions and participant observation. A number of tools including camera, audio-visual recorder, diary / notebooks will be 
used for documentation. The interview will take place at a suitable time for both yourself and the researcher over a period of 
time. You will have sufficient time to verify the accuracy of the data analysis. 
During the interview you can decline to answer any question and request that tape-recorder to be turned off. No names will 
appear in the field notes or in the transcribed interview. Extracts of the interview may be used in the research report; however 
you will not be identified in any way. Your participation in giving interview is absolutely voluntary and you can withdraw at 
any time without any obligation. Every precaution will be taken to protect your anonymity. 
If you have any question or concern regarding the study please do not hesitate to contact me to the address given below. You 
may also contact my supervisor Dr. Bob Pokrant, Senior Lecturer in Anthropology, School of Social sciences, Curtin 
University of Technology, Perth, Western Australia. 
Participants Statement 
I, ---------------------------------, have read the above information relating to the study of inland fisher community. I understand 
the nature and intent of the study and have the opportunity to ask questions. I know where to direct future questions that I may 
have. I have received a copy of the consent form. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw 
myself at any time. 
Signed-------------------------------------- Participant Date------------------------------------- 
Signed--------------------------------------Researcher Date-------------------------------------
APPENDIX 1.2: THE BENCHMARK SURVEY OF KRISHNAPUR 
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In Out In Out In Out 
1                  
2                  
3                  
4                  
5                  
6                  
7                  
8                  
9                  
10                  
11                  
12                  
Occupation Code: Fishing-1, Agri-2, Labourer-3, Business-4, Service-5, Housewife-6, Boat Plyer-7, Rickshaw/ Van Puller-8,  
Fish trading- 9, Ijaradar-10, Aratdar-11, Unemployed-12, Others-13   
APPENDIX 2.1: MAJOR HINDU AND MUSLIM FISHING CASTES IN 
BENGAL/BANGLADESH 
Among the many fishing communities identified are the Hindu Koibortta/Kaivarta, Kewat, 
Mala/Jhala/Malo/Jhalo, Tyar/Tiwar (Rajbangshi), Pod, Das Shikari (Rasbangshi origin), Beua 
(Namasudra sub-caste), Jiani (Namasudra sub-caste in Bakergonj & Faridpur), Karal/Charal (a sub-
caste of Namasudra), Bind/Bindu, Bagdi, Patni (Ferrymen), Nadial, Mali/Mahuimale, 
Gonshi/Gunhre/Mollah, Lohati/Lohati-kuri, Barpar (sub-caste of Gonrhi), 
Mureari/Maryare/Mariyari, Mala and Surahiya/Kalwat-Mallah and Muslim Mahimal /Maimal 
/Mahemahal, Maheforash, Chaklai, Datiya/Dal atiya, Dhawa/Katwar, Gutiya/Jalia, Nikare, Jiani 
(Nikari in Rajshahi), Abdal (a branche of Bebajiya), Bebajiya/ Bediya/ Mal Baidya, Kunjara/Kunjra, 
Dohariya/Dohuriya, Pajar/Pazhra/Pajara (possibly Nikari), Chandal, Musalman Bugde, Machua and 
Magh (Pokrant, 1996a, 1996b).  
APPENDIX 3.1: FISHERIES POLICIES, REGULATION AND ACTS FROM 
1793-2004 
 Policy/ Regulation/Decision Year of 
adoption 
A. Fisheries policy/regulations/laws  
1. Permanent Settlement Act/ Zamindary System 1793 
2. Introduction of leasing system for navigable rivers or parts of the rivers  1859 
3. Fish Protection and Conservation Act. 1887, India 1887 
4. The Tank Improvement Act 1939 1939 
5 The East Bengal Protection and Conservation of Fish Act 1950 1950 
6. Abolition of Zamindary System/ Permanent Settlement Act under State 
Acquisition Act 1950 
1950 
7. Water body/ Jolmohol Management Policy of MOL 1950 
8. Leasing Priority to Fishers Cooperative Society 1965 
9. Transfer of Jolmohol to MOFL from MOL 1980 
10. Jolmohal returned to MOL from MOFL 1983 
11. Marine Fisheries Ordinance and Rules 1983 
12. Fish and Fish Product (Fish inspection and quality control ordinance 1983) 1983 
13. Jolmohol up to 20 acres transferred to Upazila Parishad 1984 
14. New Fisheries Management Policy 1987 
15 Declaration of open access to free flowing river fishery 1995 
16. Jolmohal (closed) up to 20 acres withdrawn from UpazilaoParishad and placed 
with MOYS 
1997 
17. National Fisheries policy 1998 
18. Ban on Shrimp Fry Collection from natural water 2000 
B Water Policy 1990 
C Environment Policy 1992 
D Land Use Policy 2001 




APPENDIX 3.2: FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES IN 
BANGLADESH  
Both governmental and international development organisations that are actively 
involved with fisheries management and development in Bangladesh include the 
Department of Fisheries (DOF), World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), DFID (Department for International Development, UK), United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), International Centre for Living Aquatic Resources 
Management (ICLARM), Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), 
Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), Ford Foundation, the World 
Conservation Union (IUCN) and others. Several projects between government 
organizations (GOs), non-government organisations (NGOs), and fishing 
communities have emerged out of these partnerships. Major development initiatives 
undertaken in the fisheries sector in last two decades include the Third Fisheries 
Project (TFP) (1991-96), the Second Aquaculture Project (1989-96), the Fourth 
Fisheries Project (FFP) (1998-2005), Community Based Fisheries Management 
Project (CBFM) Phase 1& 2 (1995-2006), Management of Aquatic Ecosystem 
through Community Husbandry (MAACH 1998-2003), Oxbow Lake Small Scale 
Fisheries Project Phase 1 & 2 (1989-1996), Fisheries Resources Development and 
Management under New Fisheries Management Policy (1999-2003) and the 
Empowerment of Coastal Fisher folk in Conservation and Management of Coastal 
Fisheries Resource for Food Security (2000-2004) (Coastal Fisheries) (Ali et al., 
2003). 
Some of these programmes and projects are supported technically and financially by 
the WB/DFID (1st through 4th Fisheries projects), ADB/IFAD (2nd Aquaculture 
Development Project), International Centre for Living Aquatic Resources 
Management (ICLARM) and the Ford Foundation. ICLARM in partnership with the 
Government of Bangladesh (represented by the Department of Fisheries) and a 
number of NGO’s (development organisations) namely BRAC, PROSHIKA, 
CARITAS, and Friends in Village Development Bangladesh, implemented a five-




objective of the program was to identify the fishery commons, develop local 
institutions and increase the participation of local fishers in the making and enforcing 
of resource use roles. The project also tested how to involve different local resource 
users (stakeholders) in the management of open water common property fisheries 
resources. The ICLARM community based fisheries management project helped in 
the development of local management committees that improve cooperation among 
the fishers and the wider community. This ensured that conflicts could be mediated 
before they became widespread (See Ahmed et al., 2002; Ahmed et al., 1995).  
The Bangladesh Fisheries Research Institute (BFRI) and the International Centre for 
Living Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM) have generated new and 
profitable technologies (farming systems involving species suitable for polyculture, 
monoculture, and integrated culture, e.g. fish–rice, fish–poultry–duck). Moreover, 
some of the demonstration projects have contributed significantly to the adoption of 
these and other technologies. Such projects include the Mymensingh Aquaculture 
Extension Project (MAEP) funded by the Government of Bangladesh and the Danish 
agency DANIDA, the North-western Fisheries Project funded by the UK agency 
DFID, and the efforts of NGOs. A large number of other NGOs have fish and shrimp 
culture projects with landless, small and marginal farmers, and the productivity of 
these ponds is usually higher than many privately managed ponds. These continued 
initiatives have certainly led to increase overall production as well as productivity of 
the culture fisheries. However, many of these efforts are localised, and their 
widespread adoption is hampered by the poverty of the fishermen and the lack of 









APPENDIX 3.3: FISHERS FIGHTING FOR FISHING GROUND 
 






APPENDIX 3.4: COURT INJUNCTION ON FISHING IN GHORAUTTRA 
RIVER 
 





APPENDIX 3.5: GENUINE FISHERS OBTAINED LEASE OF JOLMOHOL 
THROUGH MOVEMENT 
 






APPENDIX 4.1: FISHERIES RESOURCES IN MYMENSING & 
KISHOREGANJ   
The Eastern region of Bangladesh, the greater Sylhet and Mymenshing including 
Kishoreganj cover an area of approximately 24, 500 sq. km of flooplain land 
depressions. Kishoreganj District, where the study area Krishnapur is located has got a 
very large area of such depressions, rivers and estuaries and has significant 
contribution to the country’s total inland fish production. According to the DOF 
statistics of 1999-2000, Mymensingh including kIshoreganj was on the first position 
among ten top inland fish producing districts of Bangladesh and in that year, it had 
100666 mt of total inland fish catch, of which river catch was 8309 mt, floodplains 
catch was 73,479 mt (highest compare to other districts) and lake and land depressions 
catch was 18,878 mt (2nd highest after Sylhet 27,217 mt). 
APPENDIX 5.1: SOME BASIC INFORMATION ON THE STUDY AREA  
Name of the village Krishnapur 
Name of the Upazila Bajitpur 
Name of the District Kishoregonj 
Agro-Ecological Zone  Sylhet Haor Basin (Bhati Anchal/ Bhati Elaka)) 
Geographical rgion North-East Region 
Water region Wetland/ Floodplains Region 
Fisheries rgion Inland Open water Capture Fisheries  
Types of local water bodies  River, Depression,  Lake and Floodplains 
Name of the local major 
water bodies 
Ghorauttra Nadi, Chara Badha Fishery, Joanshaher, Adkubla & 
Bedelatshwar Haor, Bengla & Digha Lake.Krishnapur  fishermen mostly 
fish in Ghorauttra River, Charabadha Fishery, Joanshah Haor and Bengla 
Lake)   
Name of the fishing communities 
 under Study 
Koibortta (Hindu) 
Name of other local fishing communities  Jalo, Malo, Tyor, Barman and Namasudra 
Total number of fishing population 
 in the locality 
10,000 (Approx) 
Name of the major fishing Villages  
depend on the same local fisheries resources 
Goradhora, Kaimarbali, Mialdi, Digeerpar, Shobharampur, Krishnapur, 
Kokrail, Kachuakhala, Noagaon, Shibpur, Boalia, Gupinathpur, Dilalpur, 
Maichchar, Noahata, Homairpur 
Total Number of Population and 
 number of Households in the Village 




Total number of Koibortta fishing 
 families in the Village 
82.45percent (Live in six Paras/ Hati)  
Total number of Muslim fishing 
 households in the village 
17.55percent (Live in one Para)  
Major activities related to fishing Fish Catching, Fish Trading, Fish Drying, Net Making, Fishing Boat 
Making,  
Name of the NGO’s working in the area BRAC, PROSHIKA, RAC, MUM, POPPY, DAMCO, Grameen Bank 
Local informal social body of the  
fishing Communities 
Lineage, Ward/village committee & Multi-village committee 
Total area of the study village 1.5 Sq.Km 
Total population in Bajitpur Upazilla & Digirpar 
Union 
197,081 & 34,018 (Census 1991) 
 
Total para in the village 7 (6 are absolutely Hindu Paras and only 1 is Muslim Para) 
Total Muslim and Hindu population in Bajitpur 
Upazila 
Muslim: 172432, Hindu: 22631 (1991) 
 
Total Muslim & Hindu population 
 in Digheerpaar Union 
Muslim: 27117, Hindu: 6075 (1991) 
Source: Fieldwork in Krishnapur in 2001-2002 





 First Day Second Day Third Day 
Breakfast Panta bhat with pura  morich 
& salt 
Panta with pura morich Panta & pura 
morich 
Lunch Bhat with choto/ gura  maach 
& sobji 
Rice with gura maach & 
sobji 
Bhat with gura 





 Dinner Repeat Repeat Repeat 
Breakfast 
 
Panta & morich Pant & morich No food 
Lunch 
 






Repeat Repeat Ruti & gura maach 
Breakfast 
 
Ruti & gur Muri & gur Panta  & morich 
Lunch 
 





















Bhat & sutki Repeat with milk Repeat with milk 
Breakfast 
 
Panta & sutki varta Ruti & gur Ruti & gur 
Lunch 
 
Bhat & sutki Bhat, sutki varta & misti 
kumra 






Ruti & sutki Repeat Bhat & dal 
Breakfast 
 
Ruti & gur Muri & gur Muri & gur 
Lunch 
 
Bhat, banana & milk Bhat, gura maach and 
okra 






Ruti & banana Bhat & dal Repeat 
Breakfast 
 
Ruti & gur Muri & gur Muri & gur 
Lunch 
 
Bhat, sutki varta & misti 
kumra 



















Bhat & dal Bhat, sutki & sobji Bhat, maach, dal 
& milk 
Panta bhat: left over rice with water & salt, Chotomaach/gura maach/panchmishali: it includes puti, 
mola, keski, baim, baila, chanda and other small fish varieties, Ruti: home hand made flat bread from 
low quality flour (ata), Gur: indigenous sweet made of sugarcane, Muri: popped rice, Dal: lentil/pulse, 
Sutki: dry fish mostly made of bad quality fish (rotten), most common sutki is puti/ sidal. Sutki is 
generally eaten as varta (sutki smesh with some strong spices like red chillies, onion and others) or as 






APPENDIX 6.1: AVAILABLE FISH SPECIES WITH UNIT PRICE (KLGM) 
2001-2002  
 
Local name               National Name                     Scientific Name         Price Per kg. 
Rou Rui/Ruhi Labeo rohita 60-170 Tk 
Kailla 
Baus 
Kali baus Labeo kalbasu !00-150 Tk 




Mirgal, Mirga Cirrhinus mrigala 40-50 Tk. 
Chanda Lal Chanda (Glassy 
fish) 
Chanda ranga 30 – 40 Tk. 
Koi Koi (Climbing perch) Anabus testudineus 60 – 100 Tk. 
Kaikka Kaikka, Kakila 
(Garfish) 
Xenenatodon cancila 50-60 kg. 
Jat puti Jat puti, Bhadiputi 
(puti) 
Puntius sophore 20 – 30 Tk. 
Chailpa Chapila (River shad) Gadusia chapra 50 –  60 Tk. 
Ilsha Ilsha, Ilisha, Hilsha Hilsa Ilisha 70-100 Tk 
Daira Mini, Roina, Bheda Nandus nandus 40 – 50 Tk 
Futka Patka, Tepa Tetraodom cututia Local people do 
not eat this fish 
Buzuri Bozori tengr (tengra) Mystusaptengra 50 – 60 Tk 
Aire 
(Gagat) 
Aire Mystus aor 50 - 100 Tk 
Gaura Ghaura Clupisoma gaura 60 – 80 Tk 
Gulsha Gulsha, Kabashi 
tengra 
Mystus caasius 60 – 80 Tk 
Rita Rita Rita rita 100 - 150 Tk 




Local name               National Name                     Scientific Name         Price Per kg. 
Eloin Silong Silonia silondia 40 – 50 Tk 
Fangas Pungas Pangasius pangasius 120 - 180 Tk 
Kechki Kachki Corica soborna 50 – 60 Tk 
Paibba Pabdah Ompok pabda 100 - 110 Tk 
Kanla Falli, Foloi 
(Gey feltherback) 




Notoptenus chitala 70 – 100 Tk 
Koilla Khalisha (Gaiant 
gourami) 
Collisa fasciatus 30 – 40 Tk 
Chela Chela,narkalichela Salmostoma bacaila  
Ing Shing, shingi Heteropneustes fossilis 100 – 120 Tk 
Magur Magur Clarias batrachus 100 – 120 Tk 
Bosa Bacha Eutropichthys vacha 80 –110 Tk 
Boal Boal Wallago attu 50 – 100 Tk 
Kajuli Kajuli Ailia coila 60 – 80 Tk 
Chirha Gochi Mastacembelus 30 – 50 Tk 
Tarabaim Tarabaim (one stripe 
spinycel) 
Macrognathus aculeatus 60 – 70 Tk 
Barabaim Shalbaim Mastacembelus armatus 80 – 120 Tk 
Ladi 
Bhabani 
Rani Botia dario 100 – 120 Tk 
Gutum Gutum Lepidocephalus guntea 50 – 60 Tk 
Sjoil/Shoal Shoal Styriped 
snakehead) 
Channa striatus 40 – 60 Tk 
Ladi Taki, Lata 
Spotted snakehead) 
Channa punctatus 30 – 50 Tk 
Kanohona
ni 




Local name               National Name                     Scientific Name         Price Per kg. 
Bailla Bele Glossogobnius giuries 50 – 70 Tk 
Elong Elang Rasbora clanga 40 – 50 Tk 
Mashol Mohashol Tor putitora .Extict. 
Kalla Malla 
(Freshwater mullet) 
Mugil corsula 40 – 60 Tk 
Gila 
painna 
Lohasura, Dhipali Rohtee cotio .Not available 
Gainna Ghainna, Kurchi Labeo gonius 40 – 60 Tk 
Nandin Nandina, Nandil Labco nandina Rare species 
Kharchona Fulchela Salmostoma phulo 50 – 60 Tk 
Khash 
khaira 
Kashkhaira Chela lauduca 50 – 60 Tk 
Chanda Nama chanda chanda Chanda nama 40 – 50 Tk 
Ektoitta/Sh
obol 
Ekthota (half beak) Hyporhamphjus gaimarde 30 – 40 Tk 
(Rare species) 
Bamosh Bamosh/Bao Anguilla bengalensis 150 – 200 Tk 
Beushi Guizza Air, Talla 
Air(Giant river 
catfish) 
Mystus seenghala 60-80 Tk (rare) 
Nagori 
bacha 
Muribacha Clupisoma muries 70 – 80 Tk 
Alone Batashi (Indean 
potasi) 
Pseudeutropius atherinoides 40 – 50 Tk 
Ugal Cheng, Telo Taki Channa orientalis 20 – 25 Tk 
Bagai Baghair (Gangetic 
goonch) 
Bagarius bagarius 30 – 100 Tk 
Gagla Kutkanti Hara hara 60-80 Tk (rare) 
Nahit Napit, Koi Bandi badis badis 50-60 Tk (rare) 
Bengra Cheka, Chega (Indean 
chaca) 









Somileptes gongota 60 – 70 Tk 
Sada 
Gutum 




Galda chingri (Giant 
Frishwater prawn) 
Macrobrachium rosenbergil 1000 – 120 Tk 
Chada/Kal
a chingri 
Bagda chingri (giant 
tiger shrimp) 




(green tiger shrimp) 










Metapenaeus monoceros 100-150 Tk 
Sadha 
chingri 
Bara chama chingri 
(Rainbow shrimp) 
Parapenaaumpsis sculptilis Not available 
Icha gura Ruda chingri Paraeceopsis stylifera 40 – 60 Tk 
 
Some marine fishes available in the Local River 
Local name National Name Scientific Name Price Per 
kg. 





Koila Chan chanda (Moon fish) Mene macyulata 100-150 Tk 
Footka Potka (puffer fishj) Chelonodon patoca 20-30 Tk 
Kaikka Gang kakila (Black spot 
brgtom) 
Belone strong lurus 40-50 Tk 
Tel kupi Sadha datina (Lind silver 
grunter) 




Chela Karati chela (Wolf hering) Chirocentrus dorab 60-70 Tk 
Kolla Achila (Lizzard fish) Saurida tumbil 80 – 90 Tk 
Ashosh badami Diddut maachh 
(Tropedo, Electric ray) 
Narcine brumac Extinct 
Kahs Khauri Chukya (big eye  ilish,jewelled 
shad) 
Ilish filigera 50 – 60 Tk 
Poma/Poa Lalpoa (silver ponnah cruaker) Johnius argentatus 30 – 40 Tk 





Mashul Sonalilbata (Goat fish) Upencus sulphurcus Rare spices 
Goong Sukura (Tripod fish) Tricanthus 
brevirostris 
























APPENDIX 7.2: FISHERS’ APPLICATION TO THE MINISTRY OF LAND 
Tapas Kanti Das, a member of Baliardi union parishad along with other fisher leaders 
put another application (9/7/2001) on behalf of the fishers of a number of local 
villages to the State Minister of Land for declaring 613.92 acres of free flowing river 
areas of Bengla as open fisheries basing on the field investigation report of the 
Revenue Deputy Collector (dated 28/4/2001) submitted to District Commissioner 
and the recommendation letter forwarded to the Ministry of Land by the District 
Commissioner (circular no:868 S.A.Ja.Ma). A estimation of production was also  
given by Rasha Raj Das, Secretary, Digheerpaar Charabadha Matsyajeebee Samity, 
Noagao, Patuli, Bajitpur in 27/01/2000 (circular no: 868 S.A.Ja.Ma, Total area: 
1334.07 acres, Mouzas: Digheerpaar, Sharsher Dighee, Patuli, Dilalpur, and 
Kaimerbauli. 
Name of the representative Name of the village 
Tapas Kanti Kaimerbauli 
Anil Chandra Das Kachuakhala 
Anil Chandra Boali 
Sumeshwar Das Kaimerbauli 
Sunil Chandra Dilalpur 
Nagendra Chandra Dilalpur 
Shambhu Chandra Goradhara 
Shambhu Das Boali 
Promud Das Boali 
Gourilal Das Krishnapur 
Khitish Das Krishnapur 
Nagendra Chandra Das Krishnapur 
Ranajit Das Krishnapur 
Kalicharan Das Shibpur 
 
Bengla-Charabadha fishery with a total area of 1334.07 acres covers the Mouzas: 
Digheerpaar, Sharsher Dighee, Patuli, Dilalpur, Kaimerbauli J.L No: 07, 09, and 31. 
Of these 1334.07 acres of Jolmohol, about 600 acres (1500 bighas) of the fisheries 
are fish production area. 200 kg of fish can be produced in each bigha of this 
production area. If average price of 1kg fish were 100 tk, then total return from 1 




300,0000tk (3 Crore).  They mentioned that in the fisheries, they will have 3 files (1 
file is counted for 3 years) and 1 small file/t file (locally called kacha file) in 10 
years period of time and will produce altogether about 10.5crore taka fish. Thus 
total cost for 10 year period of time would be 7.2 crore taka (as per their 
estimation). About 5 crore taka will be spent for the development of fishing 
ground/sanctuaries with bamboo, forestation and others. Taka 1 crore will be spent 
for paying the lease money and another 1.2 crore for fish feed, security and others. 
APPENDIX 7.3: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF SOME 
LEASEHOLDERS OF BAJIPUR   
Name of the person Place from Social background 
Kanchan Mia     Kuliarchar Industrialist/Fish Exporter 
Kader Mia Bhairab Fish Trraders/ Aratders 
Monaem Kha Homairpur Was a minister 
Mohananda Babu Austagram Fish Traders/ Fishing Party 
Mr. Monju  Digheerpaar/Bajitpur Member of the Parliament 
Aziz Mia Digheerpaar/Bajitpur Local Awami League Leader 
Mr. Khurshed Alam Bajitpur Construction Contractor 
 
APPENDIX 7.4: LIST OF FISHERS’ ASSOCIATION OF BAJITPUR 
According to the information given by Thana Fisheries Officer, there are 14 
fisher’s samities in Bajitpur. Of these, following are the majors:  
1 Krishnapur Matsyajeebee Samabay Samity Limited  
2 Boali Matsyajeebee Samabay Samity Limited  
3 Kaimerbauli Matsyajeebee Samabay Samity Limited  
4 Dilalpur Matsyajeebee Samabay Samity Limited  
5 Goradhora Matsyajeebee Samabay Samity Limited  
6 Digheerpaar-Charabadha Matsyajeebee Samabay Samity Limited  
7 Chatirchar Matsyajeebee Samabay Samity Limited  
8 Noahata Matsyajeebee Samabay Samity Limited  




Most of these fishers associations are formed and financially backed by the 
leaseholders, who are generally the local business and political elites, fish arotdars 
(traders) and moneylenders. 
 
APPENDIX 7.5: KISHOREGONJ DC’S CIRCULAR FOR LEASING WATER 
BODIES 
District Commissioner has the authority to lease out the water bodies (jolmohol) and 
sand belt (balumohol of above 20acres. In this connection, Revenue Section of the 
District Commissioner office of Kishoregonj issued a circular on “Sayrat Mohol 
Leasing” (1/98) on 5/3/1998 for leasing out their jolmohols for 3 year period of time 
and the balumohols for 1 year period of time from the Bengali year 1405 to 1407 
under the following conditions. Leasing of Digheerpaar Bosti Jolmohol was done 
under these conditions and Gourilal Das as the President of Krishnapur Matsyajeebee 
Samabay Samity Ltd obtained that lease for 3-year period of time from 1405-1407. A 
detailed description of the conditions of that leasing process has been given below: 
1. First day of the tender will be confined within the registered fishers’ cooperative 
societies. All the samities that intend to participate in leasing process should attach 
their registration documents obtaining from the district/ Thana cooperative officer. 
Applications submitted by secretary/ president of the samities will be accepted. But in 
the following tender, both samity and individual can participate. For individual 
application, applicant should mention his name/address correctly and attach one letter 
of introduction from the chairman of the union parishad. 
1. One can purchase tender schedule before the first day of tender dropping. 
Tender schedule price for the lease price of below 5lac taka jolmohol/ 
balumohol is 200 (cash & non-refundable) and above 5lac is Tk.500 (cash & 
non-refundable). Tender schedule can be purchased from Divisional 
Commissioner Office, Dhaka and District Commissioner office, Revenue 
Section, Kishoregonj and all TNO offices. 
2. On the tender dropping day, tender can be dropped in the tender box kept in 
the District Commissioner office, Revenue Section and all the TNO offices by 




tender droppers. But tender committee meeting will be held at the District 
Commissioner office. 
3. Every tender dropper has to attach a pay order/ bank draft of 10% value of the 
lease price withdraws able from any commercial bank of Kishoregonj in 
favour of District Commissioner, Kishoregonj. Highest bidder has to pay 50% 
of the tender price after acceptance of his tender and the rest 50% within the 
next 7 days. After the payment of full amount, there will be one lease 
agreement between the lessee and the leaseholder. For the jolmohol, 
leaseholder has to pay the lease money for the following years just before one 
month of following year. 
4. If the bidding price does not exceed minimum 25% of the previous lease price, 
tender will not be accepted. 
5. Sayrat Mohols, which have court cases and have injunctions from the 
Ministry, will not be leased out until any further decisions. 
6. Information regarding Sayrat Mohols topsil, location, and lease price for the 
year, information regarding court cases, ministry injunction, name of the sayrat 
mohol and other conditions of leasing can be obtained from the District 
Commissioner office, Revenue section in any working day. 
7. Leaseholder, in any situation, cannot sublease the jolmohal or any part of the 
jalmohal and successful bidder has to accept the lease of the jolmohal 
according to the given conditions. Before submitting the tender, tender dropper 
should visit the Jalmohol/ Balumohol. Any objection after bidding the tender 
will not be accepted. 
8. Every leaseholder should abide by all the present rules of the government 
related to the leasing of jalmohols and also any further future decision related 
leasing of sayrat mohol. 
9. Samities or individuals who did not pay the lease money in time during their 
previous leasing period, their tender for further leasing will not be accepted. 
10. The authority preserves the right to accept any tender and also has right to 




11. Officially leasing period will start from 1st Baishakh, even if it is done in the 
middle of the year. Leaseholder has to consider that time/period, which has 
already been past. Every samity or individual who obtain the lease will have to 
pay 3% tax/revenue according to the government recent decision. 
 
APPENDIX 7.6: A FIELD REPORT ON THE FISHERIES DISPUTE 
To resolve that dispute, District Commissioner Revenue asked a field report from 
Assistant Commissioner of Land, Bajitpur and in the field report of A.C Land 
(10/6.1997, Circular no: 258), it was suggested that for better management, Bengla-
Charabadha fisheries should be divided into 3 different jolmohols within different 
mouzas and dags. On the basis of that report, Deputy Commissioner of Kishoregonj 
issued a circular that separate leasing of these 3 Jolmohols will be implemented from 
the Bengali year1404. The mouza and dag distribution of those jolmohols were also 
given in that circular.  
APPENDIX 7.7: MAJOR LINEAGES IN KRISHNAPUR 
Other Hindu lineages are Das Gwati, Company Gwati, Haranath Gwati, Rashik Lal 
Gwati, Shukdev Gwati, Banabashi Gwati, Hiralal Gwati, Chandra Dhars Gwati, 
Gagan Chandra Gwati, and Mohesh Gwati. The Muslim ward has 5 lineages which 
are Damor Bari Gwati, Inter Bari gwati, Prema Gwati, Bhola Miar Gwati and Kashi 
Barir Gwati. 
APPENDIX 7.8: MULTI-VILLAGE REPRESENTATIVES OF KRISNAPUR   
Krishnadhan, Girendra and Emrul for Kushahati, Jitendra and Joy Dev for 
Companyhati and Brojendra, Prodeep and Avinash for Borobarirhati. 
 
 
 
